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ART. 1.—THE MESSIAH'S SECOND ADVENT.\*

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THE Church of Christ has, from the first, been taught to expect a Second Personal Advent of the Messiah. In "the Apostle's Creed," the believer is wont to say: "I believe in Jesus Christ," who "was crucified, dead, and buried," who "rose again from the dead," "ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of God, the Father Almighty, from thence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead." In "the Nicene Creed," we are taught to say: "He ascended into heaven and sitteth on the right hand of God, and he shall come again with glory to judge both the quick and the dead,

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\* "An Inquiry into the Nature, Progress and End of Prophecy. By Samuel Lee, D. D." Cambridge, 1849.

"The Second Advent: or, What do the Scriptures teach respecting the Second coming of Christ, the End of the World, the Resurrection of the Dead, and the General Judgment. By Alpheus Crosby." Boston, 1850.

"Christ's Second Coming. Will it be Pre-Millennial? By the Rev. David Brown, A. M. St. James' Free Church, Glasgow. Second Edition." Edinburgh, 1849.

"Dissertations on the Prophecies relative to the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. By George Duffield, Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church of Detroit." New York, 1842.

"Outlines of Unfulfilled Prophecy: being an Inquiry into the Scripture Testimony respecting the 'Good Things to Come.' By the Rev. T. R. Birks, M. A., Rector of Kelsall." London, 1854.

"The Coming and Reign of Christ. 'The Kingdom of this World has become our Lord's.' By David N. Lord." New York, 1858.

whose kingdom shall have no end." To which "the Athanasian Creed" adds: "At whose coming all men shall rise again with their bodies, and shall give account for their own works." Thus uniformly has the church expressed her sense of the teachings of Scripture, in respect to the Second Coming of her Lord.

Whence does she derive the doctrine? Is it to be found in the writings of the old prophets, to whom was given the high honor of heralding, hundreds of years in advance, the coming of the Messiah of ancient prophecy, to fulfill the types of the Mosaic dispensation, and to deliver his people from their sins? Towards this one grand event, it must be confessed, all desire and expectation, as well as prediction, tended of old. It was the one great doctrine of their faith, on which rested all their hopes of eternal life. The glowing descriptions of peace, plenty, and prosperity; of the utter overthrow of the combined powers of darkness; and of the glorious and universal triumph of the principles of truth and righteousness, which so abound in the Hebrew oracles, had distinct reference, beyond all question, to the First Advent. All these benign and blessed results were to flow directly from that most stupendous of the miracles of grace—"God manifest in the flesh." The temple, seen by Ezekiel in vision, by which the first temple was to be supplanted, had respect to that more glorious and enduring structure of living stones, that "holy temple," that "habitation of God," which John afterwards describes, as "the Holy City, New Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband;" and, elsewhere as "the Bride, the Lamb's wife," to whom it "was granted that she should be arrayed in fine linen, clean and white;" whence he speaks of the glory of the Messiah's reign, under the imagery of a "marriage supper."\* What the old Hebrew seers beheld, in these visions, was simply the Messiah coming to inaugurate the new dispensation of the kingdom of grace; and, to their eyes, nothing could be more glorious. So grand were their anticipations of the blessedness that was to flow from this union of the divine and human in his person, that even their most glowing conceptions fell short of a full expression of their joy and exultation, in view of the wonderful work of Redemption.

That these messengers of the Divine will and purposes had any distinct perception of a Second Advent, or any

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\* Apoc. xxi., 2, 9, xix., 8, 9.



thought of such an event, is by no means certain. Nor is it at all certain that what they saw and described is to be interpreted of any such event. That their language may be so accommodated and applied, however much we may be disposed to grant, does not at all necessitate such an application; it is only what is constantly occurring. Resemblances and identity are carefully to be distinguished,—and nowhere more than in prophecy. It is to be ascertained that “the resemblance be not only good, but that it be proved, by some other considerations, to constitute an identity with the event, &c., supposed to be foretold. Because, without such check as this, since resemblances are extremely pliant things, and are easily made to bend to the will of their authors, they may be found, perhaps, in a thousand other things, equally satisfying, and equally applicable to such prediction.”\* Something more than accommodation is wanted. What was the intent of the prediction? What particular event, or series of events, was it designed to foreshow?

Nothing can be more obvious, than that all these Old Testament predictions, relative to Christ and his church, were originally understood of the First Advent.† The coming of Christ in the flesh, and his sacrifice of himself for sin, and the subsequent triumphs of his gospel, were regarded as the fulfillment of the Law and the Prophets. Triumphantly, both the Saviour and his Apostles made their appeal to these testimonies—“Of which salvation, the prophets have inquired and searched diligently, who prophesied of the grace that should come unto you, searching what, or what manner of time the Spirit of Christ which was in them did signify, when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ, and the glory that should follow—unto whom it was revealed, that, not unto themselves, but unto us they did minister the things, which are now reported unto you by them that have preached the gospel unto you with the Holy Ghost sent down from Heaven.”‡ Aside from the teachings of the New Testament, no one would now think, as no one before the ministry of our Lord ever did think, of finding the doctrine of the Second Advent in the writings of the Old Testament. Any application of those ancient predictions to this event is nothing more than conjecture—in most cases, mere fancy—in no case

\* Lee's Inquiry, viii.

† “*Omnes hujusmodi repromissiones, juxta Judaeos et nostros Judaizantes, in mille annorum regno putantur esse complendae: Nos autem . . . in primo adventu Christi spiritualiter impleta defendimus, et impleta ex parte, non ex toto.*” Hieron, in Jeremiam, 31, 27.

‡ 1 Pet, i, 10, 12.

reliable. If the doctrine is found there at all, it is only in terms the most general, as the dim vista of the obscure horizon.

It was only when our Redeemer, in the last year of his earthly ministry, began to speak to his disciples of his early departure from the earth, and of a subsequent return, personally and visibly, to the scene of his conflict, to receive his crown, that the doctrine of a Second Advent was clearly stated and defined. What we know of it we learn from his own declarations, and from the teachings of his apostles. To the disciples themselves, it was evidently a novel doctrine. They received it with unfeigned surprise. They could scarcely be reconciled to the idea of his leaving them for a season only, though assured of his gracious re-appearing. Not until the event had verified their Lord's declaration, would they believe in his departure from the earth without the inauguration of a temporal and universal kingdom.

Directing our attention, therefore, exclusively to the New Testament, as our only reliable guide, let us see what it was that Christ and his disciples taught in regard to his Second Advent. Just before his transfiguration, in the last year of his ministry, "he began to teach them that the Son of Man must suffer many things," "and be killed, and after three days rise again;" and that subsequently, "the Son of Man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his angels, and then he shall reward every man according to his works," adding—"There be some standing here, which shall not taste of death, till they see the Son of Man coming in his kingdom."\* Occasional allusions to this event, from this time forward, appear to have been introduced, to prepare them the better for his departure. "The Son of Man cometh at an hour when ye think not." "Even thus shall it be in the day when the Son of Man is revealed." "When the Son of Man cometh shall he find faith on the earth?"†

In the interpretation of the parable of the tares,‡ he had taught his disciples that "the harvest is the end of the world," [συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος.] These two things—the end of the world, and the Second Coming of their Lord—became closely associated in their minds with the calamities that, as their Master had assured them, were coming upon their city and nation; as appears from the inquiries made by four of their number, "as he sat upon the Mount of Olives, over against the temple." "Tell us," said they,§ "when shall these things be, and what shall be the sign of thy coming,

\* Mat. xvi. 21, 28. Mark viii. 31, 38. ix. 1. Lu. ix. 22-27.

† Lu. xii. 40. xvii. 30. xviii. 8.

‡ Mat. xiii. 39.

§ Mat. xxiv. 3, 27, 30, 34. Mark xiii. 3, 26, 30. Lu. xxi. 27, 32.

and of the end of the world?" To all which he replied, that his coming would be "as the lightning;"—that terrible convulsions, represented by the blotting out of the sun and moon, and the falling of the stars, were to ensue—"and then shall all the tribes of the earth [τῆς γῆς] mourn, and then shall appear the sign of the Son of Man in heaven; and they shall see the Son of Man coming in the clouds of heaven, with power and great glory." And, to limit the application of what he then said, he adds: "This generation [ἡ γενεὰ αὐτῆς] shall not pass [παρέλθῃ] till all these things be fulfilled." In the prosecution of his discourse, and in allusion to his previous declaration, already referred to, he says: "When the Son of Man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory, and before him shall be gathered all nations, [πάντα τα ἔθνη] and he shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats."\* In the description of the scenes that follow, reference, it is commonly thought, is made to the transactions of the Day of Judgment.

On the occasion of his last interview with the twelve before his decease, he said to them: "I go to prepare a place for you; and, if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and receive you unto myself; that, where I am, there ye may be also." "I will not leave you comfortless; I will come to you." "I go away, and come again unto you."† The same night, at the house of Caiaphas, he said to the high-priest,—“Hereafter shall ye see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven.”‡ Shortly before his ascension, he said of John, “If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee?”§

These, it is thought, are all the recorded sayings of our Lord, bearing directly on his Second Coming. How they were understood by his disciples may be gathered, not only from the questions proposed him by the four Galilean brethren on the mount of Olives, before his decease, but also from the inquiry made of him by the eleven after his resurrection: || “Lord, wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel?” They could not rid themselves as yet of the hope, so universally cherished by their nation, of a restoration of the ancient grandeur of their monarchy, as in the days of David’s son and successor. Nor were their views greatly modified by their Lord’s answer—while possibly they may have been confirmed by the words of the

\* Mat. xxv. 31, 32.

† John xiv. 2, 3, 18, 28.

‡ Mat. xxvi. 64. Mark xiv. 62. Lu. xxii. 69. § John xxi. 23. || Acts i. 6.

heavenly visitants, after his final disappearance: "This same Jesus, which is taken up from you into heaven, shall so [οὕτως] come in like manner [ὁν τρόπον] as ye have seen him go into heaven."\*

Clearer views of this great truth had dawned on the mind of Peter, under the influence of the Pentecostal baptism, when he addressed the people in Solomon's porch, and told them, that "times of refreshing shall come from the presence of the Lord, and he shall send Jesus Christ," "whom the heaven must receive until the times of restitution [ἀποκαταστάσεως] of all things, which God hath spoken by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began." Not until prophecy in all its completeness shall have been fulfilled, will Heaven be called to part with its glorious Monarch again, that he may revisit the scenes of his humiliation. Allusions to this event are of frequent occurrence in the writings of Paul: "Judge nothing before the time, until the Lord come, *i.e.*," as he intimates, to judge the world. He tells his brethren, that, at the Lord's supper, they "do shew the Lord's death till he come." "Christ's" people are to "be made alive" "at his coming;" and "then cometh the end." More expressly still, he says to the Philippians,— "Our conversation [πολίτευμα] is in heaven, from whence, also, we look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body." To the Colossians he says,— "When Christ, who is our life, shall appear, then shall ye also appear with him in glory." He reminds the Thessalonians, that they have been taught of God "to wait for his Son from heaven;" and tells them that "we, which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent [φθάσωμεν] them which are asleep. For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout," "and the dead in Christ shall rise first—then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air, and so shall we ever be with the Lord." The troubled are assured of rest, "when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of our Lord [Jesus Christ]," "when he shall come to be glorified in his saints." He bids them not to be deceived as to the time of this glorious Advent, since it is to be preceded by a remarkable apostasy

\* Acts I: 11.

[ἀποστασία] and the revelation of the "man of sin," "the son of perdition," the "wicked" one, [ὁ ἄνομος] "whose coming is after the working of Satan;" "the mystery of iniquity" being, however, "already" at "work," "whom the Lord shall consume with the spirit of his mouth, and shall destroy with the brightness of his coming." Timothy is reminded, that "the Lord Jesus Christ" "shall judge the quick and the dead at his appearing and his kingdom." Titus is told, that we should be "looking for that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ." The Hebrews are assured, that "unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time without sin unto salvation."\*

James exhorts his suffering brethren to "be patient unto the coming of the Lord," "for the coming of the Lord draweth nigh." Peter reminds his brethren, that their faith will be approved "at the appearing of Jesus Christ." In response to the taunting question of the scoffer,—“Where is the promise of his coming?”—he assures them, that the day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night; in the which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the works that are therein shall be burned up; and, therefore, urges them to be “looking for and hasting unto the coming of the day of God.” In the Apocalypse, the Redeemer is repeatedly spoken of, as he “which is to come,” [ὁ ἐρχόμενος.] The announcement is made—“Behold! he cometh with clouds; and every eye shall see him.” Again and again he says of himself,—“I come quickly”—“I come as a thief;” while “the Spirit and the bride” are heard responding,—“Come!” “Even so, come, Lord Jesus!”†

In these passages, the only ones that seem expressly to teach the doctrine of the Second Advent, that event is spoken of as a *παρουσία*, an *ἐπιφάνεια*, a *φανέρωσις*, an *ἀποκαλύψις*, or by some of the forms of the verb, *ἐρχομαι*; all of which terms are also used in relation to his First Advent. A portion of them must be interpreted, evidently, of the generation coeval with our Lord himself; while yet another portion seem to demand a reference to a period yet future—the completion of the fulfillment of all prophecy—“the end of the world.” [*συντέλεια τῶν αἰώνων*] the finish-

\* Acts iii. 21. 1 Cor. iv. 5. xi. 26, xv. 22, 23, 24. Phil. iii. 20, 21. Col. iii. 4. 1 Thess. i. 10. iv. 15, 16, 17. 2 Thess. i. 7, 8, 10. ii. 1, 3, 7, 8, 9. 2 Tim. iv. 1. Titus ii. 13. Heb. ix. 28.

† James v. 7, 8. 1 Pet. i. 7. 2 Pet. iii. 4, 10, 12. Rev. i. 4, 7, 8. iii. 11. iv. 8. xvi. 15. xxii. 7, 12, 17, 20.

ing of the ages—the winding up of the grand drama of redemption. In respect to the former, the terms are necessarily to be interpreted figuratively; in the case of the latter, a literal interpretation has uniformly, or with rare exceptions, been given; as seems to be required by the address of the two angels, on the occasion of the ascension.\*

It will serve, in some good degree, to shed light on modern discussions and controversies respecting the understanding of this doctrine, to review its history, and observe the various phases, which it has assumed during the long period since its promulgation.

A literal fulfillment of all these predictions, it is obvious, was expected in the days of the apostles. The glowing language of the Hebrew prophets, descriptive of the glory of the Messiah, the splendor of his reign, and the rapid extension of his terrestrial empire, was understood, not figuratively, but literally. It flattered the pride of the Jewish converts to be told and led to believe, that a redeemed and renovated Jerusalem was to be the metropolis of universal empire—the mistress of the world; that the children of Israel were to be gathered from their dispersions, and restored to their former homes, once more to be recognized as the peculiar treasure of Jehovah, and to be admitted to the first place in the court and counsels of the Great King. After a brief visit to his “Father’s house,” they looked for the return of the ascended Jesus, to inaugurate the last great monarchy, spoken of by Isaiah, and Micah, and Daniel; and to assume “the throne of his father David,” to “reign over the house of Jacob for ever.”† In connection with this triumphal Advent of the Messiah, his own teachings led them, for want of proper discrimination, to expect an entirely new dispensation of grace to be ushered in by the resurrection trump, and the final judgment.‡

A current and popular tradition had led them to believe in the speedy renovation of this mundane system. The world, it was said, was to endure, as it had been from the beginning, for six thousand years. Then a grand sabbatical period was to be ushered in, to continue at least a thousand years. The advent of this latter Millennium was to bring in the reign of the Messiah, and to introduce among men the utmost prosperity, peace and blessedness.

This expectation was based on the sayings of the Rab-

\* Acts i. 11.  
Lu. i. 32, 3.

† Isa. ii. 2-4. Micah. iv. 1-4. Dan. ii. 44. vii. 14, 27.

‡ Mat. xxiv. 3.



binical interpreters of the sacred oracles. Numerous citations from their recorded sayings are given by the learned Joseph Mede. He refers to what is said in the Gemara, or comment on the Mishna: "Rabbi Ketina says: Six thousand years the world endures; in the last it shall be destroyed." Again: "As the seventh of every seven years is a year of remission, so of every seven thousand years of the world, the seventh millenary will be a millenary of remission." The tradition of the house of Elias is: "Six thousand years the world is to stand, two thousand years, void; two thousand years, the Law; two thousand years, the days of the Messiah."\*

Of the origin of this tradition, David Gregory, the Oxford astronomer, gives this account: "In the first verse of the first chapter of Genesis, the Hebrew letter Aleph, which in the Jewish arithmetic stands for 1000, is six times found. From hence the ancient Cabalists concluded that the world would last six thousand years. Because, also, God was six days about the creation, and a thousand years with him are but as one day, therefore, after six days, i. e., six thousand years duration of the world, there shall be a seventh day, or millenary Sabbath of rest."† Rabbi Baal Katturim is represented to have said: "Six millenniums are found in the first verse of the book of Genesis, answering to the six thousand years of the world's continuance." Rabbi Gedaliah: "At the end of six thousand years the world shall return to its old state, 'without form and void,' and after that it shall wholly become a Sabbath." In a comment on Maimonides, it is said: "At the end of six thousand years will be the day of judgment, and it will, also, be the Sabbath, the beginning of the world to come. The Sabbath year, and the year of jubilee, intend the same thing."‡

It seems that this tradition had prevailed for hundreds of years before the advent of Christ, and antedated the Babylonish captivity. Traces of it are to be found among the writings of the disciples of Zoroaster in Persia, derived, in all probability, from the Jewish captives; as, also, among the teachings of the old Greek authors. Plutarch, in his treatise, 'De Iside et Osiride,' speaking of Ormuzd and

\*"The Works of the Pious and Profoundly-Learned Joseph Mede, B. D.," pp. 535, 6.

†Hale's Analysis of Chronology, I. 79. A characteristic specimen of this species of Cabalistic reasoning may be seen in what Barnabas says of the circumcision of his household. See our No. for January, 1864, pp. 43, 4.

‡An Essay towards a new Explication of the Doctrines of the Resurrection, Millennium and Judgment. By the Rev. Sayer Rudd, M. D., London, 1734, p. 369.



Ahriman, the offspring respectively of Light and Darkness, relates, that "Theopompus says, that, according to the doctrine of the Magi, these two gods are alternately to triumph and to be subdued, each for three thousand years; and that, during the next three thousand years, they will mutually contend, and the one will make war upon the other and destroy what he had accomplished. But, finally, the god of the lower world, Ahriman, shall be entirely vanquished. Men will then be happy."\*

Several ancient Greek authorities are cited by the Rev. John Jackson, the eminent chronologist, in support of similar statements: "It was an ancient tradition," he says, "which prevailed among the Greeks from the time of Orpheus, that there would be six generations or ages of the world's continuance, which they called *γενεαὶ* or *αιῶνες*; and reckoned each the term of a thousand years; and Plutarch cites a prophecy of Orpheus founded on this notion, that, in the end of the sixth generation or millenary, the world would be consumed with fire."† This use of the word *αιῶνες* sheds some light on the New Testament phrase, already referred to, *συντέλεια τῶν αἰώνων*, the completion of the ages.

The authority of this tradition cannot, in justice, be very highly estimated. It is not based, in the slightest, upon any claim of revelation. It is put forth simply as a conjecture, a fanciful interpretation, a cunning riddle. The cabalistic comment on the first verse of Genesis is beneath contempt. The only other basis for the tradition is the saying of Moses: "A thousand years in thy sight are as a day, [בַּיּוֹם] yesterday, when gone."‡ As a vivid illustration of the inscrutable eternity of the great God, this saying is full of force and sublimity; and so it is used by the Apostle Peter;§ but it is an utter perversion of its meaning and intent, to represent it as a rule of interpretation for prophetic chronology.

The tradition, therefore, can be traced to nothing but an idle Rabbinical conceit, and is utterly worthless in the determination of revealed truth. Mede says, indeed, of this and other Jewish traditions: "I can hardly believe that all this smoke of tradition could arise but from some fire of truth

\*"Christology of the Old Testament," by E. W. Hengstenberg, D.D., I. 15. Compare the Aeneid of Virgil, VI. 748-751:

"Has omnes, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos,  
Letharum ad fluvium deus evocat agmine magno.  
Scilicet immemores supra ut convexa revisant,  
Rursus et incipiant in corpora velle reverti."

†Chronological Antiquities," I. 97.

‡Ps. xc. 4.

§2 Pet. iii. 8.

anciently made known unto them.”\* But, in this case, as so commonly happens, it is perfectly evident that the “wish was father” “to that thought.” A more worthless foundation, on which to erect a magnificent structure of doctrine, can scarcely be imagined. Yet, on this very foundation, neither less nor more, all those beautiful schemes of prophetic chronology, which contemplate a Grand Sabbatism in the seventh millenary of the world’s history, have been based. They derive not the slightest countenance from the Holy Scriptures, and are utterly unworthy of credit by Jew or Christian. If, in the prosecution of these inquiries, we find the Fathers of the Christian church expressing their belief in this tradition, we are to attribute it, not to any recorded instructions of apostles or prophets, or of our Lord himself, of which not a trace can be discovered, but to that “vain conversation received by tradition from” their “fathers,” from which Christ came to redeem them,† and by which, unhappily, the purity of Christian doctrine was so early and so extensively corrupted.

By this Rabbinical conceit, thus widely diffused among the Jews, and not unknown to the Gentiles, the doctrine of the Second Advent, from the very first, was modified and explained. This figment of tradition and the truth of Holy Scripture in conjunction, apparently confirming and explaining each other, are of almost perpetual occurrence in the writings of the Hebrew portion of the Christian church. In the well-known Epistle of Barnabas, a production, probably, of the first half of the second century,‡ if not of a previous period, we find the tradition fully developed and incorporated into the Christian system: “In six days God made the works of his hands, and had finished them on the seventh day, and rested in it, and sanctified it. Consider, children, what that means—‘he finished it in six days.’ This means, that the Lord God will finish all things in six thousand years. For, that a day with him is a thousand years, he himself testifies, saying, ‘Behold this day shall be as a thousand years.’ Therefore, children, in six days, in six thousand years, all things shall be finished. ‘And he rested on the seventh day.’ This means, that, when his Son shall come and terminate the season of the wicked one [τὸν καιρὸν ἀνόμου] and judge the ungodly, and change the sun and the moon and the stars, then on the seventh day he shall rest gloriously.”

\* Works IV., Ep. 20, p. 771.

† 1 Pet. i. 18.

‡ *Am. Presb. and Theol. Rev.* II. 30.

§ Barn. Epist., ch. 13. Received Text.

This is the form in which Chiliasm, or the doctrine of the Millennium, was introduced into the Christian church, and such the foundation on which it originally rested. The clearly revealed doctrine of the Second Advent of the Messiah was thought to be a confirmation of the theory; and it was assumed, without the slightest scriptural sanction, that this predicted event would inaugurate the expected Sabbatic Millennium. The writer of the above extract seems not to have known of the Apocalypse of John, as he nowhere makes the least allusion to it. If he knew of it, he could not have regarded it as genuine, or he would, doubtless, have appealed to John's vision of the imprisonment of Satan, and the saints reign with Christ, for a thousand years,\* in confirmation of his statements.

When, however, the Apocalypse became known and its authority established, the Christian authors of that period, ignorant, as they were, of the true interpretation of the book, and utterly at fault in regard to the chronological position of this vision of the thousand years, eagerly seized upon it, as explanatory and confirmatory of the old legend, that had come down from the days of Rabbinical conceit and Jewish superstition. It was from this legend, be it remembered, and not from the Apocalyptic vision of the inspired seer of Patmos, that the idea of a Millennium of blessedness, the seventh millennium of the world's history, was derived. The doctrine was in full vogue long before anything was known of the Apocalypse.

It was then the received opinion, moreover, that the commencement of this seventh millenary period was just at hand. "The primitive church of Antioch," says Gibbon, "computed almost six thousand years from the creation of the world to the birth of Christ."† It was taught in that singular collection of writings, called "The Sibylline Oracles," that this number would be completed, A.D. 196. Cyprian, in the third century, says: "Six thousand years are now almost completed since the devil assaulted man."‡ Lactantius, in the early part of the fourth century, says, "They, who have written concerning the times when this sum (of six thousand years) shall be completed, gathering, from the Sacred Scriptures and various histories, how great

\* Rev. xx. 1-6.

† Decline and Fall, I. 262.

‡ Epis. ad Fortunatum. De Exhortatione Martyrii. In an elaborate and truly eloquent argument, Cyprian endeavors to prove, that the world is in the last stages of decay, and that its end is just at hand. Ep. ad Demetrianum, (Africae proconsulem.)

the number of years had been from the beginning of the world, though they vary somewhat and differ in summing up the number, teach that not more than two hundred years, at all events, are to be expected.\* "These calculations," Gibbon very properly remarks, "were formed on the Septuagint, which was universally received during the first six centuries."† "The reason why," says Thomas Burnet, "so many of the Fathers were mistaken, in supposing the end at hand, was, because they reckoned the six thousand years according to the chronology of the Septuagint—which setting back the beginning of the world many ages beyond the Hebrew, the six thousand years were nearly expired in the times of those Fathers; and this made them conclude the world was very near an end."‡ "Owing to a radical error in their chronological calculus," says Prof. Bush, "they conceived themselves as actually having arrived at the eve of the world's seventh millenary; or, in other words, as having their lot cast on the Saturday of the great antitypical week of the creation."§

Thus it came to pass, that the Second Advent, the end of the world, and the beginning of the seventh Millennium, were supposed to be associated together, and were eagerly expected in those first days of the Christian church. It was not strange, therefore, that John's Millennium was interpreted of the same events.

The first among professedly Christian writers, who took this view of the vision of John, was Cerinthus. He seems to have lived at Ephesus, at the close of the first century. Irenæus, speaking of Polycarp, says: "There are those who heard from him, that John, the disciple of the Lord, when he had entered a bath at Ephesus, and saw Cerinthus within, immediately rushed out from the bath, unwashed, exclaiming, 'Let us fly, lest the bath, in which Cerinthus, the adversary of the truth, is, should suddenly fall upon us.'"<sup>¶</sup> In addition to the peculiar views of the Gnostics, of which he was one of the boldest and most noted advocates, he is said to have taught a grossly sensual Chiliasm. Caius, a presbyter of Rome, writing near the close of the second century, charges against him, that "by means of revelations, which he claimed were written by a great apostle, he falsely maintained absurd marvels, and impostures as if revealed to him by angels, and positively affirmed these things: that, after the

\* Div. Inst., B. VII. c. 25. † D. and F., I. 262. ‡ Theory of the Earth, II.

§ Treatise on the Millennium, p. 52.

¶ Adversus Hæreses, III., ch. 3, sec. 4.

resurrection of the human body, Christ would have a terrestrial kingdom, and that men in the flesh at Jerusalem would be subject to desires and lusts. Since, also, he was an enemy to the divine Scriptures, and had it in mind to deceive men, he insisted that the number of a thousand years would be consumed in the celebration of nuptial feasts.\* The same is affirmed of him, also, by Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria, about the middle of the third century.\* Neander supposes him to have held unmistakably to the personal reign of Christ on the earth: "As a sort of middle and transition point, from the earthly system of the world to the new, eternal, heavenly system, Cerinthus, with many Jewish theologians, supposed a thousand-year season of happiness, under the government of the Messiah rendered triumphant through the power of the Logos, which was to take place in Jerusalem as the centre point of the ennobled earth."†

Augustine regarded him as the originator of the doctrine in the Christian church: "The Cerinthians, so-called from Cerinthus, feign that there will be a thousand years after the resurrection in an earthly kingdom of Christ, according to the carnal desires and lusts of the flesh, whence, also, they are called Chiliasts."‡ The same thing is affirmed by Isidore.§

Such were the auspices under which the doctrine of the Second Advent, as introductory of the Grand Sabbath of Rabbinical origin, came into notice in the Christian community of the first and second centuries. The first Chiliast was a Gnostic, a heretic, a man of visionary conceits, disowned and rejected by the Fathers of the church. With him and his immediate disciples it would probably have died, or have been classed in the list of heresies, but for the influence of Papias, bishop of Hierapolis, in Phrygia, in the first part of the second century. Eusebius affirms of him, that "he sets forth things as coming to him from unwritten tradition, viz.—certain strange parables of the Saviour, and doctrines of his, and certain other fabulous things. Among them he also declares that there will be a certain Chiliaid of years after the resurrection of the dead, when the kingdom of Christ will be established materially [σώματι κῶς] on the earth." "He appears to have been," he adds, "of exceedingly small capacity, as one might affirm from the

\* Ecc. Hist. of Eusebius Pamphilus, B. III., c. 28.

† Hist. of the Christian Religion and Church during the first three centuries. Sect. IV., 2, I., B.

‡ De Hæres, ad Quodvultdeum, ch. 8.

§ B. VIII.

testimony of his own words. Still he seems to have been the cause of the like opinion among most ecclesiastics, who allege the great antiquity of the man.<sup>\*†</sup>

Neander represents him as "a man of plain piety, but—as the fragments of his writings and historical notices tend to prove—of a very limited mind, and a very uncritical credulity. He collected together, out of oral traditions, certain notices about the lives and sayings of Christ and the apostles, [in his book, entitled *λογίων κυριακῶν ἐξηγήσεις*]; and among these he received much which was misunderstood and false; and thus he was the means of propagating many unfounded notions about the enjoyments of the millennial reign. The injurious consequence of this was, that a relish for sensual enjoyment, which was in contradistinction to the gospel, was furthered, and that much prejudice against Christianity might be engendered by it among educated and civilized heathens."<sup>†</sup>

So far we look in vain for any thing like exegetical evi-

<sup>\*</sup> Ecc. Hist. III. 39.

<sup>†</sup> Hist. of first 3 Cen., Sect. V., II., Eschatology. A specimen of the traditions, on which Papias relied, is preserved by Irenæus, which we subjoin, in confirmation of the judgment of Eusebius respecting the man and his book. In an exposition of the blessing, pronounced by Isaac upon his son Jacob, —(Gen. xxvii. 28.), "Therefore God give thee of the dew of heaven, and the fatness of the earth, and plenty of corn and wine"—Irenæus says: "The aforesaid benediction, pertains without contradiction to the times of the Kingdom, when the saints, risen from the dead, shall reign; when, also, the renewed and liberated creature shall enjoy an abundance of every kind of food, by means of the dew of heaven and the fertility of the earth, even as the Elders who saw John, the disciple of the Lord, related, that they had heard from him how the Lord, teaching them about those times, had said: 'The days will come in which vines will grow, each having 10,000 boughs; and on each bough 10,000 branches; and on each branch 10,000 twigs, [flagellorum]; and on each twig 10,000 clusters; and on each cluster 10,000 grapes; and each grape, when pressed, shall yield 25 metres of wine; and, when any of the saints shall take one of the clusters, another shall cry out, 'I am a better cluster, take me, by me bless the Lord.' Likewise, also, that a grain of wheat would produce 10,000 ears; and each ear have 10,000 grains; and each grain five double-pounds of fine clean flour; and the other fruits [poma], seeds and herbage in like proportion; and all the animals, using the food taken from the earth, will be peaceful and harmonious with one another, subject to men with all subjection.'" Irenæus quotes all this from the fourth book of Papias. "Contra Hæreses," V. 33. On this passage, Dr. Whitby well remarks: "Can any man be so wholly bereft of sense, as to imagine this stuff could ever come out of the mouth of an apostle? No, certainly; he had it only from the converted Jews, in whose writings, some learned persons have informed me, the words cited by Irenæus from Papias are yet to be found." Treatise of the Millennium, chap. 1. sec. 3. The degree of credit to be attached to these tales of Papias, from which Justin and Irenæus seem largely to have drawn, may be seen, by reference to the "Free Inquiry into the Miraculous Powers, which are supposed to have subsisted in the Christian Church, from the Earliest Ages, through several successive Centuries. By Conyers Middleton, D. D."



dence of the doctrine from the inspired word. Neither Cerinthus nor Papias make any pretence to such a thing. Nothing could be more visionary than their representations, and nothing more baseless. It does not alter the case at all, that their views seemed plausible to their immediate followers, and were perpetuated for several generations in certain ecclesiastical circles. The candid inquirer seeks not to know how many have received a doctrine, but on what grounds their faith in it was based. Popularity is no test of truth.

The first show of anything like argument, in behalf of these views, we find in one of the writings of Flavius Justinus, philosopher and martyr, a Greek, but a native of the holy land. He is sojourning at Ephesus about A. D. 140 : and walking one morning in the Xystus, meets with Trypho, a Jew, and enters into a discussion with him, on some stone seats in the middle of the Stadium, on the comparative claims of the Jewish and Christian religions. Justin endeavors to prove, that Jesus is the Messiah of the Old Testament prophecies, and to disprove the current charges of the Jews against Christianity. Trypho, in the course of the conference, expresses surprise at an intimation on the part of Justin, that he believes in the Sabbatic Millennium, and asks if he truly receives this doctrine. Justin assures him, that both he himself and many others with him do truly receive it, while "many again, and such Christians too as are of pure and holy doctrine, do not admit it." He then cautions him against the mistake of supposing that all are Christians who claim to be such, especially those who deny the resurrection of the dead. He then observes,—“But I, and such Christians as are altogether orthodox [*ὁρθόδοξοι κατὰ πάντα*], know, that there will be a resurrection of the flesh ; and the prophets Ezekiel and Isaiah and others acknowledge a thousand years in a rebuilt, beautified and amplified Jerusalem.”\*

In support of his position he appeals to the language of the prophet Isaiah : “For, behold I create new heavens and a new earth.” &c., to the end of the chapter ;† using of course, the Septuagint version, in which, instead of, “as the days of a tree,” we read, “as the days of the tree of life,” “are the days of my people.” On this passage he thus remarks : “What, therefore, is said in these words—‘For as the days of the tree of life shall be the days of my people, the produce of their toils shall be multiplied,’—we understand mystically

\* *Dialogus cum Tryphone Judæo.* Sec. 80.

† *Isa.* lxx. 17, 25.



to signify a millennium ; for, when it was said to Adam, that in the day he ate of the tree he should die, we know that he did not live out that millennium. Moreover, we understand in the same way this also : 'The day of the Lord is a thousand years.'\* There are not wanting, even at the present day, some on whom such reasoning makes a deep impression. But to all sober inquirers it sounds like the babblings of childhood. It is not worth a moment's consideration.

He proceeds : "Moreover, a certain man among us, whose name was John, one of the apostles of Christ, in the revelation made to him, foretold, that believers in our Christ would pass a thousand years in Jerusalem ; and that, afterwards, there would be the universal, and, in a word, the everlasting simultaneous resurrection of all, and the judgment ; the same as our Lord said : 'They shall neither marry, nor be given in marriage, but shall be equal to angels, since they are the sons of the God of the resurrection.'"<sup>†</sup>

In this appeal to the testimony of John, it is evident that Justin could not have had the words of the apostle before him. The statement of the apostle relative to the thousand years,<sup>‡</sup> makes no mention of the place where the saints of that period were to live and reign with Christ, though it is implied that the scene is laid in this world. Nor does Justin attempt to show, that the Apocalyptic millennium and the Sabbatical millennium of Trypho and the Rabbins are identical. The reasoning is of the loosest sort ; not unlike, however, much that we meet with in our own day, in the same direction of thought.

The same is true, in respect to his interpretation of Isaiah's grand and glowing description of the gospel dispensation.§ Writing nearly 700 years before the Messiah's Advent, at a time of great gloom and disaster, the prophet foretells the coming of the Great Deliverer, and, under the imagery of a new creation, a renovated and extraordinarily fertile earth, he describes the blessedness and the endlessness of the new dispensation, as well as the extension of its privileges to the whole Gentile world. Not an intimation is given in this passage of a millennium, or of a Second Advent of Christ to introduce a third dispensation, thereby superseding the second, the gospel dispensation. Everything looks to the Messiah's coming as the Saviour of men, and the world's great Benefactor. No such interpretation as that of Justin is admissi-

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\* Ut supra.

† Rev. xx 1-6.

‡ Ut supra.

§ Isa., 65th and 66th chapters.

ble. And yet, it is by just such perversions, not intentional, of course,—unwarranted perversions,—of the obvious intent of ancient prophecy, that similar theories, are even to this day, industriously maintained and propagated.\*

The legendary origin of the Chiliasm of that period, with which the Second Advent of the Messiah, as we have seen, was so closely identified, is fully developed in the writings of Irenæus. Though he finished his course at Lyons, France, he was a native of Smyrna, in Asia Minor, and, a disciple both of Polycarp and of Papias. That he adopted the Chiliastic views of the latter, is not to be denied. "In whatever number of days," he says in his "Treatise against Heretics," A. D. 192, "the world was made, in as many thousands of years it will come to an end. And therefore the Scripture saith,—'Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the host of them; and on the sixth day God ended all his works which he had made, and he rested on the seventh day from all his works.' This is a narration of the past, and a prediction of the future: 'for the day of the Lord is as a thousand years.' But in six days all that was made was completed. Their consummation, therefore, it is manifest, is the sixth thousand year."† By such allegorizing anything whatever, however fanciful, in the way of interpretation, may be made "manifest."

Again he says: "When the Antichrist shall have laid waste all things in this world, having reigned three years and six months,‡ and held his seat in the temple at Jerusalem, then the Lord shall come from heaven, in clouds, with the Father's glory, and hurl him and his followers into the

\* We give a specimen of Justin's reasoning with the Jew, from which the style of his argument can be readily conjectured: "The lamb," he says, "that was ordered to be roasted whole was a symbol of the passion of the cross by which the Messiah was to suffer. For the roasted lamb bears a resemblance to the figure of the cross; for one spit pierces it horizontally from the lower extremities to the head, and another across the back, from which, also, hang the fore legs [*αἱ χεῖρες*] of the lamb. So, also, the two goats in the fast, ordered to be alike, the one of which was to be a scape-goat, but the other for an offering, were a prefiguration of the two Advents of the Messiah." Dial. cum Tryphone, ch. 40.

† Contra Hæreses, B. V., ch. 28, sec. 3.

‡ A modern advocate of the Messiah's Personal Reign on the Earth, referring to this passage, represents Irenæus as saying,—“Antichrist having reigned 1260 years.” The original Greek is not extant. The Latin translator uses the words, “Cum autem vastaverit Antichristus hic omnia in hoc mundo, regnans annis tribus et mensibus sex.” That mode of computation, by which a prophetic year is counted as 360 natural years, and a prophetic month as 30 years, had not come into vogue in the second century, nor did it, as we shall see in the sequel, till long after the first millennium of our era had passed away. (See “The Voice of the Church,” by D. T. Taylor, p. 62.)

lake of fire; but he will bring in the times of his righteous reign, *i. e.*, the Rest, the seventh day sanctified, and restore to Abraham the promised inheritance, in which kingdom, says the Lord, many from the east, and the west, shall come and sit down with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob."\* It enters essentially into his argument, that the inheritance must be on the earth; and that Canaan was a type of the larger domain to be given to the patriarch and his spiritual seed, the saints of the Most High God. "For it is fitting that the righteous, rising at the appearing of God, should, in that condition which is renewed, receive the promise of inheritance which God promised to the fathers, and reign in it; and that then the judgment should take place. For in that condition in which they have labored or been afflicted, tried in all ways by suffering, it is but just that they should receive the fruit of their suffering; and in that condition in which they were slain for the love of God, they should be brought to life; and in that condition in which they endured bondage, they should reign."† The Chiliasm of Irenæus may not have been as gross as that of Papias, but it was as truly Jewish and carnal.

These interpretations soon began to bear their legitimate fruit. A spirit of wild fanaticism took possession of not a few religious teachers and their followers, in the region where most these views of the Second Advent prevailed. The Phrygians of Asia Minor had long been noted for the visionary and superstitious character of their religion, and their fondness for magical enchantments and ecstatic raptures. Paul had occasion to rebuke them for their subjection to carnal ordinances, and to caution them against "philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ."‡ It was in Phrygia that Papias with so much success had proclaimed his sensuous Chiliasm; and here, too, Montanus, shortly after the middle of the second century, entered upon his visionary career. He was a native of Ardaban, a village of Mysia, on the confines of Phrygia, and, after his conversion, enthusiastically devoted himself to the cause of Christianity. However sincere and zealous in the cause he may have been at the first, he presently had the vanity and audacity to claim for himself the gift of prophecy, to be in communication with the spirit-

\* *Ut supra*, ch. 30, sec. 4.

† *Contra Hæreses*, B. V. ch. 32, sec. 1.

‡ Col. ii. 8, 16-23. Colosse, Laodicea, and Hierapolis, were all cities of Phrygia, and within a circle of a very few miles in extent.

world, and, at length, to be himself the Paraclete—or possessed of the fullness of the Paraclete—promised by the Saviour,\* who was to abide with the church forever, and to clear up by new and much more luminous revelations, the obscurities and mysteries of the Holy Scriptures.

Apollinaris, at that time the pastor of the church of Hierapolis, and others of that region, entered the lists against these dangerous errors and delusions; and, from fragments of the writings of one of them, preserved by Eusebius, we learn, that Montanus was wont to be “wrought up into a certain kind of frenzy and ecstatic rapture, raving and babbling and uttering strange sounds, and under the pretence of prophecy proclaiming things contrary to the usages of the church from the earliest times.” Those present at the time are represented as accusing him of being “under the influence of demons and the spirit of delusion.” Among those that were deluded by him were Prisca (or Priscilla) and Maximilla, “noble and opulent women,” as Jerome calls them, who were actuated by the same “spirit of ecstatic frenzy, raving and babbling like himself in a strange incoherent manner.”† Others of their number, also, fell into the same practices, and claimed to be under divine inspiration.

Among the predictions thus uttered by Montanus was, the announcement of “the near approach of God’s judicial punishment of the persecutors of the church, as well as of the second coming of Christ, and the establishment of the Millenarian kingdom, the blessedness of which he painted in attractive colors.” He and his followers maintained that “the season of the last and richest outpouring of the Holy Ghost would form the last age of the church, and precede the second coming of Christ.” Maximilla boldly affirmed, that “no other prophetess would follow after her, but that the end of the world would immediately take place;”‡ They singled out the place in Phrygia (which they regarded as the oldest country in the world), where the Messiah was to set up his throne. “Who,” says Apollonius, “is this new teacher? His works and doctrines sufficiently show. This is he that taught the dissolutions of marriage; that imposed new rules of fasting; that called Pepuza and Tymium (for they are small towns of Phrygia) *Jerusalem*, in order to call thither all men from all quarters.”§ Neander says: “They

\* John, xiv, 16, 26. xv. 26.

† Euseb. Ecc. Hist., V, 16. Hier. ad Ctesiph., I, 222.

‡ Neander’s Church History, section V, 1.

§ Euseb. Ch. Hist., V, 18.

were called 'Cataphrygians,' [*οἱ κατὰ Φρύγας*] from the country of their origin, and, also, 'Pepuzians,' because that Montanus taught that a place, called Pepuza, in Phrygia, which was, perhaps, the first locality of a Montanistic church, was selected as the spot from which the Millenarian kingdom of Christ was to proceed.\*

In reading the history of Montanism, we are strongly reminded of the scenes in our own country some twenty years since, when just such another class of religious people were predicting and anticipating the immediate coming of Christ. This is by no means the only illustration of the saying,—History is continually repeating itself in the revolutions of the world.

When we remember that Tertullian, of Carthage, who wrote at the close of the second century, became a disciple of Montanus, and the principal defender of the sect, we are not surprised to find him defending, also, their Chiliasm. In writing against Marcion and his errors, he says: "We confess that a kingdom is promised us on earth, before that in heaven, but in another state, viz., after the resurrection, for a thousand years, in a city of divine workmanship, Jerusalem, brought down from heaven; which, also, the apostle designates as our mother from above, and our *πολίτευμα*, i. e., pronouncing our citizenship to be in heaven, he speaks of it figuratively as a celestial city. This [city] Ezekiel, also, knew, and the apostle John saw." Again: "This city, we say, is provided of God for the receiving of the saints in the resurrection, and for the refreshing of them with a plenty of all good things, especially spiritual, in compensation for those which we have either despised or lost in the world; since it is both just and worthy of God, that his servants should also triumph there where they have been afflicted for his sake. After which thousand years, within which period is included the resurrection of the saints, rising earlier or later according to their deserts, then, both the destruction of the world and the conflagration of the judgment-day having taken place, we shall be changed, in a moment, into angelic substance, and, having been clothed upon with incorruption, shall be translated into the kingdom of heaven.†

That such views of the Second Advent should have obtained no little prevalence among oriental Christians, especially such as were of Hebraistic origin, and in an age of frequent and severe persecution, is not at all surprising. Not that all who received them were as sensuous in their expect-

\* Ut supra.

† Adv. Marcionem, B. III. ch. 24.

tations as Cerinthus and Papias. But that they all looked forward to a millennial period of bliss on earth, then just at hand, to be ushered in by the glorious Advent of the Messiah, is clear. Still it cannot be said that Chiliasm was the faith of the church of the first two centuries. Far from it. It seems to have originated in Asia Minor, to have prevailed principally in Phrygia, and Mysia, especially in the neighborhood of Hierapolis, Thyatira, and Laodicea, but not much in other portions of the church. "If we find," says Neander, (more discriminating and reliable here than Gieseler,) "that Millenarianism was then extensively propagated, and are able to explain this by the circumstances of that period, yet, we are not to understand by this that it ever belonged to the universal doctrines of the church. We have too scanty documents from different parts of the church in those times, to be able to speak with certainty and distinctness on that point. When we find Chiliasm in Papias, Irenæus, Justin Martyr, all this indicates that it arose from one source, and was propagated from one spot."\* It seems never to have gained much footing at Alexandria, or Rome, or in the communities of which these two cities were the great centres. When their attention was at length drawn to it, a check was at once put to its power and prevalence.

The extravagances of the Montanists, in proportion as they became known, had the effect of exciting a general spirit of opposition to these views. Men began to inquire into the reasons—the ground—of the doctrine. The tendency of these Judaistic notions, allegory and literalism combined, became continually more apparent. Juster views of interpretation began to prevail, even in Asia Minor. Apollinaris of Hierapolis, the historian Miltiades, Serapion, bishop of Antioch, Apollonius, and Caius, of Rome, all wrote against the Montanistic heresy, not sparing its Chiliasm. The Alexandrian school, much the most influential of that period, had no affinity with such methods of understanding and applying Scripture. They were spiritualists—disposed to take spiritual views of divine truth. They excelled, moreover, in the science of biblical exegesis. In vain do we search among the fathers of the first two centuries for anything like a truly critical exposition of the word of God. To Origen, of Alexandria, must be attributed the credit of being the father of Biblical Literature. It was under his instructions, or influence, that the church began, in the third century, effectually to discard the literalism of Judaism, and fully to apprehend

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\* Chh. Hist. of First Three Cent. Sec. V. 2.



the true spiritual meaning of God's word. They carried it, as was to be expected, to an unwarranted extreme. They knew not where to stop. Fascinated with the beauty of the spiritual meaning, they began to allegorize, and to find a deep spiritual sense in even the simplest narratives. Great injury resulted from these fancies, especially when men of weaker heads indulged in them. But gradually the evil corrected itself, at least among the educated classes. The true level was found, and the theology of the church became sounder, more sensible and more scriptural.

Confidence in the Chiliasm of the previous century declined. It became necessary, on the part of its adherents, to defend it. Nepos, one of the bishops of Arsinoe, in Egypt, wrote a "Refutation of the Allegorists," endeavoring to maintain his positions, by the authority of the Apocalypse. The book has perished. We know of it only by notices of it in Eusebius. It appeared to have had considerable currency, and to have perverted many from the simple truths of the gospel. Controversies were engendered. Nepos died, and Coracion, one of the neighboring pastors, headed the Chiliastic party. A serious schism impended. Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria, "the worthy disciple of the great Origen," as Neander calls him, a man of truly great learning and piety, came to the rescue. As we learn from the preface of one of the tracts that he wrote on the occasion, he repaired to Arsinoe, and gathered together the presbyters, teachers, and brethren of the various village congregations round about, and for three days, from early in the morning until evening, he reasoned with them, and took up, one by one, the positions of the book of Nepos, meeting their objections, and convincing them out of the word of God. An entire reconciliation ensued. The brethren with their leader acknowledged their errors, and returned to the orthodox faith. As the book still continued to circulate, Dionysius wrote out, A. D. 255, the substance of his argument, in two books, entitled, "Concerning the Promises," by means of which the spread of the new views was effectually arrested.

It is worthy of observation, that the Apocalypse was regarded by the wisest scholars of that day as utterly beyond their comprehension. Dionysius says: "I would by no means venture to set aside the book itself, especially as there are many brethren who so highly esteem it; but, admitting that the comprehension of it is beyond my capacity, I suppose there is some hidden and mysterious meaning throughout in its contents. For, even though I do not understand it, still I



suppose some deeper sense is couched in the words. Not measuring or judging these things by my own reason, but assigning more to faith, I attribute to it things higher than I can possibly comprehend. Still I do not reject those things which I do not understand, but so much the more do they excite my wonder, because of my inability to comprehend them."\* A truly candid admission, and worthy of profound consideration.

Victorinus, bishop of Pettan, in Upper Pannonia (Hungary), about A. D. 290, wrote commentaries on the Apocalypse and several other portions of the Scripture. He is claimed as a Chiliast, and it is affirmed, that what he wrote in favor of these views has been expurgated. Jerome and others expressly testify, that Victorinus, in his commentary, defended this opinion. Bellarmine, therefore, doubts as to the authenticity of the work that is extant, inasmuch as it not only does not defend, but even opposes, Chiliasm.†

Methodius, bishop of Olympus, in Lycia, in the latter part of the third century, represents one of the virgins, in his "Convivium Virginum," as maintaining that they who are adorned with chastity and other virtues "shall, after the judgment, reign with Christ 1000 years upon earth, at the termination of which Millennium, the bodies of the saints being made like to the angels, they shall all ascend to live forever in the kingdom above."‡

Our catalogue of Chiliasts terminates with Commodian and Lactantius. The former was a North African, and a convert from Paganism. He wrote, in Latin verse, near the close of the third century. In his book, "Adversus Paganos," he maintained "a very gross system of Chiliasm, which bears upon it the coloring of carnal Judaism. The chiefest princes of the world were, in the first place, to become the slaves of the pious in the kingdom of the Millennium, and all the vanity of the world, under the influence of an unchristian imagination is transferred to that kingdom."§

Lactantius, a native of Fermo, in Ancona, it is thought, but in later life, a resident of Nicomedia, wrote in the first quarter of the fourth century. The purity of his style procured for him the appellation of "The Christian Cicero." "His taste," says Prof. Stuart, "was as singular as his belief in respect to the Millennium. Instead of quoting the Scrip-

\* Euseb. Ecc. Hist. VII., 24, 25.

† S. Hieron. Catal. Scrip. Ecc., Ed., 1722, p. 76.

‡ Succ. of Sac. Lit. By Dr. Adam Clarke, I. 180.

§ Neander's Ecc. Hist., Sec. V. 3.

tures, he everywhere and on all occasions interlards his discourses excessively with extracts from the putid Sibylline oracles ; which seem to have been as much an object of his wonder and reverence as the Scriptures.\* Although he may have resorted to these worthless oracles, rather than to God's word, because of his writing against Paganism, yet it deprives his testimony of all credit.

In the seventh book of his "Divine Institutions," he treats of the "Happy Life." "Then the Son of the Supreme and Mighty God shall come to judge the living and the dead, as the Sibyl testifies and says :

*‘Πάθης γὰρ γαίης τότε θνητῶν σύγχυσις ἔσται.  
Αὐτὸς ὁ παντοκράτωρ ὅτ’ ἂν ἔλθῃ βήματι κρῖναι  
Ζώντων καὶ νεκρῶν ψυχὰς καὶ κόσμον ἅπαντα.’*

"But when he shall have put an end to unrighteousness and executed the great judgments, and raised to life the righteous from the beginning, he shall dwell a thousand years among men, and rule over them with a most righteous government ; as elsewhere the Sibyl in prophetic rapture exclaims :

*‘Κλυτε δέ μου μέρορες βασιλεὺς αἰωνίος ἄρχει.’*

"Then they who are living in their bodies shall not die, but during the same thousand years shall beget an infinite multitude, and their offspring shall be holy and dear to God. But they, who have been raised up from below, shall preside as judges over the living. The nations, however, shall not be utterly extinguished, but some will be left for the victory of God, to be triumphed over by the righteous, and reduced to perpetual bondage.† At the same time, the prince of demons, the contriver of all evil, shall be bound with chains, and kept in custody the thousand years of the celestial empire, so that righteousness shall rule in the world, and no evil be attempted against the people of God. After whose Advent, the righteous shall be gathered together from all the earth, and, the judgment being past, the holy city shall be erected in the midst of the earth, in which God himself, the builder, shall dwell with the reigning saints ; which city the Sibyl designates when she says :

*‘Καὶ πόλιν ἦν ἐποίησε θεός, αὐτὴν ἐποίησε  
Λαμπρώτεραν ἄστρων, καὶ ἰλίου, ἥδὲ σελήνης.’*

\* Comm. on the Apoc., I. 326.

† Do our modern Millenarians hold that Slavery will continue during the Personal Reign?

"Then the darkness, by which the skies were overspread and obscured, shall be taken away, and the moon acquire the lustre of the sun, nor shall it wane any more; while the sun shall become seven times more brilliant than it is now. Then the earth shall develop its fertility, and spontaneously produce the richest crops; the mountain rocks shall sweat honey; wine shall run down the brooks; and the rivers shall overflow with milk. Yea, the very world shall rejoice, and all nature, released and freed from the dominion of evil, impiety, crime and error, shall leap for joy. No beasts the while shall feed on blood, no birds on prey, but all things shall be quiet and peaceful; lions and calves shall stand together at the stall, the wolf shall not seize the sheep, the dog shall not hunt, hawks and eagles shall not hurt, the infant shall play with serpents."\*

The eighth part describes the final struggle after the Millennium. The devil and his angels are to be loosed and to stir up the nations to make war upon the holy city, when fire from heaven is to devour them. The earth is then to be renewed; men are to be made, like the angels, as white as snow, and live forever in the presence of the Almighty; the wicked dead are to be raised, judgment is to be passed upon them, and hell is then to receive them.†

The wonderful revolution wrought in the state and prospects of Christianity, by the conversion of Constantine, and his accession to the imperial throne, had a powerful influence, also, in repressing the feeble remains of Chiliasm. We meet with the Jewish legend of the six thousand years of toil and trouble, it is true, in Hilary, and Jerome, and Augustine. But the Sabbath that was to follow, in their judgment, was to be a spiritual and eternal Sabbath, to follow immediately upon the coming of the Redeemer to raise the dead and judge the world. The idea of his personal reign on the earth for a thousand years was vigorously assailed by Eusebius, and Cyril of Jerusalem, and Damasus of Rome, and Jerome, and Augustine, and Innocent of Rome. So effectual was the suppression when it was condemned by the latter, A. D. 411, as to lead Baronius, in the annals of that year, to say: "The figments of the millenaries being now rejected everywhere, and derided by the learned with hisses and laughter, and also being put under the ban, were entirely extirpated."

It only remained that the sixth thousand year, according to the received chronology, should come and go, in order to

\* Div. Inst. VII., 24, 26.

† Div. Inst. VII., 6, 7, 8, 24, 26.

put the finishing stroke to the legendary notion of seven chiliads. The sixth century, the beginning, as was supposed, of the seventh millennium, came and went, and with it the last remains of the effete Chiliasm, with which the doctrine of the Second Advent had hitherto been so intimately and injuriously conjoined. We are now prepared to trace, in a subsequent number, the further history of the doctrine; simply observing, that hitherto we have found nothing like a satisfactory exposition of the Second Advent. As for sound Scriptural exegesis, we look for it in vain among these early Millenarians. Their Sabbatical Millennium is shown to have been a mere figment of the fancy. While the attempt to identify this Rabbinical legend with the Millennium of the Apocalypse is scarcely worth the name of argument. It is conjecture all.

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ART. II.—THE POLITICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE OLD TESTAMENT PROPHETS.\*

By Dr. HERMANN HUPFELD.

LATTERLY writers on theology and history, have universally acknowledged, and sufficiently estimated the significance of the Prophets as regards the inner development of the Hebrew nation. But they do not seem to have equally understood their principles and conduct as respects the outward relations of the kingdom, especially when it suffered from the encroachments of the wordly powers of that time; in a word their politics or policy. Yet, now that we begin to draw the prophets out of the old restricted point of view of mere propheciers (predictors) or oracles and to contemplate them as theocratic, *i. e.*, religious and political public speakers, and to compare them with the demagogues of antiquity, we cannot draw back from this task. It must be confessed that especially this aspect of their labors is exposed to great misunderstanding and abuse, and offers many difficulties in application. It is therefore important, first of all, to get a clear notion of its true meaning and foundation.

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\*Translated from the *Neue Evangelische Kirchenseitung*, by Rev. SAMUEL T. LOWME, Pittsburgh, Pa.

The teaching of the prophets under such circumstances, especially when the people became dependent on some foreign ruler, was certainly the very contrary of that current policy of all times, which was also the prevailing policy of their day. They aimed first at this (negatively,) that the people should not seek to help themselves out of their condition by the means that the natural man in his short-sightedness commonly seizes. That is, they must not seek deliverance by open force (insurrection) and warlike equipments, nor by secret conspiracy and unions with other powers, nor by political intrigue and cunning of any kind; in short, by no breach of faith or violation of treaties. On the contrary—and that is the positive side of their teaching—they exhort the people to be faithful to their foreign rulers, after these were once put over them, and to the obligations they had thus entered into (treaties). But still they teach them to expect deliverance from this yoke expressly from God, and to put their trust exclusively in him who alone can help, and in his time will help. For this deliverance they must wait with patience, and meantime submit with resignation to the trial and discipline imposed on them. They must not anticipate, nor prematurely seek to deliver themselves by their own power; by such efforts bonds are only drawn tighter, and men prepare their own ruin.

Such are, first of all, the sentiments of Isaiah in the Assyrian period; so also in the later Chaldean time, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and all the prophets with one accord.

It might seem that this teaching suited only the peculiar condition of the Israelitish people, and was founded on principles that were part of their peculiar relation toward God. Already in the Mosaic law they were commanded to maintain strict separation from other nations, according to which every kind of union with such was forbidden; and they were encouraged to look to a special providence of God over his people, to expect miraculous interference on his part, as was, *e. g.*, repeatedly promised by Isaiah, Ch. x and xxxvii., and as really happened. But it is supposed all this cannot be counted on in the ordinary course of human affairs. The teaching of the prophets is commonly thought to be nothing less than a demand of entire inactivity on the part of men, whilst they confide in the help of God; during which they must let their hands hang idle, and expect everything from God; a passive obedience toward all foreign powers, an endurance of the most intolerable and debasing tyranny, a cowardly relinquishment of all claim to national independ-

ence and freedom. Such, in fact, is the objection that has been raised against the prophets, and especially against Jeremiah. And such is even an old understanding of similar teaching of the New Testament ; as if it commanded an unconditional submission to the powers that be, and made one indifferent to one's country or to national and political fellowship.

But all this comes from a series of misunderstandings. First of all, it is plain that the teaching of the prophets cannot spring from cowardice, that is, fear of power, or from any indifference toward the welfare of the people. For in what they advocated they stood in opposition to the opinion and passion of the ruling party, of the great and powerful as well as of the people, and they only reaped persecution from them. And, moreover, they strongly and often touchingly utter and evince their ardent attachment to their country, and their participation in the sufferings of the people that they foresaw, and their pain on account of the sad effects which they had to predict as the consequence of the contempt showed to their advice.

And what stronger proof of fidelity to his people can one give than was given by Jeremiah, the very one that has been called a bad patriot ? By the conquest of Jerusalem he was freed from the prison into which his own people had cast him, yet, instead of accepting the offer of living in honorable position at the court of Babylon, he chose rather to stay with the remnant of the people in Judah. And afterwards when these, contrary to his warning, determined to emigrate into Egypt, even then he could not separate himself from his ill-advised people, but accompanied them in their unhappy fortune.

Nor can the prophets have acted as they did from a blind faith or rash confidence in some miraculous interposition of God, inasmuch as they are unanimous in the matter, and their wisdom was sanctioned by the result. For by the contrary course, by infidelity, and eternal vacillation of the prevailing policy between opposing powers and means, both kingdoms went to destruction, first Israel, then Judah.

Therefore the following facts ought to be considered, which are commonly either overlooked or badly understood :

1. The warning against foreign alliances is not to be connected with the Mosaic prohibition of all alliances. This latter referred immediately to the Canaanites, and required their extermination, instead of living mingled with ; for from the latter there threatened disasters, which eventually hap-



pened. But in the relations in which the people stood towards foreign nations in the days of the prophets, an alliance, that is a treaty, could not absolutely be rejected by them. This is evident from the fact, that what the prophets inculcated was precisely fidelity to the treaties they had entered into with foreign powers. When the Assyrians began their encroachments in their neighborhood, Isaiah did his utmost to ward off from Judah all complication with this power, (chap. vii.) But when, contrary to his advice, they entered into relations with it, and it was called in to give aid against inferior danger, and when, in consequence, the people were reduced to oppressive dependence on it, Isaiah just as decidedly demands fidelity and obedience to the rulers to whom their own folly had subjected them. He denounces further alliances, especially an alliance with Egypt, as faithlessness in regard to this one, and because they must only lead to some new dependence or to entire destruction.

2. The dependence of the Israelites on these constantly dissolving worldly powers, Assyria, the Chaldaea, Egypt, later Persia, &c., was not an intolerable tyranny and abuse; it was no condition of lawlessness and slavery. As was generally the case in ancient kingdoms, it consisted in being made tributary, and in the recognition of superiority, including also an alliance with the obligation to furnish troops, something like in the *Rheinbund* under Napoleon. But under this alliance, the domestic institution and rule remained the same, and the sanctuary of inherited nationality, religion and social customs, and even a certain national independence continued undisturbed. And greater privileges than these the Hebrew people had seldom enjoyed, nor could they well enjoy more after they once became involved with the great powers of that time.

It was the Syrians, under Antiochus Epiphanes, that first invaded the popular institutions of the people. But that was because that ruler was influenced by a certain ideal of national unity. It was the same ideal which, founded on the modern, mechanical idea of the state, is now sought after by even greater kingdoms, embracing various nationalities, and which is enforced by all kinds of means, more or less violent and artificial.

3. The prophets by no means demand entire renunciation of hopes of deliverance from a foreign yoke, and of independence. On the contrary, they promise these, and after the kingdom was dissolved, they promised its restoration in the most glowing colors, and most exuberant expressions—



passing over to the Messianic idea. And they join with their promise the punishment of their conquerors, by a mighty judgment of God against them, on account of their arrogance, which shall revenge, by their destruction, all the injustice done to the people of God and other nations.

All the prophets are full of this idea of the restoration and completion of the kingdom, as also of the great, divine judgment against the worldly powers that stand opposed to it. The earlier prophets, especially Isaiah, are opposed to the Assyrians, the latter ones to the Chaldeans and the Egyptians. This idea reaches its climax, first in that Babylonian exile, when all appeared to be over with the kingdom, and the great mass of the people had begun already to unite itself with a foreign nationality (in the second part of Isaiah). So far are they from yielding to the pressure of present circumstances, that the more discouraging these were, so much the stronger and more enthusiastic was their hope of deliverance and restoration. All their addresses make it their great object to keep this hope alive in the people.

Moreover, they do not mean by their "be still," entire inactivity, and that the people must, with cowardice, let every possible injury happen to them. But they mean that men shall abstain from the foolish means by which men commonly seek to help themselves; from reckless rebellion and intriguing. This is the false human "wisdom" against which they contend. They urge the people to endure with patience what God imposes on them, and to trust in the help he shall send at last, and to await the time that he in his council has chosen for it. For example, this is true of Isaiah. It is evident that he does not reject personal effort, in itself considered. For he describes a time when, after the destruction of the false "crown"—that is, of the treacherous means by which men seek their honor and strength—and after enduring a chastening judgment, God shall be for a true "crown and diadem" to the converted remnant of his people—that is, they shall seek and find in him alone their honor, welfare and safety. In that day, beside, "the spirit of judgment"—that is, of incorruptible integrity in exercising judgment—he mentions that a spirit of valor shall be an effect of the Spirit of God, that shall then inspire them, and by which they shall repulse the attack of the enemy (Isa. xxviii. 6).

Both virtues, righteousness and bravery, are confessedly the very foundation pillars on which the preservation of a kingdom rests. But both are only then of the genuine kind when they proceed from the Spirit of God, who alone can

impart righteous judgment and real valor. For, as respects the first, if the judge is not guided by the Spirit of God, he will judge only according to the deceitful appearance, and the variable opinion and sentiment of the day (Isa. xi. 3), or else from a regard to human favor and the fear of man. Even with the best intention, the letter of the law will be a two-edged sword in his hand. As for valor and everything truly great, a man is found equal to it only when he undertakes a matter, not in mere reliance on his own powers, and in his own name, but with the consciousness that he struggles for a greater good, even for the cause of God, and trusts in God's protection and assistance, and when he feels, by reason of this confidence, and the enthusiasm with which the consciousness of a great mission fills one, that he is carried beyond himself, and filled with a wonderful, divine energy, which is mighty even in the weak, and has brought about the most momentous results. Thus the greatest heroes have always been the most humble and God-fearing men. And we have in Bible history, from the time of the Judges down to the days of the Maccabees, many examples of such divine heroes and champions for the freedom of their country from foreign oppression.

It is therefore nothing impossible, or superhuman, nor anything unworthy, that the prophets urge upon their people. But if this is true, the further question now presents itself, whether this teaching and demand possess universal validity and applicability, and is thus to be a clue for our conduct in like critical circumstances. This inquiry is the more important and unavoidable, inasmuch as essentially the same thing is taught by Christ in opposition to the restless conduct of his contemporaries, and by his apostles also to the Christians of their day. But in order thoroughly to comprehend that this policy of the prophets may be generally valid and applicable, we must go back to the foundation on which it rests, and then see if we do not occupy the same ground.

This foundation is the doctrine of the prophets concerning God and his government. It is the doctrine that God on the one hand, is the Lord and King of his chosen people Israel, and that he will faithfully perform his kingly duties, and protect his people against all the powers of the world; preserve them in all distresses, and that he can and will restore them even from seeming destruction, as in the Babylonian exile, and will lead them to the high position and destiny he has appointed for them. On the other hand, this doctrine teaches that God is Lord and Ruler also of the world, and that he

bends all nations of the earth to the purposes of his providence ; that he appoints to each its peculiar position and destiny ; and that he uses, now this one and now that one, to rise for the help or the punishment of others, and especially to discipline his chosen people, in which case even a foreign oppressor and conqueror is called "the servant of God ;" while at the same time he inevitably punishes every manifestation of arrogance on the part of those who are merely gratifying their own passions, without knowing that they are made the servants and instruments of God. Thus God conducts all nations to one common goal, and at last will unite them all in one great and glorious kingdom of heaven.

But this doctrine and hope of the prophets is undoubtedly also the substance of our faith and our hope as Christians. Indeed, what the prophets could only anticipate in the obscure distance, is for us, who have witnessed its fulfillment in Christianity, an immovable, imperishable conviction, and a surety for the further development of the kingdom of God, and all the future of the world's history. Even not on specifically Christian grounds, but from the contemplation of the past course of the history of the world, this conviction has become universal, and is now proverbial in the words of the poet, "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht;" The world's history is the world's judgment.

Only those, therefore, can deny the universal validity of the teaching of the prophets, who either altogether disbelieve in God's providence in history, and in his word in the Scriptures, or else have only the common historical belief in the Scriptures. The latter are those that contemplate the kingdom of God and its history, in the Old Testament, as something wholly different from the present time, and from the laws that are seen in all other history, and thus as an exceptional wonder-world, and therefore assume that God, in this sphere, formerly wrought extraordinary miracles, and ruled his kingdom in a way he does not now.\* But he that

\* This logical consequence that I have attached to the *mere historic faith*, may be unexpected by many, and appear extreme. But there is no other way of it. They who have a faith that is *no more* than this, a faith that is satisfied with a mechanical reception of the letter of Scripture, and clings to this, and finds the essential and divine part of it only in its miraculous transactions and predictions, and sees God *only* in that, to them the ways of God remain hidden as much as to the unbelieving. Just in that degree that one contemplates the world of revelation as exceptional and privileged, so far will it cease to be instruction and illustration to him of what the ways of God are. This is worth consideration by those who recognize such a faith as the only true faith.

has a living faith in God, and believes that his Spirit rules in the word of Scripture and in biblical history, is also sure that the principles there revealed are the eternal laws of his kingdom, that he still rules in this way, and that these principles apply also to us.

Yes, in all such conditions of nations, where everything sighs under the oppression of the present, let that oppression come from without or within, from some tyrannical despotism or from traditional institutions, and where the existing state of things seems intolerable, and there is a universal longing for reform and improvement, it is an eternal rule of divine government, that no relief can be found in mere outward force and revolutions. There must be no machinations and intrigues, no breaches of faith and law, or the like ; for nothing durable and flourishing can be established by such means. God has vindicated for himself the founding of kingdoms and their reformation and destruction, and all the will and wit of men avails nothing when he is not with them. All impatience and arbitrary helping one's self ; all activity and conspiracy does nothing to hasten the period of relief, but only augments the evil. In no other way can men find deliverance, but in persevering fidelity and patience ; in trust in God, and expectation of his help, who alone knows the means and ways to it, and has the power to effect it. This fidelity must be shown by a performance of the duties the position imposes, by upright conduct, and adherence to the common rules of divine order that are known to all, and which are the only safe pole-star for our guidance. This patience is manifested in the endurance of the hardships of the imposed condition, so far as they cannot be removed by lawful means, even though they may seem never so intolerable to our impatience, and from the conviction that it is a trial and discipline sent from God, that promotes our salvation, and must be part of every education.

This necessity of education does not apply only to individuals, but also to nations. It is by education that they attain to any good, and therefore to civil liberty and majority. It is a common but grave and portentous error to contemplate liberty only as a gracious gift, which princes and potentates have only to pour out into the lap of their people, or hang up like a toy on a Christmas-tree ; or which is only to be seized by force, in order to enjoy it at once. On the contrary, liberty is a virtue. To attain it, it demands, above all, that men should be experienced in obedience to law, in love and devotion to the common weal, in regard for the freedom

of others, and the subjection of private interests and desires to the good of the whole ; in a word, self-sacrifice and inward moral discipline that is founded in the fear of God. Otherwise it is no blessing, but a curse, and like "the slave that breaks his chain," it exchanges one slavery for another, and that more vexatious.

This is confirmed by the example of every people which, without these inner conditions of liberty, has thought to obtain it by mere revolution, as in the recent French and South American revolutions, where men toss out of revolution into revolution, without gaining anything but a constant change of rulers, and even worse tyranny and disorder.

These observations do not apply only to rude uneducated nations, and to some sudden transition from servitude to unbounded freedom. They are equally true of half educated and of civilized people, and their transition from a state of freedom, in many respects restricted, to some higher state, or their attainment of any better condition, which is the fulfillment of patriotic ideals and desires, no matter how worthy these may be, in themselves considered. For the right measure and object of the trial and discipline, or the education, is known only to God ; and there remains nothing but to await perseveringly the period that God in his wisdom has selected.

But here the unavoidable question arises : How is this to be known ? The simple reply is this : God so arranges the circumstances and prepares the way, that all is ripe for reform and improvement ; so that this comes about almost of itself, and can be attained without sin, very differently from all that human wit would have foreseen or invented. For how often it has happened, that by some small event, a so-called accident, which no one could have anticipated, which lay quite out of human reckoning and power, the state of affairs has been wholly changed, and that deliverance and reformation has been effected in a moment, that had long been the subject of wishes and endeavors that were vain.

But still there is an inward limit and condition to patience. It is commanded only so far and so long as the condition of the common life has any character of lawful order, an order that admits of intercourse consistent with man's sense of rectitude and Christian duty. Where this character has been lost ; where that which is commanded is contrary to conscience and God's law, and where the greatest treasures of life and of the soul are jeopardized and rendered unattainable, then there is no longer any inward obligation to exer-

cise endurance, or to obey the powers that be. On the contrary, then we must apply the command: "we ought to obey God rather than men." Acts, v. 29. In such case it is the duty of conscience to protest against unlawful violence, to renounce obedience, and to make active resistance as soon as it is feasible. This is the justification of wars of independence, like that of the Maccabees, and more recently of the Greeks, and of great religious changes, as Christianity and the Reformation.

But even then it must be remembered, that men must make God their sole reliance, and not stain a sacred cause by using unworthy means. The consciousness of having God on our side, and the conviction that he will not let his cause be lost, if we are faithful to it, and stake everything on it, inspires an enthusiasm, a joyfulness in doing and suffering every thing, and a valor that is invincible, and has enabled the feeblest nations to wrest their liberty from the most powerful.

It is the grand doctrine of the prophets and of all history, that spirit is superior to flesh; that the powers of spirit are always in the end victors over physical power, even the greatest; and that the sacred cause of right and freedom cannot be permanently oppressed by any human power. The greatest evil of our time is, that this faith seems to be lost to it; that to it, force and cunning seem the most effective instrumentalities, and the prevailing public opinion hardly takes any notice of the most crying wrongs, provided they accord with the wishes and passions of the day. It would be easy to prove this, were this the place for it, by looking at the way in which common opinion and its leaders have dealt with the great questions of our day. As for instance the German, the Italian, and how many others, which are in many respects, the most difficult problems that the centuries past have involved in confusion, and left unsolved.

The year 1848, with those that immediately followed it, has taught us a painful lesson in this respect. Not all the governments of Europe have learned from it; and what was then the subject of universal grievance or revolutionary attack, is to-day still in existence, and that in an aggravated measure in some respects. Nor have the people learned from it what would promote their welfare, and now again seek relief in the same ways; and the signs occasion fears of even worse things.

But, come what may, God is not mocked; that is, he will let no task be shirked in his school, and if men will not learn his lessons of eternal wisdom otherwise, he will certainly



beat them into them by his judgments. And he will do this the more severely the more men have set them at naught, (see Isa, xxviii. 9-19.) It is just because the natural man is so slow to receive them, that the divine judgments have so much to do.

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### ART. III.—THE ANTIQUITY OF MAN.

By DANIEL R. GOODWIN, D. D., Provost of the University of Pennsylvania.

The Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man, with remarks on theories of the Origin of Species by Variation. By SIR CHARLES LYELL. Philadelphia : G. W. Childs, 1863.

THE antiquity of man is presented by Sir Charles Lyell exclusively in its geological aspect. He has aimed to put us in possession of a condensed but exhaustive and digested statement of all the extant geological evidence bearing upon the question. Our readers may rightfully demand, that if the subject be discussed in these pages at all, it should be discussed with a distinct recognition of its Biblical and theological bearings. In this sense we propose to discuss it.

Those who are accustomed to talk of Moses, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Plato, and Paul, and Milton, and Swedenborg, as on the same level of authority, or no authority, differing only in the *degree* of their insight and inspiration ; those who are impatient of all fixed dogma, and who, decrying all positive logical, systematic thought as dry and thrifless, love to range in the realms of fancy, or to expatiate in the free air of the universe, unshackled by principles, unrestrained by the laws of consistency, and regardless of established truth ; and those, who, while they profess to admit the Divine inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, yet regard the Pentateuch, not as containing a proper history and chronology, but as a composition of mystical numbers and allegorical narrations, in the style of ancient Hebrew thought, intended not to state sublunary facts, but to adumbrate spiritual truths ; all such will of course turn away from a Biblical treatment of this question as idle, or narrow-minded, or superstitious.

We are far from intending to include Sir Charles Lyell in any such class or classes of persons. He simply *ignores* the Scriptures. He would seem to assume that science has noth-

ing at all to do with the Bible, either for it or against it ; but is simply to mind her own business, and let the Bible take care of itself. And this is perhaps the prevailing tone of the scientific world. But is such a view philosophical ? Is such a position tenable—*scientifically* tenable ? So far as science restricts herself to the discovery, the orderly digesting, and historical statement of *facts*, it is all well ; she need trouble herself neither about the Bible nor about ethics nor mathematics. But the moment she proceeds to enunciate a theory, to draw inferences from her facts, to dogmatize ; she is not at liberty coolly to announce, as verities or as probabilities, doctrines which stand in flagrant contradiction to other facts and other truths resting upon appropriate and commonly received evidence—and that, too, without attempting to refute, or even so much as alluding to those other alleged facts and truths, or to the evidence on which they repose. Such a procedure cannot claim to be either philosophical or scientific. Science must aim at a harmony of truth, at a unity of conception. No truth, no evidence, lies beyond her sphere. If she reject any facts, if she neglect any testimony, she undermines the very foundations of her whole edifice. It is not narrow-mindedness but large-mindedness which leads a true philosopher to take into his account all the facts and all the evidence from all sources and of every kind, before drawing his definitive conclusion.

Nor can we profess ourselves satisfied with the lazy confidence, if not the skeptical indifference, of those professed friends of the Bible, who would quiet all scruples and silence all discussion by the simple suggestion, that, as the Bible and the book of nature have both the same author, they cannot really contradict each other, and that so we need have no fears of scientific discoveries or theories, or trouble ourselves about any modes of reconciling them with the teachings of Scripture. This may do tolerably well *practically*, though not *philosophically*, as long as the Divine authority of the Bible and the truth of revelation are nowhere drawn in question. Otherwise, this very argument, suggested as a prophylactic for the Bible, may become an engine for directly assaulting it. For it may be said : If the Bible and the book of nature have the same author, they could not contradict each other, but they do contradict each other, therefore they have not the same author ; and as all parties agree that God is the author of nature, it follows that God is not the author of the Bible. And unless something further is done in the matter, this will come eventually to be considered the simplest view

of the case, and the most natural conclusion to be drawn from the premises. Indeed either this conclusion *must* be admitted or one of the premises must be denied ; but the major premise is admitted ; therefore the minor premise must be denied—it must be denied that science and revelation contradict each other—denied as a matter of fact, shown to be false, and not merely asserted to be impossible ; for such an *a priori* assertion, however it may express the assurance of faith, cannot have the force of evidence or the weight of an argument. Few men can be expected to have what is called by some, *simple Christian faith*, strong enough to hold *at the same time*, that man was developed from the monkey, hundreds of thousands if not millions and billions of years ago, *and* that man was created by the Almighty on the earth less than ten thousand years since ; that one of these propositions is true scientifically and the other theologically, and, being both true, they cannot contradict each other, but must be somehow consistent, though we cannot tell *how*, and need not trouble ourselves to inquire.

The true state of the case seems to us to be this : Science has its proper authority and proper evidence on which that authority rests ; and so have the Scriptures. In both cases the authority and the evidence are incontrovertible. If, therefore, the two seem to point to opposite conclusions, we may know that it is only a seeming, that neither can in reality testify to falsehood, and consequently our business, as seekers after truth, must be to arrive at their *reconcilement*—not the reconcilement of contradictory *conclusions*, (which even the strongest “Christian” or “Catholic faith,” so-called, must find it difficult to believe possible), but the reconcilement of the facts of science and the testimony of Scripture, which *seem* to point to these contradictory conclusions. This is to be done in most cases by correcting our interpretation of the testimony on one side or the other, or both. It is far more likely either that we have interpreted the Scripture wrong, or have made hasty inferences in our scientific inquiries, or both, than that all the evidence for the truth of the Christian religion and the Divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, on the one hand, or all the evidence for geological science on the other, is a delusion or a falsehood.

But, dogmatically, to enunciate doctrines in palpable contradiction to the testimony of the Scriptures—passing over their testimony in silence—is neither consistent with respect for the Christian religion, nor with the rules of scientific procedure. Suppose two or more professed eye-witnesses had

testified to a certain fact; what should we think of a judge or even of an advocate who, from certain circumstantial evidence, should lay down the direct contrary to that fact as unquestioned truth, without alluding to those witnesses at all? Would it be treating them with respect? And is it a regular scientific procedure positively to announce certain points as established in view of a certain amount of evidence drawn from a certain quarter, while an equal or greater amount of directly antagonistic evidence from another quarter is quietly ignored?

It seems to be too often forgotten that there is *real evidence* for the truth of the Christian religion, and for the Divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, and consequently for the truth of whatever they teach—evidence of facts and testimony—evidence, taken as a whole, of a vastly greater compass and weight than there is for any scientific dogma whatever which stands in contradiction to the Bible or any of its contents—evidence which cannot be annihilated or rebutted by being simply ignored—evidence which, until it is fairly and directly met and refuted, stands firm, and will stand firm forever. If the Scriptures have testified in regard to the matter in hand, their testimony is *a part of the evidence in the case*. If they have not testified, let that be shown, or at least *expressly* assumed. If they have testified falsely, let the falsehood be proved and brought home. If they have testified truly, let the testimony have its due weight. In any event, it has a just claim not to be ignored.

We have spoken of reconciliation by means of correcting our interpretations of Scripture. Some affect to treat such suggestions as evasive, as making the Scripture a measuring line of india-rubber. But this is not so. Whatever may have been the earlier interpretations, no fair-minded critic will now maintain that the statements of Scripture are inconsistent with the creation of matter more than millions of years ago, or with the creation of the lower animals in many pairs, in diverse places, and at various times, or with the sun's being the centre of our system. The truth is, that current discoveries in geology have necessitated vastly more fundamental and numerous changes, from one period of twenty years to another, in the theories of geology itself, than in the interpretation of Scripture. How old, for example, is the glacial or the *glacier* theory, or that of the repeated submergence and elevation of continents? Nor can the science of geology claim to have *yet* reached such a complete, stable, and certain form, as to have a right to demand that

the interpretation of Scripture should be definitively conformed to its existing theories, or, if that is impossible, that the Scripture should be given up altogether.

Within the domain of science itself, contrasts and antilogies are by no means wanting. Indeed, so many and so great are they that the "oppositions of science" are a striking characteristic. There have been the neptunian, the plutonian, and at last the glacial, theories in geology; each supported by earnest advocates and a large amount of evidence. One explains everything by central heat and a gradual cooling, another by superficial ice and a gradual thawing. How remarkable the contrast between the historical skepticism, which, having shown the early Roman story to be legendary, would discredit the narratives of the Old and New Testaments; and the historical credulity, which is ready to admit the vast antiquity claimed by the Chinese, the Hindoos, or the Egyptians—claims chiefly guaranteed by so-called astronomical records, which no more prove those who made them to have lived at the time of the phenomena described than the calculation of an eclipse to take place a thousand years hence would prove that the calculator is living or will live at that time; a contrast the more striking as the skepticism and the credulity are equally hostile to the authority of the Bible. Another still more remarkable contrast appears, between the scientific strictness, which cannot believe the present races of men to have proceeded from one common origin; and the scientific largeness, which is ready to assume that not only man but all animals, and not only animals but all animal and vegetable forms together, have been propagated from one common original primordial germ, and that germ developed from the great fire-mist by a happy concurrence of atoms and circumstances—and that fire-mist developed, one knows not how, from the vast womb of eternal nothingness. And here again the strictness and the largeness seem to have been not the less earnestly espoused by their respective advocates, because both alike contradict the apparent dicta of Revelation; Herod and Pilate, on one point, were friends. We may also note yet another contrast—between the readiness to perceive marks of intelligence, human intelligence, in the chippings and cleavage of certain wedges of stone rudely resembling edged tools, and the reluctance to acknowledge the proofs of intelligence—intelligence only vastly *more* than *human*—in the numberless adaptations and harmonies of nature.

It is the universal acknowledgment that the geological tes-

timony tends with overwhelming evidence to indicate man's comparatively recent origin. This is in perfect coincidence with the received teaching of Scripture.

The apparent exceptional facts are, therefore, to be scrutinized with great care and jealousy, and no contrary inference to be admitted from them without absolute necessity. This on purely scientific grounds. The Scriptures only reiterate and confirm the same demand.

Sir Charles Lyell was formerly an uncompromising opponent of the immense antiquity which some were disposed to ascribe to man. He still earnestly insists upon man's *comparatively* recent origin; but his ideas of *recent* have wonderfully expanded, so that now he hesitates not, as we understand him, to ascribe to man an antiquity of some hundreds of thousands of years. [See page 204, etc.] Now the Scripture chronology of man's existence on the earth, is not absolutely fixed. Various estimates have been given, from about 6,000 to some 7,500 years. And if one or two thousand years more were required, perhaps it would not be a desperate undertaking to reconcile the text to such a demand. But to provide for such a period as a hundred thousand or a million of years since Adam, exceeds the utmost stretch of any method of criticism which has been or is likely to be suggested, short of the suicidal scheme of "mystical numbers." It might, indeed, be suggested that, as there were undoubtedly other races of animals many ages before the time assigned in the Scriptures to the creation of Adam—and death among them, too; for many of them had perished long before Adam was made, not to say, before he fell—so it is not impossible that a race physically, and perhaps in other respects, corresponding to man himself, may have existed and passed away before the creation of Adam. But all Pre-Adamite theories are beset with peculiar difficulties. The practical question is, whether it be necessary, after all, to admit so high an antiquity of the human race as that above stated?

The evidence heretofore alleged for the affirmative had been chiefly drawn from the discovery, in certain caves, of human bones in juxtaposition with those of extinct species of animals. But this evidence had been examined and rejected by Dr. Buckland, and other of the most distinguished geologists, and by none more emphatically than by Sir Charles Lyell himself,—who, with it, rejected also other evidence alleged to be presented by certain exhumations on the banks of the Mississippi. But the recent discovery of certain



bones in peculiar relations in the Brixham cave, and of certain flint instruments near St. Acheul and elsewhere, in a peculiar position and peculiar associations, have seemed to Sir Charles to furnish such incontrovertible proofs of the high antiquity of man, that he has been led to review the other evidence also, and to assign to it a weight which he had before denied. But, after all, it must be evident that *the whole case rests upon the later evidence from the Brixham cave and the antique flints*; for, the explanations previously given of the earlier evidence are as good now as they were before, when Sir Charles Lyell, with the facts fresh from under his own observation, deemed them satisfactory. The great array of proofs, therefore, which he now presents, need not frighten us. Nor is it enough to say that those facts which had already been shown not to prove the high antiquity of man, may nevertheless go to confirm the probability of that fact deduced from later proofs; for, however probable that antiquity might be in view of the scientific evidence, in case there were nothing in the Scriptures to the contrary; still, as long as there is any authority in the Scriptures or any evidence of their truth, their testimony must be taken into account in estimating the general or ultimate *probability* of any conclusion to which it applies. A scientific theory which contradicts the Scriptures cannot be held by a Christian to be *probable*; while the *very same theory* with the same evidence and no more, had it been consistent with the Scriptures, might have been so held. But any facts undeniably ascertained, or any theory incontestably proved by facts, must be admitted at all events; and, if the Scriptures cannot be interpreted or reasonably conceived to square with such facts or theory, either the Divine inspiration of the Scriptures must be given up altogether, or must be held consistent with errors and misstatements in matters of fact. We do not now ask, therefore, what conclusion would be scientifically *probable*, if the Scriptures were left out of the question; but we ask whether it has been incontestably proved from facts—from any facts,—that man has existed on the earth longer than a reasonable interpretation of the Scriptures would admit? We shall demand, we feel authorized to demand, clear, undeniable, incontestable proofs. We shall claim the right to subject the evidence to the strictest scrutiny and the severest tests of verification, and to reduce its weight to the least possible measure. This right we claim, but it may not be necessary to exercise it. We shall see.

The peaty records of the earliest period of the stone age

and the "shell-mounds," or *kjökken-mödding*, in Denmark, are set down, according to the estimate of Steenstrup and other good authorities, at a minimum of 4000 years; "and the signs of man's existence have not been traced down to the lowest or amorphous stratum." p. 17.

"It is still a question" whether any of the subaqueous repositories of ancient relics in the Swiss lacustrine dwellings "go back so far in time as the 'shell-mounds' in Denmark." Several calculations, however, are given from M. Morlot, Troyon, and others, which assign to the oldest Swiss relics an antiquity of from 5000 to 7000 years. pp. 26-28. But it is afterwards admitted that "the calculations which certain archæologists and geologists have indulged in as to precise dates must be considered, as yet, tentative—at best but rough approximations. Much collateral evidence will be required to confirm their estimates of 4000 or 7000 years as the lowest antiquity of certain monuments." p. 372.

"The depth of overlying peat affords no safe criterion for calculating the age of the cabin or village," for bogs have sometimes been known to burst out and flow forth at somewhat the rate of ordinary lava currents, overwhelming woods and cottages to the depth of 15 feet.

Artesian perforations have shown that there has been a general subsidence of the deltas and alluvial formations of the Po and Ganges. Whether the same has taken place in Egypt remains to be proved. According to Mr. Horner, the amount of matter thrown down by the Nile in different parts of the plain from Assouan to Cairo, varies so much that to strike an average with any approach to accuracy must be difficult. He holds the estimate of 5 inches in a century to be very vague and founded on insufficient data. The brick found at the depth of 72 feet by Linant Bey may, for aught we know, be "comparatively modern;" for the boring may have been made where an arm of the river had been "silted up." Herodotus tells us that in his time those spots from which the Nile waters had been shut out for centuries appeared sunk. pp. 35-39. It may be added that Herodotus estimates that the Nile would fill a space equal to the Red Sea in 10 to 20 thousand years. But it need not be assumed that the deposit from the Nile or any other river has always gone on at the same rate. Indeed the assumption involves an absurdity; for it would imply that the river should have been flowing from all eternity with about the same volume and in about the same channel, while yet it—each single river—would have deposited in the course of ages more mat-

ter than is contained in the globe of the earth. The process by which the river has reached its present state cannot have been uniform; it may have had a sudden beginning, and a much more rapid development in its earlier course.

The mound builders of North America must have been very ancient, it is thought, but it is admitted that nothing is alleged to show that they were earlier than the Danish stone period. "I cannot form an opinion as to the value of the chronological calculations which have led Dr. Dowler to ascribe to his skeleton an antiquity of 50,000 years." As to the estimates of the rate of upheaval or depression of the coasts, "they must all be considered in the present state of science, as tentative and conjectural; since the rate of movement of the land may not have been uniform, and its direction not always the same." pp. 41-55.

Thus it will be seen that we have nothing to fear from the monuments and tools of the ages of iron, bronze, and stone, of Scandinavia; nor from the submerged villages of the Swiss lakes; nor from the deltas of the Po, the Ganges, the Nile, or the Mississippi—Dr. Dowler's 50,000 years old relic inclusive. Sir Charles Lyell knows nothing in connection with any of these cases, which would require us to stretch our chronology much beyond its ordinary limits. He does indeed venture to estimate that the formation of the delta of the Mississippi has required a minimum of 100,000 years; and the 600 feet of elevation of Norway a period of 24,000 years. But these estimates may not directly involve anything in regard to the antiquity of man, and, besides, he has himself shown that they must be regarded as mere conjectural assumptions.

The cave evidence comes next to be re-examined.

"After giving no small weight to the arguments of M. Desnoyers, and the writings of Dr. Buckland on the same subject, and visiting myself several caves in Germany, I came to the opinion that the human bones mixed with those of extinct animals, in osseous breccias and cavern mud, in different parts of Europe, were probably not coeval. The caverns having been at one period the dens of wild beasts, and having served at other times as places of human habitation, worship, sepulture, concealment or defence, one might easily conceive that the bones of man and those of animals, which were strewn over the floors of subterranean cavities, or which had fallen into tortuous rents connecting them with the surface, might, when swept away by floods, be mingled in one pro-

miscuous heap in the same ossiferous mud or breccia." p. 62.

Such was Sir Charles Lyell's earlier view of cave evidence. He still admits it to have weight ; but he now thinks that the convincing evidence from other quarters of the contemporaneity of man, with the mammoth and other extinct species of animals, renders the other reading of the evidence from cases quite probable. Dr. Schmerling thought he discovered in the Liège caverns evidence of the contemporaneity of man and the cave-bear ; but all this Sir Charles himself had found capable of an explanation negating so high an antiquity of man, until subsequent discoveries led him to change his mind. Among these later discoveries was that of Prof. Malaise, who found in the cavern of Engihoul, at "the depth of two feet below the crust of stalagmite, three fragments of a human skull, and two perfect lower jaws with teeth, all associated in such a manner with the bones of bears, large pachyderms, and ruminants, and so precisely resembling them in color and state of preservation, as to leave no doubt on his mind that man was contemporary with the extinct animals." But we are entirely unable to see that the answer already given to the other cave evidence is not equally applicable to this. And as to the human bones being found at levels inferior even to those of the extinct animals, "we may suppose that a stream, after flowing for a long period at one level, cuts its way down to an inferior suite of caverns, and, flowing through them for centuries, chokes them up with debris ; and afterwards rises once more to its original higher level." As to the changes which must have taken place in physical geography in connection with and subsequently to the formation or the filling up of these caverns, it is expressly admitted that "it is more than probable that the rate of change was once far more active than it is now ;" an important principle, which the author would have done well to have borne in mind elsewhere. "But," he adds, "although we may be unable to estimate the *minimum* of time required for these changes, we cannot fail to perceive that the duration of the period must have been *very protracted*,"—a somewhat singular juxtaposition of thought !

A skull from the Engis cave, and another from Neanderthal, near Düsseldorf, have been alleged to prove the very great antiquity of man. But after all the elaborate measurements, and significant comparisons, and scientific circumstances given from Prof. Huxley, it is formally admitted that the Neanderthal skull may be no older than the Borreby skulls of Denmark ; which belong to the stone period, and

were subsequent to the age of the mammoth and his compeers. It is also admitted that the Engis skull, disinterred by Dr. Schmerling, near Liège, and said to be associated with the mammoth, rhinoceros, bear, hyena, and other quadrupeds of extinct species,—is nevertheless a skull of a much more advanced type, and probably belonged to a much higher race than the Neanderthal and Borreby skulls. Indeed its size and proportions correspond in a striking manner with the measurements of an English skull, noted in the catalogue of the Hunterian Museum as typically *Caucasian*. With a horizontal circumference of half an inch less than the English specimen, it has a vertical height of  $4\frac{1}{4}$  inches against 4 4-10, *i. e.*, it has the advantage in height of 35-100 of an inch over the Caucasian standard. "The fossil man of Denise," too, although alleged to have been contemporary with the mammoth, and coeval with the last eruptions of the Le Puy volcanoes, is allowed to be of the ordinary Caucasian or European type. pp. 75, 89, and 200. This certainly looks inauspicious for Prof. Huxley's doctrine of development; for he will not deny that the greater brain and higher intelligence will have, on the whole, the better chance in the struggle for existence. He sees the difficulty, and makes his escape from it only by taking refuge in the possibilities of the vast ages of a past eternity; in comparison with which the few hundreds of years which may have elapsed since the mammoth period are but as yesterday.

But Sir Charles Lyell is very bold, and draws from the phenomena of the Neanderthal skull a direct argument in favor of Darwin's theory; for, says he, they are "just what might have been anticipated if the laws of variation were such as the transmutationists require. For if we conceive this cranium to be very ancient, it exemplifies a less advanced stage of progressive development and improvement. If it be a comparatively modern race, [sic] owing its peculiarities of conformation to degeneracy, it is an illustration of what the botanists have called 'atavism,' or the tendency of varieties to revert to an ancestral type, which type, in proportion to its antiquity, would be of lower grade." Waiving the question which naturally forces itself upon us here, whether, by way of illustration of this tendency of "atavism," our experience has furnished us with any well authenticated instances of the Caucasian man reverting to the monkey type, from which, according to this theory, he sprung—we cannot help observing that in this reasoning Sir Charles has a very easy way of removing difficulties, a way by which any one

may prove almost anything. If such reasoning is accepted by scientific men, let them complain no more of the strained efforts of theologians to reconcile the facts of science with the dicta of Scripture. And yet, if the doctrine of the transmutationist were not a mere hypothesis but had already been incontrovertibly established by proper and positive proofs,—as we claim to be the case with the Holy Scriptures—we should not object to such a method of reconciliation. Under those circumstances, it might be the most reasonable thing that could be done. But as it is, the case is totally different.

Thus far we still feel authorized, in accordance with the views previously stated by Sir Charles Lyell himself, to pronounce unsatisfactory and insufficient the evidence of man's antiquity derived from the supposed contemporaneity of cave-deposits—those in which the Engis skull was found inclusive.

But now comes one of the “undeniable proofs,” that, viz., from excavations in the Brixham caverns. “No human bones were obtained anywhere during these excavations, but many flint knives, chiefly from the lowest part of the bone-earth; and one of the most perfect lay at the depth of 13 feet from the surface, and was covered with bone-earth of that thickness. From a similar position was taken one of those siliceous nuclei, or cores, from which flint-flakes had been struck off on every side. Neglecting the less perfect specimens, some of which were met with even in the lowest gravel, about fifteen knives, recognized as artificially formed by the most experienced antiquaries, were taken from the bone-earth, and usually from near the bottom. Such knives, considered apart from the associated mammalia, afford in themselves no safe criterion of antiquity, as they might belong to any part of the age of stone, similar tools being sometimes met with in tumuli posterior in date to the era of the introduction of bronze. But the anteriority of those at Brixham to the extinct animals is demonstrated not only by the occurrence at one point in overlying stalagmite of the bone of a cave-bear, but also by the discovery at the same level in the bone-earth, and in close proximity to a very perfect flint-tool, of the entire left hind leg of a cave-bear. This specimen, which was shown me by Dr. Falconer and Mr. Pengelly, was exhumed from the earthy deposit in the reindeer gallery; near its junction with the flint-knife gallery, at the distance of about 65 feet from the main entrance. The mass of earth containing it was removed entire, and the matrix cleared away carefully by Dr. Falconer, in the presence of Mr. Pen-



gelly. Every bone was in its natural place, the femur, tibia, fibula, ankle-bone, or astragalus, all in juxtaposition. Even the patella, or detached bone of the knee-pan, was searched for, and not in vain. Here, therefore, we have evidence of an entire limb not having been washed in a fossil state out of an older alluvium, and then swept afterwards into a cave, so as to be mingled with flint implements, but having been introduced when clothed with its flesh, or at least when it had the separate bones bound together by their natural ligaments, and in that state buried in mud."

"If they were not all of contemporary date, it is clear from this case, and from the humerus of *Ursus Spelaeus*, before cited, as found in a floor of stalagmite, that the bear lived after the flint tools were manufactured, or, in other words, that man in this district preceded the cave-bear." pp. 100, 101.

To this "demonstration" of the anteriority of man to the cave-bear, we answer :

(1.) If the "fifteen flint-knives" were selected from heaps of ruder fragments, is it so certain that they are really of artificial formation ?

(2.) It was remarked by Mr. Pengelly that "the pebbles in the gravel and the bones in the loam had their longer axes parallel to the direction of the tunnels and fissures, showing that they were deposited by the action of the stream ;" that is to say, that they were brought from some other locality ; and how long they may have previously been in that locality nobody knows.

(3.) Unless we can be sure that the *stalagmite* referred to must have been formed more than, say, three or four thousand years ago, its complication with the remaining evidence will prove nothing.

(4.) The complete bones of the hind leg of the cave-bear may have been carried together to the same site in the cavern by various accidents, even ages after the death of the animal. For example, they may have been buried any number of centuries in alluvium ; then, the bed of the stream having shifted its position, they may have been left one autumn just exposed on the surface of the bottom in some shallow place, may have been frozen into the ice in the winter, and so, in the spring-flood, transported entire with the ice in which they were imbedded and deposited in the cavern where they were found.

(5.) The cave-bear himself, or a few straggling specimens, may have survived to a later period than has generally been supposed.

The other source of "undeniable evidence" is the flint instruments discovered, no longer in caves, but in peculiar geological relations in the alluvium of the valley of the Somme, near Abbeville, and particularly at St. Acheul.

Supposing no trickery in regard to these flint instruments—and there undoubtedly has been trickery in some similar cases—the *peculiar* proof of their great age under these circumstances must depend ultimately upon the length of time required for the formation of the *peat* in the valley below them. To this Sir Charles Lyell seems half inclined, with M. Boucher de Perthes, to assign a period of some 30,000 years. Still he admits that "differences in the humidity of the climate and in the intensity and duration of summer's heat and winter's cold, as well as diversity in the species of plants which most abound, would cause the peat to grow more or less rapidly, not only when we compare two distinct countries in Europe, but the same country at two distant periods." p. 111. And in his "Principles of Geology," he had already stated that a "boat loaded with bricks was found in the lowest layer of the peat in the valley of the Somme;" that "within 50 years after the destruction of a forest in Ross-shire, the inhabitants were digging fuel from a peat moss to which the fall of the trees had given rise:" that in Hatfield moss, 1800 years old, were found trees 100 feet long, and Roman roads covered 8 feet deep; and that peat is now found in various parts of Britain and Germany, where forests stood in Roman times. It does not seem necessary, therefore, to assign to this peat so high an antiquity.

Then, as to the scooping out of the deep valley or channel, and the formation of the different alluvial beds, it is to be remembered that the changes in the relative level of sea and land are not confined to one subsidence or one elevation, "but have comprised oscillations." p. 112.

The bones of extinct animals may have been deposited on the lowest beds long before the flint implements were deposited with them; and afterwards may have been removed by floods or similar accidents, from one place to another, and thus mixed up with the tools which may have been subsequently deposited at different higher levels. "No vestige of human remains has been found with these bones and implements." p. 145. To explain why human bones are not found with those of the coeval extinct animals, it is suggested that "the primitive inhabitants of the valley of the Somme may have been too wary and sagacious to be often surprised and drowned by floods which swept away many an incautious

elephant or rhinoceros, lion and ox." p. 148. Yet we are told that "many stone coffins of the Gallo-Roman period have been dug out of the upper portion of the alluvial mass." p. 134.

That we have not assumed any incredible complexity of movements and geological changes to account for the position and mutual relations of the bones and the flint tools in the valley of the Somme, may be seen from the following significant passage: "Shiftings of the site of the main channel of the river, the frequent removal of gravel and sand previously deposited, and the throwing down of new alluvium, the flooding of tributaries, the rising and sinking of the land, fluctuations in the cold and heat of the climate—all these changes seem to have given rise to that complexity in the fluvial deposits of the Thames, which accounts for the slow progress we have hitherto made in determining their order of succession, and that of the imbedded groups of quadrupeds. It may happen as at Brentford and Ilford, that sand-pits in two adjoining fields may each contain distinct species of elephant and rhinoceros; and they may occur at the same depth from the surface, and yet be referable *each* [sic]\* to *two* subdivisions of the post-pliocene epoch, separated by thousands of years." pp. 159, 160. If this be true of the Thames, why not, perchance, of other rivers also?

The upheaval of the coast of Sardinia near Cagliari, to the height of 300 feet, presenting marine shells with fragments of antique pottery, is forthwith estimated to have required 12,000 years, and the age of the pottery is assumed to be at least equal. p. 178. Whereas the upheaval may have taken place in 5 years or a 1,000 years, and the pottery may have been deposited at various subsequent times.

As to determining the comparative age of bones by chemical analysis, Sir Charles admits it "possible that after a bone has gone on losing its animal matter up to a certain point, it may then part with no more, so long as it continues envel-

\* The carelessness and slovenliness of Sir Charles Lyell's expressions are quite surprising. "Reduced to one-fourth their altitude," should have been "enlarged to four times their altitude." p. 107. "Submarine" should have been "supramarine," or "fluvial." p. 111. So we have "subsiding five feet" for "rising five feet." p. 335. We are told of "blocks of limestone and serpentine which have been brought down from Monte Rosa, through the gorge of Ivrea, after having traveled for a distance of 100 miles." Where, then, did they *begin* this journey of 100 miles? And again we read that "the mud of the main river passed far up the tributary valleys, just as that of the Mississippi, during the floods, flows far up the Ohio, carrying its mud with it into the basin of that river."

oped in the same matrix, so that if all the bones have lain for many thousands of years in a particular soil, they may all have reached long ago the maximum of decomposition attainable in such a matrix." He might have added, that of two bones found lying in close proximity, the more recent may, in consequence perhaps of some greater previous exposure, have undergone greater decomposition than its elder neighbor.\*

It is admitted that the phenomena of the Aurignac fossils might seem "to imply that some of the extinct mammalia survived nearly to our time, (*i. e.* nearly to the historical period :) First, because of the modern style of works of art found with their remains at Aurignac. Secondly, because of the absence of any signs of change in the physical geography of the country since the cave was used for a place of sepulture." This is then controverted with more or less specious arguments; but the rejoinder itself contains one or two significant admissions. "We must remember that it is the normal state of the earth's surface to be undergoing great alterations in one place, while other areas, often in close proximity, remain for ages without any modification. In one region rivers are deepening and widening their channels, or the waves of the sea are undermining cliffs, or the land is sinking beneath or rising above the waters, century after century, or the volcano is pouring forth torrents of lava or showers of ashes; while in tracts hard by, the ancient forest or extensive heath, or the splendid city continue scathless and motionless." p. 191.

In like manner, after describing certain dislocations and convulsions within a circumscribed area in the island of Möen, and giving the proofs of their very recent date, the

\*Chemical analysis is reported to have recently been applied to some purpose in testing the antiquity of a human jaw-bone said to have been disinterred, together with a large number of flint hatchets, at Moulin-Quignon, near Abbeville. The genuineness of this bone and of these hatchets was supported by evidence apparently as irrefragable as exists for that of any of the bones or tools said to have been discovered in this vicinity. But, in the first place, the celebrated geologist, M. Elir Beaumont, is reported to have declared that this locality does not belong to the diluvium at all, but to a period quite within the range of the ordinary chronology. In the second place, the "marsupial invasion," which, Prof. Huxley had flattered himself, corresponded marvelously with the type of the Australian jaw, was found likewise in a considerable number of specimens of human jaws from a London churchyard. And, finally, upon sawing up one of the molars, not only was the section found to be white and fresh-looking, but upon chemical analysis, it was ascertained to be full of gelatine, and thus unquestionably to be a tooth from a recent jaw-bone. For within certain limits, the negative testimony of chemistry is unanswerable.

author adds: "Hence we may be permitted to suspect that in some other regions, where we have no such means at our command for testing the exact date of certain movements, the time of their occurrence may be far more modern than we usually suppose." p. 348. From observations "at the time of the *shock*, it was ascertained that the extreme upheaval [in the island of New Zealand] of certain ancient rocks followed a line of fault running at least 90 miles from south to north into the interior; and, what is of great geological interest, immediately to the east of this fault, the country, consisting of tertiary strata, remains unmoved or stationary." p. 349.

After developing his glacial and glacier theories, and that of several successive elevations and subsidences of the western coast of Europe—freezing and thawing, strewing and scraping, dipping and drying the land over and over again with the greatest ease and nonchalance imaginable, all as if he had superintended the process himself—Sir Charles confidently and naively predicts that "it is by repeated efforts of this kind, made by geologists who are prepared for the partial failure of some of their first attempts"—and who, he might have added, have seen most of the similar attempts of their predecessors, of thirty years standing and upwards, completely and universally exploded; "that we shall ultimately arrive at a knowledge of the long series of geographical revolutions which have followed each (?) other since the beginning of the post-pliocene period." pp. 274, 281, 282.

Having gravely given M. Morlot's estimate of the age of the higher delta of the Tinièn as 100,000 years, the author cautiously adds: "If the lower flattened cone of Tinièn be referred in great part to the age of the oldest lake dwellings, the higher one might, perhaps, correspond with the post-pliocene period of St. Acheul, or the era when man and the *elephas primigenius* flourished together; but no human remains or works of art have as yet been found in deposits of this age, or in any alluvium containing the bones of extinct mammalia, in Switzerland." p. 322. "Should future researches confirm the opinion that the Natchez man co-existed with the mastodon, it would not enhance the value of the geological evidence in favor of man's antiquity," when compared with the discoveries of Abbeville and Amiens. p. 205. "The oldest memorials of our species at present discovered in Great Britain are posterior in date to the boulder clay." "No flint tools have yet been discovered" in the lower beds corresponding with the old alluvium of Amiens and Abbe-

ville. p. 228. Prof. Crahay, of Louvain, had described certain human remains discovered near Maestricht, and alleged to be of extraordinary antiquity; but Sir Charles Lyell declares that he has "had no opportunity of verifying the authenticity (?) of the Professor's statements." p. 339. "As to the human skeleton alleged to have been found in ancient loess at the village of Keer on the right bank of the Meuse, opposite Maestricht, I explored the locality in company with M. Broquet, and we satisfied ourselves that the proofs advanced in support of its antiquity cannot be depended upon." p. 340.

After enunciating a number of "may-be's" and probabilities," Sir Charles discourses thus: "We may likewise *presume* that the people of post-pliocene date, who have left their memorials in the valley of the Thames, were . . . anterior to the time when the rivers of that region had settled into their present channels." "The vast distance of time which separated the origin of the higher and lower level gravels of the valley of the Somme, both of them rich in flint implements of similar shape (although those of oval form predominate in the newer gravels), leads to the conclusion that the state of the arts in those early times remained stationary for almost indefinite periods." p. 376. Is it not quite as reasonable and as scientific to infer that this phenomenon renders the alleged vast distance of intervening time altogether improbable? Or shall we believe, with the transmutationist, that primitive men, who for so many ages used flint tools so rude as "to cause the unpractised eye to doubt whether they afford unmistakable evidence of design, if they possessed the same improvable nature as their posterity, could not have been endued with any superior intellectual powers or with inspired knowledge," but must have been a dumb and filthy herd, but just removed from the character and condition of the brutes.

"Quum prorepserunt primis animalia terris?"

For the doctrine of man's bestial origin is at least as old as Horace and Lucretius.

While Sir Charles Lyell denies human degeneracy from a primitive type and condition, he easily conceives of protracted barbarism. "When they had gradually penetrated to remote regions by land or water—drifted sometimes by storms and currents in canoes to an unknown shore—barriers of mountains, deserts, or seas, which oppose no obstacle to mutual intercourse between civilized nations, would insure the complete isolation for tens or thousands of centuries of tribes



in a primitive state of barbarism." But might not arts already known be lost under such circumstances, and great degeneracy take place in much less time than that? Might not the *individuals*, thus separated, be entirely unacquainted with the processes of the arts—the smelting of iron ore, for example—which were already well known among their *parent tribes*, and thus those arts be, in the new settlements, entirely lost?

It is maintained, contrary to the received doctrine, that, in the history both of the vegetable and animal kingdom, there is "no evidence of steady progression in time from lower to higher organisms, but there are often retrogradations." As to the correctness of this statement, much will depend upon the interpretation of the word "steady." In one sense of this word the doctrine disputed has never been affirmed; in another sense of the same word, it cannot safely be denied.

The transmutationists, we are told, are not of course progressionists. "They are too profoundly impressed with the imperfections of the record to entertain any such positive theory." Would it not be as well for them to omit the "*such*"? Or, if they will have a theory, to base it rather upon what the "imperfect record" contains, than upon what it does not contain; to reason rather from what we know than from what we do not know?

Darwin maintains that the theory of indefinite variability of species, is no more arbitrary than that of their fixedness. We have no right to presume, says he, that the limit which we may have reached is absolutely impassable. But he forgets to remember that after all, it is confessedly the "*limit* which we have reached." And he expressly admits that "varieties which are nearly allied, cross readily with each other and with the parent stock, and such crossing tends to *keep the species true to its type*, while forms which are less nearly related, although they may intermarry, *produce no mule offspring capable of perpetuating their kind*." p. 411. This is a pregnant truth, and may furnish a *point d'appui* for the total demolition of the Darwinian theory.

The claims of this theory are stated to be:

(1.) "It dispenses with the necessity of the laws of progression, and accounts for degradations." But so does the theory of original species, if the facts require the dispensation; for if this is consistent with the Divine wisdom in one theory (Darwin's) so is it surely in the other.

(2.) "It makes all classification really genealogical." So far as *species* are concerned this is undoubtedly the true

view ; but when pushed further it is exceedingly precarious, and ultimately becomes manifestly false.

(3.) "It explains why all living and extinct beings are united by complex affinities into one grand system." And so does one original scheme in the Divine mind, however it may be supposed to be carried into execution.

(4.) "It explains rudimentary organs." And so does the supposition of an original harmonious scheme ; if indeed, this is to be called a *supposition*. pp. 412, 413.

Dr. Hooker, a transmutationist, confesses that "the majority of species are so far constant within the range of our experience and their forms and characters so faithfully handed down, through thousands of generations, that they admit of being treated as if they were permanent and immutable. But, (he adds) the range of our experience is so limited that it will not account for a single fact in the present geographical distribution or origin of any one species of plant, nor for the amount of variation it has undergone, nor will it indicate the time when it first appeared, nor the form it had when created." pp. 418, 419. It would seem, therefore, that these facts, if learned at all, must be learned, not from science, but from revelation.

We are told that the new species of animals naturally introduced into Australia, are analagous to their predecessors ; while utterly different species, when artificially transported from abroad flourish in Australia even better than its native races. pp. 422, 423. And what is intended to be the inference from all this ? Why, manifestly, that it is therefore, improbable that the later species thus naturally introduced were new and original creations ; because, in that case, their Creator would certainly have introduced the species best fitted to the place and the circumstances. And, we suppose, their is not a transmutationist who would not be ready to use the argument and make the inference. But do not the transmutationists assure us that they are not atheists, that they would not exclude God's agency or banish him from the world ; in short, that their theory is perfectly consistent with the teachings of natural theology ? What advantage, then, has their explanation of the alleged Australian phenomenon over the other ? If it be consistent with infinite wisdom to have introduced the successive species of animals in Australia, in the order in which they have been naturally introduced by the process of variation and natural selection ; why not equally consistent to have introduced them by any other process, say, that of special creations ? Special creations do not preclude a uni-

versal scheme ; rather, with the idea of God, they presuppose it. If a personal will seems *arbitrary* ; without a personal will natural selection is certainly *fortuitous*. But the Divine will is not arbitrary. Even miracles, we may be permitted to believe, are not mere hap-hazard, capricious, interpositions, but in perfect accordance with an original Divine plan, with fixed, universal laws of wisdom and goodness. One thing at least seems plain from the alleged phenomena ; viz., that the external circumstances of organized beings, do not reduce the progressive developments of organization which are best fitted to them.

When we urge the actual geological evidence against the transmutationists, they reply that we can *imagine* explanations of the apparent geological gaps consistent with constant transmutations. "If in the battle of life," say they, "the competition is keenest between closely allied varieties and species, as Darwin contends, many forms can never be of long duration, nor have a wide range, and these must often pass away without leaving behind them any fossil memorials." p. 426. But can any actual instances be given by way of illustration ? Besides, of what weight this suggestion may be will be seen by considering two things ; (1.) that the rate of variation is held to be most rapid in the most highly organized beings ; and (2.) that man himself, the most highly organized of all, has continued hundreds of thousands and even millions of years without any secular perceptible variation at all.

It may be answered to the transmutationist that, so long as he confines himself to facts, the most he can do, is, either simply to diminish the *number* of received species, or to establish exceptional instances of protean forms.

According to Sir Charles Lyell, "In whatever manner the changes have been brought about, whether by variation and natural selection, or by any other causes, the rates of change have been greater where the grade of organization is higher." "Mammalia vary, on the whole, at a more rapid rate than animals lower in the scale of being." p. 422, 423.

The problem with such a scheme is, how to begin at all ; and, once begun, how not to end too soon.

The movement of such a series must have been *infinitely* slow at first, and must be *infinitely* rapid at last. But how did this compound geometrical progression take its rise ? Did it begin with a Divine creation, or with absolute nothing ? If with the former, then an act of Divine creation is not a scientific absurdity ; if with the latter, then it never began at

all. But the rate of change, it seems, is constantly increasing with onward progress : when, then, will it reach its maximum ? And why not reach that point at one period in eternity as well as at another ? Or is the progression infinite ? or will the movement return back in a circle ? But again how can that consistently be ? Why should we be at one point in the infinite progression or the endless circle rather than at another ? and how could one point be distinguished from another ? The truth is, that a finite development in an infinite progression or an endless circling, *without a source and basis in a Divine personal will* is a *felo de se*. "Development" will not explain the universe. It can furnish no cause or ground for the course of nature. At best it can but state the fact—a fact, taken by itself, utterly inexplicable. It is only a personal, Divine, *creative will*, that can explain the evolution of the finite in the infinite ; only moral causes that can solve the enigma of the universe. Positive science there may be ; but mere positive philosophy is no philosophy at all ; it is the abdication of philosophy ; it is, as we have just said, an act of suicide. The problem is not how to get a personal will, as an afterthought, into a ready made world. Personality lies at the basis of all human thought and consciousness. Personality must be the very root and postulate of all human philosophy ; it is the key which unlocks the profoundest and otherwise inscrutable mysteries of being.

"In our attempts to account for the origin of species"—we heartily thank Sir Charles Lyell for this clear and pointed statement,—“we find ourselves soon brought face to face with the working of a law of development of so high an order as to stand nearly in the same relation as the Deity himself to man's finite understanding, a law capable of adding new and powerful causes, such as the moral and intellectual faculties of the human race, to a system of nature which had gone for millions of years without the intervention of any analogous cause. If we confound 'Variation' or 'Natural Selection' with such creational laws, we deify secondary causes or immeasurably exaggerate their influence.” p. 469.

It is a question of life and death for the transmutationist, whether the difference between man and the lower animals is a difference of kind or only of degree. Many of the gaps, we are told, which divide species from species of brutes, are as great in a physical point of view, as that which divides man from the nearest allied mammalia. If this be true, it will prove nothing to the purpose, until it is shown that such “gaps” among brutes can gradually be bridged

over. Are there any facts to show that such chasms have ever actually been filled up or leaped across? Do they not actually determine differences of kind? Prof. Rollerton contends that even "differences in the *quantity* of brain may amount to a difference in kind. The psychical power, instead of depending on the bodily structure, may play the first instead of the second part in a progressive scheme."

On the other hand, Prof. Agassiz finds the same *kind* of intellectual and moral powers in the lower animals as in man. And Prof. Huxley adds, "they are capable of shame and sorrow, and, though they may have no logic nor conscious ratiocination, no one who has watched their ways can doubt that they possess that power of *rational cerebration* which evolves reasonable acts from the facts furnished by the senses, a process which takes fully as large a share as conscious reason in human activity." And what if it does? so long as "conscious reason" is something different from any degree of "rational cerebration."

Quatrefages, one of the most eminent of modern physiologists, maintains that man must form a *kingdom* by himself, if ever we permit his moral and intellectual endowments to have their due weight in classification." And we are glad to see that Sir Charles Lyell expressly recognizes the fact that "some of the arguments in favor of a future state may be common to man and the lower animals, but they are by no means the weightiest and most relied on."

If we were to signalize the proper distinction between the human and the brute intellect, we should not content ourselves with that exclusively insisted on by Dr. Sumner, the *indefinite improbability* of the human mind. That is a very important point, but we should insist also upon three other points of generic distinction: (1.) The power of apprehending general and necessary truths as such, (2.) the power of apprehending the distinction between right and wrong as such, and (3.) the power of logical discourse in language. There is no race of men so degraded but that one might hopefully undertake to teach their children to comprehend the mathematical proposition that the sum of the angles of *every* plane triangle *must* be equal to two right angles, or the ethical truth that it is *wrong* to *covet* one's neighbor's goods, or how to use language as an instrument of thought in varied discourse. But, on the other hand, there is no species of the lower animals so educated that the transmutationist himself, if he had the pick of the most intelligent specimens of the most intelligent variety, would waste his time in endeavoring

to develop their minds to a capacity for such intellectual efforts as these. The rudiments of those developments are found in every race of mankind; there is no evidence that even the rudiments exist elsewhere in the animal kingdom. No race or variety of mankind, therefore, could ever, for one moment, be confounded, or ever has been confounded, with any species of the lower animals. Here, if anywhere, is a difference of kind. It is the clearest and the broadest distinction to be found in the animal kingdom. But, in truth, the theory of the transmutationist absolutely annuls all distinction of kind everywhere, and holds a simple and absolute continuity throughout the universe. The very conception of *kind*, as distinguished from *degree*, becomes a mere fiction, a mere creation of the fancy, without anything in nature corresponding to it, or any materials out of which it could have been constructed.

We are admonished that "at present we must be content to wait patiently and not allow our judgment respecting transmutation to be warped by the *want of evidence*." But upon what, pray, is a correct judgment—if we are to have any judgment at all—if not upon existing evidence? Still it is insisted that the theory, even as applied to the origin of man, may be true. Great inventors, it is said, poets, prophets, have in former times been deified. Since mental as well as physical attributes are transmissible by inheritance, it is thought that we may possibly discern in such leaps the origin of the superiority of certain races of mankind. In our own time the occasional appearance of such extraordinary mental powers (but why in our time rather than in former times?)—may be attributed to *atavism*; but there must have been a beginning to the series of such rare and anomalous events. If, in conformity with the theory of progression, we believe mankind to have risen slowly from a rude and humble starting point, it is suggested that such leaps may have successively introduced not only higher and higher forms and grades of intellect, but at a much remoter (why *remoter*?) period may have cleared at one bound the space which separated the highest stage of the unprogressive intelligence of the inferior animals from the first and lowest form of improvable reason manifested by man. pp. 504, 505.

But then why are not these latter leaps, which are so easily *imagined* to clear at a bound the immense interval between man and brute, still made from time to time, as well as the former? We still have men becoming poets; why not have monkeys too becoming men, or even becoming poets at once?



Or, if the latter kind of leap once made has established a permanent species "by inheritance," why do not the former also? Why do we not have separate races of hereditary poets and prophets and *savans*? Or are the two cases, after all, totally and radically unlike? Besides, this whole notion of "leaps" is irreconcilable with the doctrine of the transmutationists. *Nullus saltus in natura* is one of their pet principles.

A theory may have some foundation in fact, and be true within certain limits; and yet not be susceptible of universal application by analogy. Variation and development may be true as applied to the different races of men; and not true as applied to all organized (and unorganized) beings. They may be true as applied to the diversities of human speech; and not true as applied to all the sounds and signs, articulate and inarticulate, of the animal kingdom. There may be good evidence of the unity of man and of the unity of human language, without proving or implying the genetic unity of all varieties of natural forms or of natural sounds. That which is important truth within its appropriate limits, often becomes falsehood when stretched to a universal application. Yet, if this important truth be a new discovery, or supposed to be such, it is almost sure to be thus falsified. The history of the medical art will furnish abundant illustrations. Every nostrum and every mode of treatment, which is so absurd and so mischievous when urged as a panacea, may be extremely valuable as a special remedy in a restricted sphere.

The analogy between the history of languages and Darwin's view of the history of organic beings, presented so plausibly by Sir Charles Lyell, may serve to illustrate what the transmutationists *mean* by their theory; but beyond this, for any purpose of argument, as tending to render their theory more probable, it is quite too shadowy, figurative, and far-fetched, to have any logical force whatever. The probable original unity of language, as bearing upon the probable genetic unity of mankind, is an argument of great weight. Here the connexion is direct and proper. It is something more than an analogy. In that other case, if there be any argument at all, it must be purely analogical; and the analogy itself is very obscure. The whole mass of human languages, present and past, must be supposed to represent the collection of organic beings for all time hitherto. Each language will represent a species; each dialect, a variety. Then the transmutation of languages and the development of dialects will represent the transmutation of species and the formation of varieties. So

far all looks well. But then what in language shall represent the *individuals* of a species? Shall the separate words, or the language as spoken by each individual, furnish the analogon? Or what else? Do the words of a language beget their successors in the same or in subsequent languages? Or does the language as spoken by one individual beget the language as spoken by another individual? If I teach a child my language, is that which he learns to speak the genealogical offspring of that which I speak? All this may be true figuratively; but is it after all a literal fact? If not, then we have here no case of real genesis, no species, and consequently no transmutation of species, after all. One may talk about the principles of "natural selection" controlling the formation and introduction of words (and here the separate *words* seem to be made the representatives of the individuals, or the varieties of a species,) and their mutual struggle for existence; but all these must be seen at once to be highly metaphysical expressions. In organized beings the formative, specializing power, the organic force, the life principle, dwells within the organism itself. In the case of language, that principle which determines, modifies, shapes, produces, begets, the phenomena is external to them—is in the intelligence, the organism, the history of man, acting *ab extra*. The argument from this analogy, therefore, is all the other way. Language does not make its natural selections, or determine its secular transformations, but man makes them. Here it is *mind creating*, not the phenomena evolving themselves by force of their inherent laws in a blind struggle, and without the superintendence and direction of creative intelligence. One may, indeed, interpose and say that even man's intelligence, in all its various developments and activities, is controlled and determined by his external condition and circumstances. This may be asserted; but is it proved? Has it been shown that all the intelligence, reason, and conscience of man have originated in, and are explicable by, physical causes and laws? Has it been shown that matter is the mother of mind? The discussion is a broad one, and would lead us too far. It is sufficient to say here that this assumed supremacy of matter, and its absolute priority to mind, is, at least, a subject of dispute as yet, and has not been made out to the satisfaction of all reflecting men. Materialism is not as yet scientifically established. All mental experience is against it. It is not to be quietly assumed. Any theory, therefore, which postulates this doctrine, has its foundations yet to lay. With this *caveat*, we dismiss that question.

Dr. Gray would persuade us that Darwin's theory, at all events, is not inconsistent with natural theology. But natural theology is not simply the *belief* in God, but the *evidence* for that belief from nature and reason. If the theory of "natural selection" is consistent with the belief in God, yet does it not overthrow the evidence for that belief? Does it not destroy the most effective proofs on which that belief, as a doctrine of natural theology, must rest? Grant that the *a priori* argument and the ontological argument may remain the same—with whatever weight they have—does it not totally undermine the teleological argument—that on which our chief practical reliance must be placed? There may be no such thing in the world as *chance*, strictly speaking (or, rather, not *strictly* but *arbitrarily* speaking), i. e., in the sense of *no cause* and *no law* at all. But the argument from *design* is drawn by distinguishing it from *what is called chance*, as seen, e. g., in a throw of dice. And unless "natural selection," as a phenomenon, can be distinguished from chance taken in that sense, unless it can be shown to be different from the "natural selection" whereby a die\* determines its position upon coming out of the box, it certainly would destroy—not the laws of nature, not the original design, perhaps—but the *marks*, the *proofs* of design, and consequently the *evidence* of an intelligent controlling cause. The transmutationists may not be, and certainly they need not be, atheists or pantheists; but their doctrine will surely breed atheism and pantheism in their pupils.

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ART. IV.—BULGARIAN POPULAR SONGS AND PROVERBS.†

By ELIAS RIGGS, D. D., Missionary of the A. B. C. F. M., at Constantinople.

THIS collection is specially interesting as exhibiting (1) national traditions, the wild and fabulous character of which only tends to increase the interest attaching to them; (2) religious legends, in respect to which the serious Christian reader will notice with pity what a sad travesty they present

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\* Under the laws of gravity, inertia, elasticity and motion.

† Bulgarski Narodni Pesi; Collected by Demetrius and Constantine Miladinov. Agram: 1861, 8 vo., pp. 542.

of the truths which form their basis ; and (3) prevailing notions and customs. The following translations, which are very literal, and preserve in every instance the measure of the original, will serve as specimens in all these departments.

The language employed is the plainest language of common life. This we have imitated, studiously avoiding any elevation or refinement of diction which would be inconsistent with the character and standing of the speakers. The repetitions of words and phrases are preserved, as presenting a striking characteristic of the originals.

The first two pieces exhibit prevailing ideas respecting Fairies and Nymphs.\* The third and fourth may be designated as religious legends. The *resurrection* is transformed into a *restoration* to his mother of the Saviour (always an infant), by the wonder-working power of the saints. In the legend of St. Peter's mother appear the most miserably degraded notions of the way of salvation, and of everything connected with the future state. Another piece of this class describes the confession of the Virgin Mary, preparatory to receiving the communion from the hands of the saints. The only sin which she had to confess was, that when on her way, most of the trees bowed to her in reverence, but certain trees refused to do so, she cursed them, and they withered away ! Another presents St. Elias as inflicting drought and famine on the inhabitants of Palestine, to compel them to go to church and make the sign of the cross !

The last two pieces, which are the longest, are also most valuable, as exhibiting the traditions connected with the times of essential independence of the Turkish government. Marco is the hero of many of these traditions. He is supposed to have been some three centuries ago prince or king of Prelep, a city in Macedonia. Popular tradition represents him as still living, but hid away upon a desert island where he retired in disgust when he saw the effects of gunpowder, regarding its invention as an infamous contrivance by which any child might kill the greatest hero. His magnificent mansion is believed to have been seen by a Prelep merchant, driven there by contrary winds, and hospitably entertained

\* Popular belief represents these mysterious beings as residing on high mountains, and being very fond of dancing. They are supposed to attach themselves to young heroes, and frequently to preserve them from death, but in general to be mischievous, and especially to put out the eyes of those with whom they are offended. The water nymphs are supposed to reside in ponds and lakes, and to have long hair, with which they entangle those who enter the water and drown them. It is said that they sometimes appear on the shores of the lakes combing their long hair.

by Marco, who dismissed him with the assurance that he would shortly revisit his country. Near the lake of Ochride is shown a stone bearing what is regarded as the imprint of Marco's foot when he stepped on it to mount his horse ; and near Cookoosh, a rock which he is said to have hurled from a mound a day's journey distant. The existence of such fabulous traditions in reference to a period which in Europe is one of recent and authentic history, is curious, and illustrates the tendency of partially civilized tribes to invest their history with the marvelous—the same tendency which three thousand years ago was preparing the materials for the Iliad.

## I.—THE FAIRY CITY.

SAMOVILA built a city,  
Not on earth, nor yet in heaven ;  
Just beneath the clouds she placed it.  
What did she put in for pillars ?  
Choice young men were all the pillars.  
What did she dispose for railings ?  
All of them were choice young maidens.  
What did she put in for windows ?  
All of them were choice young children.  
But for these yet one was lacking,  
On the side on which the sun shone.  
Marco had a son beloved,  
Son belov'd, caressed and fondled ;  
Him she took, that son beloved,  
Took to fasten to the window.  
Marco tenderly besought her ;  
" Tender sister, Samovila,  
" Tenderly do I beseech you,  
" Caring for my son beloved,  
" Son belov'd, caressed and fondled,  
" Frequently to give him water."

## II.—ANGELINA.

ANGELINA, sea-nymph's sister-in-law,  
Go no more to wander on the mountains,  
On the mountains healing herbs to gather,  
Herbs to gather strip no more the forest,  
Strip no more the forest for your brother ;  
Nothing you can do will cure him.  
For your brother lov'd is by a sea-nymph.  
If you disbelieve it, climb the summit,  
Level rocky summit of the mountain ;  
Then look down on the broad plain below you,  
On the plain you'll see a tree's thick foliage,  
And beneath the tree a sea-nymph sitting ;  
Your dear brother on her lap is lying,  
While the nymph is playing with his ringlets.  
When you see her thus, be not affrighted,

Suffer not yourself to scream with terror,  
 But instead, with singing and with laughter,  
 Thus address her,—“Sister-in-law, sea-nymph,  
 Send away to me my darling brother.”  
 Angelina climbed the rocky summit,  
 Level rocky summit of the mountain,  
 Thence look'd down on the broad plain below her,  
 On the plain she saw a tree's thick foliage,  
 And beneath the tree the sea-nymph sitting;  
 But instead of singing or of laughing,  
 With loud cries she thus the nymph accosted:  
 “Treach'rous sea-nymph, send me here my brother,  
 You who now for these nine years have lov'd him.”  
 Then the nymph, with cruel rage excited,  
 Toss'd her brother to the highest heavens,  
 And she tore his body to such fragments  
 That the largest one an ant could carry.

### III.—RESURRECTION OF CHRIST.

Oh, my beautiful Yordani,  
 What has happened to your father?  
 What a loss to sell his houses,  
 Houses fair with nine great gateways,  
 And a tenth which was the smallest,  
 By the smallest gate a meadow,  
 In the meadow a green pine tree,  
 Neath the pine tree a cool fountain,  
 By the fountain was a table,  
 At which all the saints were seated,  
 With St. Nicholas presiding.  
 Near to him was Saint Elias,  
 And between them Sister Mary  
 In her hands the Christ-God holding  
 With a golden cap upon him.  
 Whirling down there came two storm-clouds,  
 And they snatched away my Jesus;  
 Mary fell at once to weeping,  
 But St. Nicholas consoled her;  
 “Hold thy peace now, sister Mary,  
 We again will get him for you,  
 Back to you again we'll give him,  
 And we at his trade will set him,  
 To construct the wondrous bridges,  
 By which sinful souls pass over.  
 Soul the first which thence passed over  
 Was a sinner, a great sinner;  
 She had nursed another's baby,  
 But she gave it not her blessing.  
 Soul the second which passed over  
 Was a sinner, a great sinner,  
 Of her neighbor she had borrowed  
 Flour, but when she came to pay it,  
 She returned it mixed with ashes.  
 Soul the third which thence passed over



Was a sinner, a great sinner ;  
Of her neighbor she had borrowed  
Salt, but when she came to pay it,  
Mixed with sand did she return it.

IV.—ST. PETER AND HIS MOTHER.

WHEN St. P. once was starting,  
And to Paradise was going,  
Going to Heaven to the communion,  
Earnestly his wicked mother  
Begged that he would take her with him.  
“ Wait, oh wait, for me, son Peter,  
Wait, son Peter, I would also  
Go to Heaven to the communion.”

Then thus answered her St. Peter :  
“ Flee away my sinful mother,  
For you are so great a sinner,  
You indeed cannot go with me,  
Go to Heaven to the communion,  
Heaven's gates are closed against you,  
But the gates of hell are open ;  
For my mother you remember  
How when young you were a grocer,  
When the poor your house frequented,  
Came to drink within the wine shop,  
When they asked you “ As your soul lives,”  
As your soul lives, will you give us  
Of pure wine a full oke measure ?  
Then you answered them “ As God lives,  
As God lives, and as my soul lives,  
I do give a full oke measure.”  
And yet not a full oke measure.  
Nor pure wine did you then give them,  
But you mingled it with water.

And you sold with different measures,  
When there came poor strangers, travellers,  
Who the oke could not distinguish,  
Then three hundred drams you gave them,  
And the wine too, mixed with water.  
When again there came in merchants,  
Then you dealt to them full measure,  
Of pure wine a full oke measure,  
For this, mother, you're a sinner.  
When you went to stand as sponsor,  
For baptizing neighbors' children,  
To the children you gave nothing,  
Not a shirt, nor yet an apron,  
Altho' sponsors to the children,  
Always give a change of garment,  
And for this, you're a great sinner.

This, too, mother, rests upon you ;  
You had stock on hand abundant,  
But you would not sell to people  
Who were poor, you'd not trust them.

Once a poor man so much urged you,  
That you gave him half a distaff,  
Half a distaff, hemp for spinning,  
And at once was sorry for it.  
"There, now, what have I been doing!  
Letting all my stock be wasted,  
Giving it to these poor beggars."

And in this, too, you're a sinner.  
Mother, when some flour you borrowed,  
And the time came to repay it,  
Half was flour and half was ashes,  
Thus it was that you returned it.  
So, too, when some salt you borrowed,  
Mixed half sand did you repay it.

And in this, too, you're a sinner.  
Mother, when you borrowed pepper,  
You did not return pure pepper,  
But you pounded up some brick dust,  
And you mixed it with the pepper.  
Thus no chance remains, my mother,  
Now for you to go to heaven."

Then his mother thus besought him:  
"O, son Peter, now forgive me,  
Now forgive me, and pray for me."  
So he prayed for her, St. Peter.

When she reached the gates of heaven,  
Reached the gates of the communion,  
Heaven's gates were shut before her,  
But the gates of hell were open.  
Into them at once she entered,  
Entered Peter's sinful mother.

Then again he prayed, St. Peter,  
To redeem his sinful mother.  
And he came across the distaff,  
Distaff full of hemp for spinning,  
Down he reached it to his mother,  
His dear mother in perdition,  
That he might thus save his mother.  
But the hemp was not sufficient,  
From his head a red hair drawing,  
To the hempen cord he tied it,  
So that he might save his mother.  
Down he reached it to his mother.  
When his mother, from perdition  
To escape, laid hold upon it,  
Many souls laid hold upon her,  
That they, too, might 'scape perdition.

Upon this she cries impatient,  
"Back with you ye sinful creatures,  
'Tis my son is me delivering,  
But I do not wish you with me."

Scarce the sentence had she uttered,  
When the hempen cord was sundered,  
Down she fell, e'en to hell's bottom,

All the other souls escaping.  
 Then accosting her, St. Peter  
 Said: "Alas! Alas! dear mother,  
 As you've done so you must suffer;  
 'Twas not for you to see heaven,  
 Heaven to see and heaven to enter,  
 E'en in hell your pride indulging."

V.—SULTAN SELIM AND THEODORE SALAKIM.

SULTAN Selim, writes a letter Royal  
 Writes a letter; whither will he send it?  
 Whither but to Theodore Salakim,  
 From him presents four therein demanding?  
 Present first his beauteous bride is numbered,  
 Present second his cross-bearing standard,  
 Present third his favorite fleet courser,  
 And the fourth his village, Callophoeo.  
 Reads the letter Theodore Salakim,  
 Reads the letter, tears drop down like hail stones,  
 Young Theodoritsa\* sees him weeping;  
 Young Theodoritsa thus accosts him:  
 "Prythee, Theodore, my lord, now tell me,  
 What it is your spirit thus distresses?  
 As you read your tears drop down like hail stones."  
 Theodore Salakim thus responded:  
 "Ah, my beauteous bride, if I should tell you  
 My distress, what could you do to help me?"  
 Thus responded young Theodoritsa:  
 "Though it is not in my power to help you,  
 When you grieve, I also would grieve with you."  
 Then he told her Theodore Salakim  
 How he sent the royal sultan Selim,  
 Sent a message, presents four demanding.  
 "Present first my beauteous bride is numbered,  
 Present second my cross-bearing standard,  
 Present third my favorite fleet courser,  
 And the fourth my village, Callophoeo.  
 All the other presents I could yield him,  
 But thyself, my bride, how can I yield thee?"  
 Thus responded young Theodoritsa:  
 "Nay, but, Theodore, my lord, now grieve not,  
 Only send him back a fair white letter,  
 A white letter, with black ink thus written:—  
 "Look here now, my royal sultan Selim,  
 You have sent me presents four demanding,  
 But not even pebbles four I'll render." "  
 Freely to his bride's advice he listened,  
 And he did according to her counsel;  
 And he sent him back a fair white letter.  
 When the royal Selim read the letter,  
 Mightily at once his wrath was kindled,  
 And he sent his Turkish Janissaries;

\*The termination *itsa* or *vitsa* designates a wife. Thus Theodoritsa is the wife of Theodore, Marcovitsa the wife of Marco, &c.

Under ground they made their way by mining,  
And an entrance gained into the cellars,  
Thence to kidnap young Theodoritsa.

Theodore was on his lofty sofa  
Seated, ready for a princely supper ;  
At his side his honored aged mother,  
On his knee his darling son was sitting ;  
To the cellar young Theodoritsa  
Goes to draw the wine of three years standing,  
When behold ! a wonder and a marvel,  
In the cellar Turkish Janissaries !  
Turks awaiting there the chance to seize her !  
Thus addressed them young Theodoritsa :  
" Now, look here, you Turkish Janissaries,  
Are you reasonable men or villains ?  
Now, then, what of me would you be seeking ?  
I am not the young Theodoritsa ;  
I am nothing but a poor hand maiden,  
She above is seated on the sofa.  
Tell me, therefore, why it is you seek her ;  
I will then decoy Theodoritsa,  
And at once will bring her hither to you."

" We are sent by royal sultan Selim,  
Sent to seize the young Theodoritsa,  
And to take her to our royal master."

So they let go young Theodoritsa ;  
She returning to the lofty sofa,  
Takes her place and joins the princely supper.

Thus she speaks, the young Theodoritsa :

" Theodore, my lord, now listen to me,  
I am supping here on princely viands,  
But within my heart are chips and pebbles.  
For I've seen a wonder and a marvel,  
In the cellar Turkish Janissaries,  
Hither sent by royal sultan Selim,  
Me to seize on purpose he has sent them.  
When to draw the wine I there descended,  
There I met the Turkish Janissaries,  
And I told them I was a poor maiden,  
By this means alone their hands escaping.  
What we now can further do, consider."

Theodore Salakim then responded :  
" Nay, fair bride, let not this grief oppress thee ;  
I will keep them shut within this cellar ;  
Take thy seat upon the lofty sofa,  
Hold upon thy lap our boy, our darling."

Then he stood upon his foot heroic,  
And he took his favorite fleet courser,  
And he took his heavy yellow war club,  
And he took his sharp glittering sabre,  
And he took his own cross-bearing standard,  
And his beauteous bride he thus accosted :  
" Keep your eye on my cross-bearing standard,  
While it floats let no alarm oppress you ;

Should it fall, my own cross-bearing standard,  
 You yourself at once these gates may open."  
 When he entered thus within the cellar,  
 Turks he cut to pieces with his sabre,  
 Turks beneath his horse's hoofs he trampled,  
 With their blood knee-deep the cellar filling.  
 When, amid the blood the courser slipping,  
 Drooped a moment the cross-bearing standard,  
 Then what cries the young Theodoritsa  
 Uttered, for she thought that they had slain him.

Theodore then called her from the cellar.  
 "Hush, be quiet, young Theodoritsa,  
 For indeed the Turks have not destroyed me;  
 All of them, the Turks, I've cut in pieces."

Down she came, then, young Theodoritsa,  
 There to see the wonder and the marvel,  
 See within the Turks all cut in pieces.  
 Then returned they to the lofty sofa.

When the news reached royal sultan Selim,  
 News that all his Turks were cut in pieces.  
 Mighty rage did not come down upon him,  
 But he gave to Theodore great presents,  
 Gave him as a present a fleet courser,  
 Gave him too a sharp and glittering sabre.

#### VI.—THE SEVEN CHIEFTAINS AND THE ARAB.

Marco, chief of Prelep made a journey,  
 Made a journey through the plain of Roso,  
 And he built there sev'nty monasteries  
 Without leave of Grand Vizir or Sultan.  
 Thence he went to the broad plain of Scopia,  
 There a monastery likewise founding,  
 Consecrating it to Saint Demetri.  
 Just as Marco had this work completed,  
 Tidings of it reached Constantinople,  
 Reached Murat, Constantinople's Sultan.  
 Soon a crier traverses the city,  
 Publishing the royal proclamation:

"Have you heard, oh Turks and subject nations,  
 "Of the rising of hot-headed Marco?  
 "What can mean all these his strange proceedings?  
 "Where is now a noble, valiant chieftain,  
 "Who will take alive hot-headed Marco,  
 "Take him captive, and to me will bring him?  
 "With three fine domains I will reward him,  
 "One I'll give him in Mount Camenitea,  
 "One I'll give in Bosna Saraevo,  
 "And a third the whole of bloody Bosna;  
 "Only let him bring me Marco living;  
 "If he asks yet more domains I'll grant him."

Then there entered in a tawny Arab,  
 And before the King he did obeisance;  
 "Royal Master, may you live forever!  
 "I can take alive the chieftain Marco;

"But, a curse upon the lands you offer,  
"Lands which neither bread nor wine can furnish.  
"Promise, King, whatever else you'll promise."

Then replied Murat, the royal Sultan :

"I will give you Stalakina city,  
"Governed now by Theodore Stalakin,  
"And I'll give you Radomira city,  
"Where the old Wallachian princess governs,  
"I will give you also Prelep city,  
"Prelep city, governed by Prince Marco,  
"Marco's dappled steed I'll also give you,  
"Give you, too, his war-club and his sabre,  
"I will give you, too, young Marcovitsa,  
"Marcovitsa and her son I'll give you."

Then he slips away, the tawny Arab,  
To the market of Constantinople,  
Makes his way straight to the clothiers' market,  
For a suit of monkish dress is measured ;  
Thence he goes to those who deal in jewels,  
And procures a set of gilded crosses,  
For his head a monkish coral procuring,  
Placing on his arms two golden bracelets,  
Thus himself to a black monk transforming.  
Then he made his way to Prelep city,  
Made his way to the strong gates of Marco,  
Called and knocked at them the tawny Arab ;  
To his call responded Marco's mother ;  
"Where, inquired he, is your son Prince Marco ?  
"For the priests, the monks, request his presence,  
"Holy service for his sake performing."

Thus to him responded Marco's mother :  
"My son Marco is not here at present,  
"He is yonder, building a fine convent,  
"A fine convent, built for Saint Demetri."  
Thus instructed, quick the tawny Arab  
Mounts his courser with the golden stirrups,  
Makes his way to the broad plain of Scopia,  
Straight he hies him to the beautiful convent,  
Takes his stand right at the chapel portal,  
Then he calls aloud, the tawny Arab,  
Saying, "you are wanted here, Prince Marco."

Marco turned to view, and thus responded :  
"God do so to you, as you have called me,  
"You have called me here, you tawny Arab."  
Then the tawny Arab thus responded :  
"Now away with you, hot-headed Marco,  
"Do not now against your soul be sinning,  
"Do not take me for a tawny Arab ;  
"I'm a monk right from the holy mountain,  
"From the Chilindara monastery.  
"Do not now against your soul be sinning,  
"For when priest or monk a house approaches,  
"Then the master should be first to meet him,  
"And to chant for him a prayer invite him !"



Then replied to him hot-headed Marco :  
 " I beseech you pardon me, oh father,  
 " Pardon me, for who you were I knew not."  
 Then with solemn air the tawny Arab  
 Drew a book, a prayer book, from his bosom,  
 And he laid it on the head of Marco,  
 And began to say a prayer with chanting.  
 While with his right hand he held the prayer book,  
 With his left he held a chain, the Arab,  
 Which he slipped upon the neck of Marco,  
 And thus bound him to his horse's saddle ;  
 So he took him from the beauteous convent.  
 Marco shouted like a furious dragon,  
 And the robber Debel Novak heard him.  
 Novak quickly to his young wife calling,  
 Thus commands : " The horse to saddle hasten,  
 Let me rush to the wide plain of Scopia,  
 To the convent of good Saint Demetri."

When the robber Debel Novak reached there,  
 And no Marco found within the convent,  
 Straight he speeds across the plain of Scopia,  
 Spurs his horse to reach the tawny Arab,  
 To deliver from his hands Prince Marco.

When he reached to where the tawny Arab  
 Dragged along in chains hot-headed Marco,  
 Dragged him all along the chilly pavement,  
 Thus the robber Debel Novak shouted :  
 " Cursed one, thou tawny Arab, hear me,  
 " Say, did not the food you ate suffice you,  
 " That you hither come to catch our chieftain ?  
 " I am called the robber Debel Novak,  
 " From the lofty city Catchanina.  
 " Tell me, do you know, you tawny Arab,  
 " That if once I throw my heavy war-club,  
 " And should strike between your eyes your forehead,  
 " Both those eyes would leap quick from their sockets,  
 " Brightest day at once to night transforming ?"

Turning then about, the tawny Arab,  
 Turning then about his dervish wrapper,  
 Thus he spake : " Avaunt, oh robber Novak,  
 " Cursed be the kingdom that you govern,  
 " If you do not first destroy this Arab !"  
 Debel Novak threw his heavy war-club,  
 But the tawny Arab caught the war-club,  
 Caught the war-club on his little finger.  
 Then he threw a ring, the tawny Arab,  
 And he caught the robber Debel Novak,  
 And, instead of one, had two brave chieftains.

Then again began those two brave princes  
 Both at once to shout like furious dragons,  
 And their voices reached a son of Novak,  
 Gruitsa the captain, son of Novak,  
 When he came to the broad plain of Scopia,  
 Swift he rode across the plain of Scopia,

Here and there to seek the tawny Arab,  
 Till he found him at the gates of Scopia.  
 Gruitsa, the captain, thus addressed him :  
 " Cursed one, thou tawny Arab, hear me !  
 " Cursed one, 'tis not hot-headed Marco,  
 " 'Tis not my own father, Debel Novak,  
 " But 'tis I, called Gruitsa the captain.  
 " As a torrent pours down muddy water,  
 " So will I bear thee away, thou miscreant,  
 " Now expect my war-club down upon thee."  
 Then the Arab holding up his wrapper,  
 As a mark himself presented, shouting :  
 " Gruitsa, now let me see your valor."  
 Then he as a mark his knee presented.  
 Gruitsa the captain, threw his war-club,  
 On his knee the tawny Arab caught it ;  
 Then his ring at Gruitsa swift hurling,  
 Caught him, and held captive three brave chieftains.  
 They again shout out like furious dragons,  
 And the younger son of Novak hears them,  
 Tatomirche, younger son of Novak,  
 Swiftly rides across the plain of Scopia,  
 Driving here and there to find the Arab ;  
 In th' outskirts of Scopia overtakes him,  
 Seven hours' journey distant from the city.  
 Fiery Tatomirche thus accosts him :  
 " Good for nothing fellow, tawny Arab,  
 " Come to us to take our princes captives !"  
 He again his dervish wrapper holding,  
 Shouts : " Avaunt ! thou fiery Tatomirche,  
 " Well I know thee, and the world well knows thee,  
 " Knows the valor which thy breast possesses,  
 " As the Iron Gates thou hadst thy dwelling,  
 " Thou didst not permit a bird to pass thee,  
 " How much less permit a man to pass thee,  
 " Yet thou, then, a mighty war didst suffer,  
 " Even then thou fearedst an unarmed dervish ;  
 " Let me see thee, fiery Tatomirche."  
 Tatomirche throws his heavy war-club,  
 But the Arab on his left hand caught it,  
 Then him, too, within his ring inclosing,  
 Made the number up to four brave princes.  
 They again shout out like furious dragons,  
 As the Arab drags them o'er the pavements.  
 Chieftain Yankul heard afar their voices,  
 Yankul, chieftain of Shidina city ;  
 He at once his sturdy courser mounting,  
 Rode with speed to the wide plain of Scopia ;  
 There he found the monastery empty,  
 His adopted brother Marco nowhere.  
 Ah ! thought he, the Arab now has caught him.  
 His swift-footed steed at once remounting,  
 Out he rode, the plain of Scopia leaving,  
 Driving here and there to find the Arab.

Reaching him upon the plain of Koso,  
Chieftain Yankul thus with shouts accosts him :

"Hold ! upon the spot, you tawny Arab,  
"For you see before you chieftain Yankul ;  
"As a river bears down muddy water,  
"So will I bear you away before me."

When the tawny Arab heard this summons,  
Turning up again his dervish wrapper,  
He replies, "Come on, then, chieftain Yankul,  
"Let me see the proof of your great valor ;  
"Cursed be the Kingdom that you govern,  
"If you do not first destroy the Arab."

Chieftain Yankul threw his heavy war-club,  
But the Arab with his left hand turned it,  
Flinging then his ring he caught chief Yankul,  
Making up the number five brave warriors.  
They again shout out like furious dragons,  
As the Arab drags them o'er the pavements.

Milosh of Organa city, heard them ;  
He did not direct his course to Scopia,  
But across the plains and rugged mountains,  
Drove to overtake the tawny Arab ;  
'Tis the Arab only Milosh wishes.

Brandishing from far his heavy war-club,  
"Hold !" says he, "thou cursed tawny Arab,  
"Who hast come invading thus our country,  
"In Constantinople rules the Sultan,  
"But in our own country we are masters.

"Know my name is Milosh, of Organa."

In reply the tawny Arab shouted :

"Milosh get away with all your valor,  
"Cursed be it, if you do not slay me."

Milosh then his heavy war-club brandished,  
But the Arab drew around his wrapper,  
Giving thus no spot for it to strike him.  
Then the Arab found himself in trouble ;  
Right upon his breast came down the war-club ;  
Still he threw his ring and captured Milosh,  
Making up his number six brave warriors.

They again like furious dragons shouting,  
Roared so that both earth and heaven trembled ;  
To earth's farthest bound were heard their voices,  
As when mighty Saint Elias thunders,

So the voices of these princes thundered.  
When they roared aloud like furious dragons,  
They were heard by Secula Detentze,

Secula of Buda, son of Socol.  
Secula had seen full nine years' service  
In the army of Murat the Sultan.

He at supper quietly was seated,  
When the voices of the princes reached him.

Then at once his loving wife addressing,

"My first love," said he, "young Seculitsa,

"Listen to me, and delay not, love, delay not,

"Quickly saddle for me my fleet courser,  
 "Let me over the broad plain be riding,  
 "Me who nine full years have left my country,  
 "Over the broad plain I hear a murmur,  
 "'Cross the plain there tramps a tawny Arab;  
 "Can it be that he has been obtaining  
 "Royal leave thus to invade my country?  
 "From the stable bring the saddled courser,"  
 Then at once arose young Seculitsa,  
 And for him the dappled courser saddled;  
 Secula himself girt on his sabre,  
 And he took with him his heavy war-club,  
 And he crossed himself tow'rd the sun rising.  
 Stepping then upon a golden stirrup,  
 Quickly on his courser's back he mounted,  
 When a little cup young Seculitsa  
 Offered him; respectfully he raised it  
 To his eyes, and thus his bride accosted:  
 "My first love, farewell, may health be with you."  
 Straight his course to Scopia's plain directing,  
 To the convent of good Saint Demetri,  
 There he finds the convent standing lonely,  
 But his uncle, the Prince Marco, nowhere.  
 Ah! thought he, the Arab now has caught him.  
 Then to all the Saints devotion offering,  
 But especially to Saint Demetri,  
 His wing-footed steed again he mounted,  
 And quick crossed the spreading plain of Scopia.  
 From his horse's hoofs, such fire there issued,  
 That the sparks arose his head surrounding.  
 'Twas but little he had gone from Scopia,  
 When with human voice his dappled courser  
 Spake aloud, and thus addressed his master:  
 "My good master, Secula Detentze,  
 "If you wish to overtake the Arab,  
 "You have only to hold fast upon me,  
 "I can promise to o'ertake the Arab."  
 Thus he spake, and flew beneath high heaven,  
 Here and there to overtake the Arab.  
 When at length within a verdant forest  
 He o'ertook him, Secula dismounting,  
 And his head with reverence uncovering  
 Made to heaven and to earth prostrations,  
 Then the same to all the saints in order  
 And especially to Saint Demetri.  
 "Help me now, good God, and Saint Demetri,  
 "To make prisoner the tawny Arab."  
 When thus Secula his prayer had finished,  
 On his horse's back his seat regaining,  
 Soon he overtook the tawny Arab,  
 Overtook him in the verdant forest.  
 Secula Detenze thus accosts him:  
 "Hold! thou good for nothing tawny Arab;  
 "Cursed one, 'tis not hot-headed Marco;

"Cursed one, 'tis not the robber Novak ;

"But my name is Secula Detentze,

"And I am surnamed son of Socol\* ;

"I have seen nine years of royal service.

"Hold at once, I bid thee, tawny Arab,

"Let me see what you possess of valor."

Then the Arab, holding up his wrapper,

Thus responded : "Secula Detentze,

"Let us see, I've taken six brave warriors,

"But I have a ring for you remaining ;

"Heaven will grant me also you to capture.

"As a brother leads a bride's procession,

"So shall you be leader of six princes."

Then responded Secula Detentze :

"Let me see thee then thou tawny Arab,

"Let me see what valor thou possessest ;

"Do not look upon me as a stripling† ;

"Hear now, tawny villain, what I tell thee,

"Come out now upon the field of battle,

"There we'll see, in contest fair, whose mother

"Bore a son, whose sister held a brother,

"And whose mother is to be a weeper !

"Leaving on the road those six bound princes,

"Come thou out upon the field of battle."

No excuse remained then for the Arab ;

So he came upon the field of battle ;

So did also Secula Detentze ;

Brandished the youth his heavy war-club,

And the Arab, too, his war-club brandished.

Secula Detentze thus accosts him :

"I have eaten‡ many an Arab war-club,

"Yours may add another to the number."

As a mark himself he then presented.

Then the tawny Arab, aiming at him,

Not too high, nor yet too low directing,

Took his aim right at the horse's forehead.

When the Arab hurled his heavy war-club,

In an instant Secula's good courser

Dropped, and on the green sward lay extended ;

So the war-club passed entirely over,

O'er the head of Secula Detentze.

Secula Detentze, quick uprising,

Hurled his club, not at the horse's forehead,

But right at his breast the blow directing ;

On his knees then fell the Arab's courser,

But the club came down upon his master,

Just between his eyes the blow descended.

From his horse upon the green sward rolling,

Fell the Arab ; Secula on him,

Quick he drew his sabre from its scabbard,

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\* Socol signifies a falcon.

† Alluding to his name Detentze, which signifies a child.

‡ i. e., borne the brunt of.

And the Arab's head from body severing;  
 In his horse's barley pouch he thrust it,  
 And attached it to his horse's saddle.  
 Secula Detentze then accosted,  
 Then accosted those six noble chieftains:  
 "Brothers of my father and my mother,  
 "I have now destroyed the tawny Arab."

Instantly then Secula Detentze  
 Drew again his sabre from its scabbard,  
 And with it the Arab's nooses severing,  
 Set at liberty six noble warriors.

Secula Detentze then addressed them:  
 "Brothers of my father and my mother!  
 "You return to the broad plain of Scopia,  
 "To the convent of good Saint Demetri;  
 "There await me; I to the great city,  
 "To Constantinople, to Murat the Sultan,  
 "Go, to ask him if he gave permission,  
 "Ask him if he gave the tawny Arabs  
 "His permission to invade our country.  
 "If the Sultan thus has given permission,  
 "I will draw my sabre from its scabbard,  
 "And his head too from his body sever.  
 "Uncles, you may wait for me in Scopia."

Then proceeded Secula Detentze,  
 He proceeded to Constantinople,  
 To Murat the Sultan made obeisance  
 With a kiss, his hand and foot saluting,  
 Secula Detentze thus addressed him:  
 "Honored sovereign, may you live forever!  
 "How is it about these cursed Arabs,  
 "Who are wandering about our country,  
 "And who seek to put in chains our princes?"

Thus replied Murat the royal Sultan:  
 "Son beloved, Secula Detentze,  
 "Bring me here the head of one such Arab,  
 "I will give you fifteen loads of treasure,  
 "Solid treasure, all in golden florins."

When he heard it, Secula Detentze  
 From the high divan with spread descending,  
 From his horse's pouch the head withdrawing,  
 Rolled it down before Murat the Sultan,  
 Causing him three years of chills and fever.  
 Then he spake to Secula Detentze:  
 "Harken to me now, thou son of Socol,  
 "Henceforth in thy hands are all the Arabs,  
 "Bring them to me, dead I'd have thee bring them,  
 "Bring them not alive, a curse upon them."  
 And he gave him fifteen loads of treasure,  
 Solid treasure, all golden florins.

Straight returned then Secula Detentze,  
 Straight returned to the broad plain of Scopia,  
 To the monastery of Saint Demetri,  
 And to it ten loads of gold devoted,



Five for the cool wine saloon reserving.  
 Then he thus addressed the six brave warriors :  
 "God's protection to the six brave warriors!"  
 They, "God bless, Secula Detentze!"—  
 "Brothers of my father and my mother,  
 "To the wine saloon, now for a banquet!"  
 In the wine saloon sat down the seven,  
 In the wine saloon the seven brave princes,  
 Three whole weeks they ate and drank together,  
 There drank up five loads of golden treasure.  
 Secula Detentze then addressed them :  
 "Harken now to me ye six brave warriors,  
 "Hearken now to me; from this time forward,  
 "Whensoe'er you meet a tawny Arab,  
 "Let it be no care of yours to touch him,  
 "Only send to me the slightest message,  
 "I'm the man, 'knows how to skin an Arab,  
 "How to flay an Arab's skin from off him."  
 Secula Detentze did this marvel,  
 To be praised and to be told in story;  
 And a song remained, sung in his honor,  
 Worthy to be heard by all our brothers.  
 So, a song from us, from God his blessing.  
 Amen! many years of health God grant you.

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 BULGARIAN PROVERBS.

As you season, so you will sip.  
 Bad the thorn, bad the mattock. (Remedy as bad as the disease.)  
 Hurrah! for three days, alas! for all days. (Allusion to the festivities and carousals at weddings, contrasted with the prevailing misery of married life.)  
 Your mill grinds coarse. (You do not attend to your business.)  
 Even the hen looks up when she drinks water. (Duty of gratitude for providential mercies.)  
 Christ on his forehead, the devil on his arm.  
 The wolf does not lay down salt meat. (Applied to a gluttonous and improvident person.)  
 If you have money (para) you have relatives (phara).  
 From a thorn a rose, from a rose a thorn. (Applied to a child very different from his parents.)  
 Pears fall under a pear tree.  
 He who brags (phalit) will not set the house on fire (phalit).  
 Neighbor's horse will throw you at half way.  
 Neighbor's rye is sweeter than wheat.

Every pear has a stem. (If a thing is worth getting, a way can be found to get it.)

Look out for your own affairs, or other folks will do it for you.

Summer does not come with one swallow.

Vulture does not pick out vulture's eyes.

As the heart ached, so the eyes wept. (Alluding to affected mourning.)

Even his rooster lays eggs. (Said of a person without merit, but very prosperous.)

I do not keep you for black eyes. (Said in reproving a steward for idleness.)

When the thought (oomut) came, the groom'sman (koomut) was gone.

He has neither eaten an onion, nor smelt of one. (He has not meddled with the business.)

Two rough stones grind no meal. (Associates accomplish nothing unless they are agreed.)

The world is like snow. (Transient.)

#### ART. V.—THE PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

By NOAH PORTER, D. D., Professor in Yale College.

An Introduction to Mental Philosophy, on the Inductive Method. By J. D. MORELL, A. M., LL.D. London: 1862.

MR. MORELL has made so many important contributions to the philosophical literature of this generation, that whatever he writes cannot fail to attract attention. His "History of Speculative Philosophy" is well known to be the most comprehensive and complete book of reference on this subject that English authorship has yet produced. In the year 1853, he published "Elements of Psychology, Part I." which was never completed. It is a brief and rather imperfect work, but was not without value at the time when it was written, as it brought before the English mind certain methods and results of psychological study which, though accessible to the readers of the German language, were to others entirely unknown. The present volume, though more complete and elaborate than "The Elements," is, in no sense, an enlargement or expansion of the earlier work. The author affirms

that "it is entirely distinct, both in its method and in its execution." The feature by which it is most strikingly distinguished, is the partial adoption and application of the fundamental principles of Herbart's Psychology. Nothing of this is found in the "Elements of Psychology." Mr. Morell does not, indeed, profess to adopt these principles in full, nor to apply them with all the vigor or consistency to which the master and the leading disciples of this school have pushed them. "I have rather," he asserts, "reconstructed the whole in accordance with my own general views of mental philosophy." He has also given special attention to the many writers in England and on the Continent, who have prosecuted Human Physiology, either as an independent science, or in its special relations to the phenomena and functions of the soul. The relations of the soul to the body are carefully considered, and the author thinks that he has found special advantage from his researches in this direction, in explaining the nature and development of purely psychical phenomena, by a frequent reference to the analogous processes and growths with which physiology is conversant. Indeed, he contends, most earnestly, that psychology can never become a science, unless it begins with physiology, and that as a science it can only be developed into a form at once symmetrical and complete, as the relations of its principles and laws to those of human physiology are carefully and constantly exhibited. To Herbart and the physiologists he owes his first obligations. Next he names George, Lazarus, Fichte, Ulrici and Beneke, all well known representatives of schools and principles by no means in harmony. Last of all appears Mr. Herbert Spencer, whose "Principles of Psychology," it is not so easy positively to characterize as it is negatively to say, that it cannot readily be made to agree with the principles which are ordinarily received.

On reading the Preface of Mr. Morell, in which he announces his plan, and names the authors to whom he has been most indebted, one would naturally fear that he might find no little difficulty in combining these somewhat incongruous materials into a harmonious and consistent whole. This fear would not be diminished by reflecting on the marked peculiarities of the Herbartian Psychology. These seem to require that, if received at all, they should be received entirely; that if they are applied to any of the problems of psychology, they should be applied to all of them. Their nature is such that they cannot assimilate with any other principles. They must pertinaciously refuse their aid in certain exigencies if

they are not always called upon, as physicians of the allopathic or the homœopathic school will not consent to serve a patient occasionally, but must have the entire control of his case. Whether or not these natural anticipations have, in fact, been realized, must be decided by a critical examination of the work itself.

Our object in this examination is two-fold : first, to state and examine certain doctrines which have attracted our attention ; and second, to consider those principles of the Herbartian system, which are adopted by the author, or are suggested by our examination of this treatise. These principles are so little known in this country and in England, that it seems necessary to state and discuss them somewhat more carefully than would otherwise be required in a criticism of this work of Morell.

Following the order of the author, we begin with the Introduction, which is divided into chapters, the first containing Preliminary Remarks on Method, and the second treating of the Facts of Psychology. Both of these deserve some consideration, especially for the reason that the 'Method' of Psychology has been much discussed of late. It is also notorious, that no little diversity of opinion prevails as to what classes of facts properly constitute the subject-matter of its investigations.

In the chapter on Method, Mr. Morell indicates his own principles with sufficient clearness, to any reader who is somewhat conversant with the writers to whom he alludes. To one who has little knowledge of the subject, his own remarks would convey little definite knowledge. The principles which he lays down as constituting the correct method of psychological study, and as essential to the reform and development of the science itself, are briefly stated the following : The study of the mind has hitherto been prosecuted too much by itself. The facts of the mind have been considered apart from other classes of facts to which they are nearly allied. The soul has been too commonly regarded as separate from the central subject of vital phenomena ; whereas, the phenomena of the soul are but a single class of the varying manifestations of the one living being, which exists and acts as body and soul. The two classes of phenomena commonly referred to two independent subjects, ought to be studied in their common relations, in order that by wide generalizations, deeper and more pervading laws may be discovered, that hold alike of the two classes of phenomena, which spring from this common centre. Moreover, the history and laws of the develop-

ment of these phenomena, should receive pre-eminent attention. The phenomena of life in the order of time precede and prepare the way for the phenomena of rational and self-conscious activity; and even when we reach the sphere of purely rational or psychical facts and events, we find that a law of genesis or growth holds good, by which the lower prepares the way for, and, as it were, enters the higher. It is not enough that we classify the facts of the soul; this is but to give their natural history, or rather the facts as classified and arranged constitute their natural history. On the other hand, these facts, when traced in the order of their development and internal dependence, become a psychical philosophy.

We have stated these principles in our own language, rather than in the language of Morell, as more brief and condensed than his. We are quite certain that it fairly expresses his views, and is, on the whole, quite as well fitted to secure for them as favorable an impression as are his own somewhat vague and very diffusely phrased statements.

So far as these principles enounce a method, they will command universal assent. There is not one of them to which, when stated in the abstract, there can be the least possible objection. No one would hesitate to affirm that in philosophizing concerning the facts of the mind, the widest and most comprehensive sweep of generalization should be taken. Every person will acknowledge that all descriptions of facts should be brought within the field of view, which can reveal any possible similarities; and most of all the order of development, or of growth, should be carefully considered. These principles have become the common-places of scientific study, the very axioms of any method which claims to be philosophical, whatever be the subject-matter about which it is employed, whether it be matter or spirit.

We take no exception to these principles as formally enounced, or as doctrines *de methodo* in the abstract. We freely grant that the science of the soul has, in common with the sciences of other departments, been prosecuted in too narrow and exclusive a spirit, and in particular, that it has been too much severed from the science of life and of human beings. What we except against, is the application of these principles made, or rather suggested all along by the author, that some new and extraordinary light is to be cast upon the facts of the soul, by the discovery of undetected similarities of either phenomena or laws, as the result of bringing more closely together the psychological and physiological spheres. This

doctrine is very earnestly enforced by a large class of recent physiological writers, and it is accepted by many the more readily from the circumstance, that much attention has of late been bestowed upon that class of phenomena which abound in the border land, which physiology and psychology hold in common, and which are classed under the names of somnambulism, animal magnetism, hypnotism, biology spiritualism, &c. The mystery that pertains to some of these phenomena, the pretension that is attached to others, and the abnormal and extraordinary character that belongs to all, invest all inquiries in regard to them with a singular fascination. The mystery and fascination together excite the surmise, the hope, the confident assertion, that out of this land of twilight, a mist-dispelling sun is speedily to emerge, which is to reform both the method and the science of psychology proper. We find in this chapter of Morell the surmise, the hope, the assertion, all in one, but so vaguely supported by definite or satisfactory grounds, as to command but a feeble conviction on our part. Rather are we aroused to the apprehension that the author has adopted a false method, which will be sure to vitiate and confuse his future researches.

We insist as earnestly as does Mr. Morell, that psychology should be studied with a constant reference to physiology. It is only as the facts and phenomena of life are held close to the attention, that we are prepared to notice and appreciate the more subtle facts of consciousness. It is by observing the one that we are disciplined to observe the other. The facts and phenomena which lie upon the border line between the two sciences, are admirably fitted to conduct the mind by gradual and insensible approaches from one to the other. It is not, however, so much the similarities that can be discerned in the subject-matter of the two sciences, as it is the differences which are in this way revealed to, and as it were, forced upon the attention. It is not that the laws, which are common to the two, are in this way developed, but that those which are peculiar to each separate department are set in bold and striking relief. Indeed, we apprehend that true science is as really promoted by the discovery of differences, as it is by the establishment of resemblances, whether of fact or of law. We think, moreover, that in confirmation of this principle, it could readily be shown from the history of psychology itself, that its slow beginning at the first, and its tardy progress, were owing most of all to the unsound analogies which it borrowed from the current physiology. Its slow advances since are, we think, to be ascribed to the per-



sistent purpose of its devotees to depend on material, and in their turn vital, analogies for illustration and proof, which has excluded the rational impulse and desire to do full justice to its own independent and self-sufficing phenomena and laws. It is true, that with the advance of the inductive sciences, there has been a sure and steady progress in the axioms and rules which are common to them all. Of the advantage which each particular science shares in the general progress of all, psychology has received its special portion. Inasmuch, also, as certain principles and methods which are most frequently applied in physiology, are those which psychology also has the most frequent occasion to use, it has often had occasion to turn to physiology, in order to justify itself in the use of the modes of inquiry, which the two sciences have most in common. But the more nearly the two are allied, the more imperative is the necessity that the alliance does not become so intimate as to be entangling and hurtful.

These remarks may seem to our readers very general. We design them only as an offset to the equally general remarks of the author. Their import will be more obvious when we come to apply them in the way of criticism upon the uses which the author makes of his own principles.

In chapter II. of the Introduction, Mr. Morell gives a somewhat more exact statement of these uses. He divides the Facts of Psychology into four classes, first and foremost of which are those which belong to every man, and which, therefore, furnish the chief subject-matter for our science. These again are subdivided into physical and mental, revealing three kinds of force, viz., vital force, nerve force, and mind force, each of which is in intimate connection and the closest correlation to the other two. At this point we are surprised at the following incautious statements, the first-fruits, as it would seem, of his peculiar principles concerning the union of psychology and physiology. "Modern investigations in natural science have brought to light the truth, that the varied *physical* forces of the universe, (such as gravitation, mechanical power, heat, light, electricity, etc.) may, with very few exceptions, be transformed into each other." pp. 17, 18. "Physiology, then, applying this doctrine of forces to the different powers connected with the human organism, has demonstrated, without the least shadow of doubt, that a similar correlation exists between vital energy, nervous energy, and mental energy." p. 18. "The whole doctrine of the correlation of the three sets of forces, of which we are the subjects, show us clearly how impossible it is to isolate

mental facts from all those of the nervous and vital system with which they are so closely connected. It points rather to the deeper truth that there must be at the root of them all a *unity*, out of which they alike spring." p. 19.

Upon these statements we offer the following comments. The doctrine that the various physical forces can be transformed into one another, is as yet not sufficiently defined and established to serve as the ground for an inference by analogy to a similar doctrine of the transmutation of a bodily into a mental or spiritual force. Digestion, secretion, circulation and nervous irritability are so much more unlike memory and imagination, than heat is unlike electricity, that even if the doctrine were accepted, that the physical forces named are transmutable, it would scarcely authorize us to infer that therefore vital forces could by any possibility be changed into psychical. Moreover the argument would prove too much; the analogy, if it reaches so far as to unite together all the forms of human or anthropological force into one intercommunity, or rather interchangeability, ought to reach yet farther and to bind together the physical and the psychical energies, as only varying and transmutable manifestations of the same fundamental power. In other words, if we have reason to believe that vital force is transmutable into mind force, because gravitation [as is believed] is changeable into heat, then we have also reason to believe, by extending the application of the analogy, that gravitation is changeable into mind force, leaving only a single force in the universe capable of an indefinite variety of transmutations. The last sentence quoted above, is, if possible, still more ambiguous and objectionable. What is the unity at the root of these forces to which the author refers? Is it a unity of substance, a unity of mutual causal dependence under certain conditions, or a unity of adaptation? The author does not inform us. Indeed he does not seem to distinguish these several kinds of unity, nor even to recognize that they are most clearly and widely distinguishable. For in the very next sentence he writes: "This unity, indeed, becomes sufficiently apparent, if we look at them all three in relation to *final causes*." Just as though a unity of mutual transmutableness did not, in a certain necessity, weaken, if it does not exclude the evidence, if it does not exclude the possibility, of the unity of adaptation. As though the pantheismus of Spinoza, the panlogismus of Hegel, and the panmaterialismus of Epicurus did not sacrifice teleological to essential unity, the unity of adaptation to the unity of substance. We are surprised

that the learned historian of opinions should have been inadvertent of this fact so notorious in the history of philosophy.

Mr. Morell has also overlooked the fact that the unity which he is so earnest to establish between psychical and vital force, is in its very principle, antagonistic to and inconsistent with the fundamental doctrine of Herbart, upon whose psychology he draws so largely in a subsequent portion of his treatise. Herbart insists on the independence and isolation of the elements all being, whether material or spiritual. He adopts the doctrine that separate monads, so-called, constitute the essence of separate material beings, and that their relations to other monads explain these phenomena. The soul, according to Herbart, is a simple substance. The possibility that it should, by any method, be interchanged with any other, and that by any possible transmutation vital should pass into nerve force, or that nerve force should be in its root one with psychical force, is forever excluded by this theory. Whatever advantage, then, Mr. Morell may hope to derive from the comparison of psychological and physiological forces, and whatever ingenuity he may display in effecting a transition from the one to the other, will be at the expense of consistency with himself, when he comes to make use of the theories of Herbart.

But we leave at this point the introduction of our author, and proceed to consider the substance of his treatise. The first part treats of the Primordial Forms of Mental Activity, and the first chapter of Part I., of Fundamental Distinctions of Vital Phenomena. It is worthy of notice that the author carries forward into this discussion the following, as the result of his preliminary investigations: "We have already pointed out the impossibility of drawing any exact limit between the vital and the spiritual facts of our nature. It is the vital power, however, which appears *first* in the history of the individual; and it is out of this, as the germ, that all mental phenomena are evolved. We are referring, of course, now, simply to the apparent order of events, without intending to convey any theory as to the actual priority of *mind* or *organization*." If this is all that the author has evolved from his discussion of principles, we have nothing to object against it. That it does not cover all the principles which he occasionally uses—not all which he sometimes applies, and thereby shows that he unconsciously assumes, will appear farther on.

The fundamental characteristics of all living beings are the tendency to individualization, the dependence on sur-

rounding physical forces, and consequent growth. These bring to light the general law, that every being strives to maintain its own being by the power which it has both to appropriate and reject from its surroundings or conditions of its existence. In the activity of appropriating and rejecting, it secures its growth. He illustrates the operation of this law by the familiar phenomena of assimilation and excretion, in the development and growth of the plant and the animal, and finds it repeated again "in the operations of mind force from the lower instincts up to the highest exercise of reason. For what is instinct but the power of adaptation to external circumstances, *i. e.* of selecting what is conducive to well-being, and repelling all that is noxious to it? And what is reasoning, but the power of separating and distinguishing, as a necessary preliminary to the assimilation and complete appropriation of truth?" This is "the most general, universal and fundamental fact of life, whether physical or mental." We cannot deny that a very general resemblance or analogy of this sort is discernible. It is, however, quite too general to be capable of being turned to any possible use of science. Indeed, the suggestion of any resemblance between the appropriation and discrimination used in reasoning, and that which occurs in digestion or growth, seems poorly fitted to illustrate the advantages which we were promised would result from the close connection of psychology with physiology. We should rather find in it an illustration of the truth of our observation, that science gains quite as much by noticing differences, as by straining after resemblances. In that book of forced attenuated generalization, of great pretension and small results—*The Principles of Psychology*, by Herbert Spencer—there is a generalization very similar to this by Morell, which seems to us very barren of important consequences.

Let us, however, reserve our judgment concerning this principle of Mr. Morell, and consider the application which he makes of it. This he proceeds to do in the 2d chapter, in which he considers "the point at which the mental phenomena diverge from the purely vital."

The views expressed by the author on this subject are briefly the following: The mind or body are not two, but one. There is "a nascent spark of intelligence in the primary cell," and this is "the soul in its primary, unconscious state." "Some intelligent principle *must* exist there from the moment the formation of the human frame commences, or no acts of design could be performed." "It is it which, by

an inherent law, adds cell to cell, shapes the tissues into organs and limbs, adapts the body to perform the functions of life, constructs the wondrous net-work of the nervous system." We are not sure that we understand the author. It would seem that he reasons, that if there be adaptations in the arrangement of skeleton, muscle and nerves, there must be a force working in all these arrangements which will in due time be itself developed as a conscious intelligence. In other words, the presence of adaptation in the body proves that the soul itself is intelligent—because it manifests an intelligent force working unconsciously, in preparation for materials or instruments against the time when it shall itself become consciously intelligent, and avail itself of the instruments that it has provided. That there is adaptation, we do not doubt; adaptation in the parts of the corporeal structure to each other; adaptation in the successive development of each part as it is required, and in the relation of each to the service of the body or soul. That adaptation implies, and is the result of intelligence, is also true; but that it necessarily proves "nascent" intelligence in the common centre of life, is more than we can see. If it did, then adaptation in the plant ought to prove nascent intelligence in the plant, nay even in the vegetable cell. So must all the prospective arrangements, that are revealed in the successive stages of growth, presuppose a soul that shall by and by emerge as a conscious spirit, when the bright, consummate flower reveals that the goal is attained, and the cycle of development has been completed. To go to this length is no more than the author ought to do, if he takes Schelling literally at his word, in the sentiment to which he alludes, "that all physical motion, activity and life effort is *unconscious thinking*."

The critical point to be passed is the point at which the *vital* pass into the *mental* forces. The problem to be solved is, When does the unconscious become conscious intelligence? This the author seeks to explain by making the vital processes to respect the structure and interests of the bodily frame, and the mental "to have an object apart from the well-being of the organism, whether it be involved in a sensation, a perception, an act of memory, or judgement, nay, even in an instinct or a volition." It is obvious that this criterion would greatly enlarge the sphere of mental acts beyond what is common. Nor are we reconciled to it any the more because the author observes that the division is merely arbitrary, the great object being to say "that the nerve-force is termed *vital* so long as it is wholly subjective

and internal ; but that we term it *mental* so soon as it takes us out of ourselves and connects us with the objective world." Is there then no objection to calling the nerve force in some special form of its activity *mental force*? And has Mr. Morell been for so many years conversant with the terms *subjective* and *objective* as to be content to limit and apply them to relations *within* and *without* the bodily organism only?

We pass over the elucidation of the motor, sensori-motor, and cerebral systems, as being vitiated by the same vague conceptions and objectionable language which we have already noticed. The doctrine of the chapter is summed up in the brief sentence near the end, "that consciousness is not a *necessary*, though it is a *usual* accompaniment of our mental operations." This position is illustrated and enforced more at length in the next chapter, under the title of "Pre-conscious Mental Activity." This chapter will attract the attention of all readers, whose interest in this subject may have been aroused by Hamilton's doctrine of "a latent consciousness," and by the consideration of the facts which are referred to by Leibnitz, Hamilton and Morell—facts which are forced upon the notice of every one who reflects with the slightest attention on the phenomena of his own experience. These facts are detailed by Mr. Morell at some length. That they have not been sufficiently considered by the majority of psychologists is equally clear. That they have not been entirely overlooked might be easily shown. That they permit ground for conclusions or inductions of some sort is obvious. We question whether the theory of Mr. Morell is either clearly conceived by himself, or satisfactorily sustained by the phenomena. His theory is expressed as follows: "That the vital forces and the mind forces are one and the same at the root; 2dly, That all our conscious life rests upon the basis of an unconscious life, out of which it grows; and 3dly, That there is such a correspondency between vital and mental activity, that the laws of the one will help us to throw some light upon the laws of the other."

The facts on which this theory is raised are almost too obvious to be referred to. We cite them only that we may not be accused of unfairness. We possess knowledge that is not at the passing moment consciously present. We have faculties that are not consciously now in exercise. Moreover there is knowledge and there are faculties that are not only not now in actual being or in present activity, but which ordinary circumstances and ordinary volitions cannot bring into



energy. Such is the knowledge and such the activity which fever and delirium develop. Such are those which somnambulism and the mesmeric sleep more rarely elicit. Again, there are striking tendencies to particular activities which are inherited, sometimes disappearing during and reappearing after a whole generation, but meanwhile existing in latent energy, somewhere and acting somehow. Again, not only do knowledges, powers and tendencies exist in this latent form, but even mental processes go on behind the curtain, which consciousness lifts up. For example, thoughts rearrange themselves, in latency, so that, on a second view, what was confused and unintelligible becomes orderly and readily understood. Thoughts suggest one another by links of association, which consciousness cannot detect or trace out. The most rapid and intricate combinations are made without effort, when they have been often repeated, as by the musical performer, etc. These facts are not new. Nor are speculations concerning them so new as Mr. Morell would have us believe. The only thing novel in modern science is the attempt to find in them decisive evidence, that the vital runs into the mental activities by so fine a gradation of *nuances*, that it is thereby rendered certain that the vital and the mental force are the same; and again, that the one interplays with the other so as to prove unity of substances and nature; and, strangest of all, as most contradictory to the tenor of all philosophizing, is it insisted by Mr. Morell that the teleological relations of the vital or the unconscious to the mental and the conscious, prove identity or oneness of substance, and that we must adopt this view or run into pantheism.

Even these efforts are novel only so far as the physiology is novel on which they rest, and which furnishes the analogies by which they are illustrated. The doctrines of animal spirits and of brain vibrations were turned to similar applications in their time; but they never satisfied the phenomena, nor explained the facts. Do the researches of what is confessedly a sound physiology serve to suggest any more satisfactory analogies, or more solid explanations in respect either to the nature, the powers, or the processes of the intelligent or rational soul? Is the theory of Mr. Morell, as stated in the three points above cited, "the best interpretation of those facts which can be at present suggested?" First, are "the vital-forces and the mind-forces one and the same at their root?" In one sense they are, and to deny this is to commit a serious oversight, the fruitful parent of

scientific and theological consequences fraught with evil. In another sense, the sense perhaps not intended, yet certainly not avoided by Mr. Morell, they cannot be without materialistic inferences. Let us explain. The human soul is a unit, a single and identical agent, and as such capable of the various functions and all the functions which are appropriate to human nature. It is as truly one of the functions of the soul to form to itself a human body, to digest, assimilate, excrete, to circulate the blood, to attain the growth, to exercise bodily motion, etc., as it is to reason, to imagine, to hope, to fear, or to attain to moral developement and to assume moral character. In more technical language we say, given that entity or being called the human soul, and given the appropriate conditions, and it performs all these functions, goes through these successive stages of development, and produces these effects or results. In this sense it is not only true, but a most important truth, 'that the vital-forces and the mind-forces' are 'one and the same at their root.' We may say more than this. Modern psychology has often overlooked, sometimes it has excluded or even denied this truth. In the Cartesian limitation of thought as the essential function and the sole characteristic of spirit as opposed to matter, in the extreme dualistic theories which allowed no power of interaction between spirit and matter, in the unscientific timidity which dreads lest the moral prerogatives and the immortal destiny of the spirit should be sacrificed if any other view should be adopted, we trace the consequences of these one-sided conceptions. Indeed, we ought to confess, without reserve, that the natural importance and deserved supremacy which Christianity asserted for the higher functions of the soul, has led the way to a lower and more limited definition of its essence than that which the ancients formed, who never dreamed of finding two centres of unity or active force, for the soul of the man, any more than for the soul of the plant. This extreme dualism of modern psychology has been fearfully revenged upon, by the extreme unitarianism of materialistic theories.

On the other hand, it is not true that "the vital-forces and the mind-forces are one and the same at their root," in the sense that all vital-force is transmutable into mind-force by a higher development or under more favorable conditions. The soul of the fox, the horse and the dog, to say nothing of the soul of the mollusc and of the insect, are capable of their animal and, if you please, intelligential or instinctive functions and growth. Given the beings and given the condi-

tions, and they perform their functions, run through their circle of development, achieve their results, and fulfill their possible destiny. But it is not true that, given new conditions, they will attain to higher functions. There is no such relation between the vital and the mental forces as to warrant the faith that the one secures the other, or can be transmuted into the other. The vital functions of the fox, the horse and the dog, even their sensorial capacities, are, in some respects, higher and more perfect than are those of the man; but there is no promise in all these that these souls will therefore learn to reason or morally reflect and purpose.

The second point in the theory of the author, "that all our conscious life rests upon the basis of an unconscious life out of which it grows," is too vaguely expressed to furnish room for criticism. That the unconscious processes precede those of which we are conscious in the order of time, is true. It is equally certain that there are unconscious processes that accompany those of which we are conscious through the highest forms of mental activity, and that the unconscious are the conditions of the conscious. Though in one sense it is true that the conscious grows out of the unconscious life, it is never true that the one *outgrows* the other. There is no such development from the one to the other as that the higher displaces the lower.

The third point of the author is, that "there is such a correspondency between vital and mental activity, that the laws of the one will help us to throw some light upon the laws of the other." This we deny altogether, and assert that the consideration of the differences between the two is of prime importance, and that the study of the laws of life are of chief value to the psychologist as they draw his attention to, and bring out in more striking relief, the peculiar and essential differences of the mental activities. Whether our own views or those of the author are right will be made more apparent as we follow him still further. Nothing that he has advanced hitherto amounts to more than the suggestion of *pia desideria*, or flattering possibilities.

Chapter Fourth treats of Primordial Mental Activity accompanied with consciousness. Here is traced the beginning of the conscious experience in the form of instinct. Before, all was action and reaction without sensation; but now, "as soon as the impulse *ab extra* reaches the sensorium, consciousness is awakened, and the accompanying actions are at once attributed to the mind—the self—the individual." Again,

says the author, "We have now, accordingly, two distinct factors brought under our consideration; 1st, various external impulses acting upon us through the organism; and, 2dly, a nervous centre which receives those impulses, makes us conscious of them, and initiates a reaction." We submit that the author here commits two oversights. In the first passage he exalts instinct too high, in requiring that there should be that energy of consciousness which attributes the accompanying actions to the self—the individual. In the second passage he makes this a result or function of the nervous centre, saying expressly that the nervous centre "makes us conscious" of the impressions which it receives. We are prompted also to ask, what is the sensorium of which he speaks in the phrase, "as soon as the impulse reaches the sensorium?" Does he mean by it the organized flesh—as for example, the eye or the ear—together with the organized nervous matter in filaments, ganglia and brain? Or does he mean more than this, *i. e.* the organized flesh and the nervous substance and the vitalizing rational spirit? If he means more than this, he ought to say it; especially ought he not to say that a nervous centre can make *us* conscious. Pray, who or what is the *us*, and what is it to be *conscious*? and how can the reaction of a nervous centre, even when it is called a sensorium, explain in the least those beginnings of the experiences of the living and feeling soul, even in their lowest form of distinctive or sensational activity? The fact is forced upon our conviction that Mr. Morell does not clearly conceive what he is driving at. He has accepted the vague and most unmeaning, if not most equivocal of all assertions, that the soul in all its activities is intelligent; that there may be unconscious intelligence wherever there is intelligent adaptation; and so he is prepared to use language in the broadest and most fantastic significations; and so at last, in his elucidation of instinct, he entertains us with the following: "It is not an uncommon idea to contrast instinct and reason, as though they were opposite in their nature, and the one excluded the other. The real fact of the case is that, so far from being opposites, they are fundamentally *identical*. Instinct is reason; but reason in its undeveloped, semi-unconscious, and wholly involuntary form." But, pray, who shall tell us how or wherein they differ? Is there no truth in the remark that science teaches differences as well as similarities?

We pause here in our examination of the author's Introduction. We have dwelt longer upon it than we intended,

partly on account of the importance of the question, What is the proper method in psychology ; chiefly because of the promise of new light from the revelations of the newer physiology. We have been disappointed, as we frankly own, that the author has fulfilled his promise no better. At the same time it is but just to him to say, that, as he proceeds in the volume, he seems to lose sight of, if not altogether to abandon the fundamental positions of his Introduction. We think it not unjust to say, that each separate portion is written in the spirit of a different philosophy, and bears marks of the influence of some leading treatise or prominent writer. We are prompted almost to write in the margin, Carpenter, George, Herbart, Trendelenburg, Spencer, etc., etc.

Part II. is entitled, *The Nature and Development of Perception*. We look first in order, and with awakened curiosity, for his doctrine of Sensation ; for we are trembling along the line which divides physiology from psychology, and here if anywhere may we expect that the promised light is to be furnished from the better theory of the soul's essence and action, for which we are to render thanks to physiology. We are surprised, however, to find that the author changes his language so soon as he is distinctly confronted with the duty of defining what sensation is. He now says that "consciousness is ordinarily awakened in connection with the action and reaction" consequent upon the impulse that excites the sensory ganglia at the base of the brain. Again : "Sensation itself accordingly must be regarded as an ultimate and indecomposable fact." Indeed, then, even according to Mr. Morell, there is an impassable chasm between nerve-force and mind-force ; the functions of the one are not to be resolved into or compared with the functions of the other. If this is so, then he has abandoned all his fond expectations and fair promises of finding analogies between the one and the other. So it would seem. But yet he returns again upon the question with new eagerness and more ardent confidence. Forgetting that it is one thing to discern the conditions of a phenomenon and quite another to analyze or accept the phenomenon itself, he plunges into a purely physical or physico-physiological disquisition concerning the one, seeming to himself apparently to be making rapid advance in explanation of the other. He tells us that all objects in nature that are sensized must be in motion ; that in order to the production of sensation, the nervous system itself must be excited to motion, or rather the sensorium

itself is in a constant thrill of activity ; and it is, as its own proper activity receives impulse and direction from the palpitating universe without, that the sensations arise which are specific in respect of both quality and intensity.

All this may be or may not be true. But whether the facts and laws alleged are to be received as true, or to be set aside as not yet proved, they concern only the physical and physiological conditions of sensation, and shed not the faintest light upon the nature of the process itself. This still remains "the ultimate and indecomposable fact," which Mr. Morell has confessed it to be. We must confess our surprise that the author has, against this clear assertion of his own, confounded for so many pages things so easily distinguished as sensation and the conditions of sensation—that he has sought to explain the one by the other, and that after acknowledging once and again that the two are not to be blended together, he has returned again to the effort as though he had not confessed the problem to be insoluble.

But what does he make of sensation as a purely psychological phenomenon? Surely, in his zeal to state its conditions, he will not wholly overlook the phenomenon itself; not wholly, indeed, and yet so nearly as to show that he has regarded the explanation of the one as pertinent to a solution of the other. The "ultimate indecomposable fact" is said to be "the consciousness of any nervous impression thus originating." Then it is called "a peculiar feeling produced in us as soon as the reaction from the centre sets in." In a previous chapter, as we have already cited, it is said "the accompanying actions are at once attributed to the mind, the self, the individual." In Chap. II., On Perception, sensation is said "not to be knowledge," "not even experience;" and "all that any number of sensations could indicate would be a succession of isolated mental feelings, having no connexion with each other, and leading, consequently, to no kind of intelligence or knowledge." This is all the light that the author furnishes upon the nature of *sensation proper*. We regret that his doctrine on this subject is so meagre and so incoherent, and we would fain congratulate ourselves that we are leaving the border-land between physiology and psychology, and cherish the hope that we may emerge into the region of clearer vision, and more definite boundaries.

What, then, is perception? Chronologically, it is not distinguished from sensation, only logically. Only perception is not possible on a single sensation as its condition, it being the transition from one sensational condition to another,



which is the condition of that apprehension and comparison which is properly termed perception. But if this be so, then the first sensation is not entirely obliterated while the mind occupies itself with the second. The two must, in some sense, be co-existent, in order that the so-called act of perception may take place by the agency of transition. That this is so, the author argues from his favorite analogy of the cell-building process, by which animal and vegetable, and, as he infers, mental growth, are accomplished. Moreover, that there is a difference between sensation and perception, is indicated by the physiological fact that the one is performed mainly by the nerves of sensation, and the other by the nerves of motion. Thus far, it would seem, we are concerned with the conditions of perception, but what is the act itself? To perceive an object is to recognize it. Inasmuch as two objects must be sensed before perception can take place, then there must be an apprehension of similarity. Inasmuch as the discernment of likeness implies classification, therefore as soon as we perceive we begin to classify. All perception is in some sense acquired perception, the interpretation of sensations, and this is especially manifest in the more complicated acts by which we apprehend ordinary objects, which acts are made up, as we all know, of many separate acts that are rapidly grouped and combined as apparently one.

The outline doctrine of perception here sketched, is afterwards expanded by the author in a series of chapters, each treating a separate topic. Thus in order to show that not one but two sensations, and in ordinary cases many indeed, may be present as the condition of an act of perception, the author furnishes an argument in proof of the indestructibility of every perception [sensation] showing by manifold examples, that never is an impression made of which the traces or effects are wholly effaced. Next arises the very natural question, what is the nature of these effects or *residua*, which are so potent in the processes and building up of the mind. To this question he gives no definite answer, so far as the physical or psychical nature of these *residua* is concerned; but affirms that they involve a tendency or predisposition to recur; that this tendency aids immensely both objectively and subjectively. Objectively, in furnishing distinct and vivid perceptions to the mind, as each residuum blends with its like or its related to give sharpness to the outline, vividness to the coloring, and boldness to the shading of oft apprehended objects; and subjectively, by giving added facility to the mind to apprehend those objects or perform those

functions with which it is most conversant. The nature and influence of these *residua* are still further illustrated, as they explain the apprehensive of the similar and the different, which, according to the author, is involved in the act of perception. If we look at a pencil with each eye closed, we perceive a different object; if we look at it with both eyes, these different objects, or rather the *residua* of the two as perceived, blend into one. If we look upon a complicated object, as a cathedral, or an extended landscape, we must look at the several portions many times, in order to accumulate *residua* enough from each to fix a definite impression of all into a whole. We see daily multitudes of objects which we do not discern as unlike others we have seen, as single leaves, pebbles, paving-stones, single palings of a series, &c., each of which is a generalized perception, or the product of many blendid *residua*. So that "the multiplicity of our impressions blends into combined images, and classified perceptive knowledge is the result." It is in this way that the infant emerges by a slow but sure progress from the mass of confused impressions that throng in upon its senses, into the possession of and mastery over those definite objects which are the result of the blended residue, which have remained after a myriad of single, indefinite apprehensions. The perception of distinct objects, in the way described, is but the first step or act in the process which ordinarily receives this appellation.

We interrupt our sketch of the author's theory of perception, and defer all criticisms for the present, in order to notice the influence of the psychology of Herbart, to which he confesses himself so greatly indebted, and the presence of which is most distinctly manifest in the analysis which we have already given. It is somewhat difficult to state this theory within our prescribed limits, but its chief points may perhaps be clearly indicated.

The soul, according to Herbart, is a unit, a monad. As such it is capable only of a single activity or state at any one instant. The doctrine that it can be in several states or modes of activity at once, is rejected with great earnestness. The apparent complexity of the soul's subjectivity results from the number of the objects with which it has to do. The soul, as one, is not endowed with separate faculties. That this doctrine is incompatible with its simplicity and unity, is most earnestly and scornfully rejected by Herbart and his disciples. But is not the soul capable of various forms of subjectivity? No. These all are but the reacting energy of the soul, its self-sustaining elasticity as it is impinged upon by the several

objects with which it is brought in contact. These reactions of the soul constitute its states or phenomena—*vorstellungen*—the play and interplay of which account for all the so-called faculties, laws, ideas and growth of the human soul. Each state being but a form of the soul's own energy as excited by some object, can only be thrust aside or repressed by some more exciting object, and when thus thrust aside, remains in a condition of tension, ready to reappear upon the first occasion. That occasion is furnished after the following law: Similar states blend together, so as to reinforce one another, producing either a stronger simple idea, or a more tenacious complex idea. Dissimilar, but successively occurring objects, blend into distinct series, each of which series, when reinforced by repetition, is also endowed with a tension similar to that which belongs to a distinct object. Indeed, as it is not the object itself in any case, so much as the mind's reaction, that is capable of greater or less tension, it is rather the state of transition from one state to another which is endowed with the force tending to recur, which furnishes the key to all psychical phenomena. To the relative force of these states all striving to rush over the threshold and break through the doorway of consciousness, Herbart contended, might be applied the formulas of mathematical science, as properly as to the states and dynamics of fluids tending to equilibrium, or pressing on in motion. Hence the pages of his "Psychology as a Science" bristle with mathematical characters, and the student of mental science, according to Herbart, requires to be fresh in his algebra and the calculus. Without showing how he works out the details of his system, it is enough for us to say that the activity which he denies to the soul he transfers to the soul's ideas or states, investing them with a fearful energy to attract and repel, and allow to the poor soul itself the privilege of being the scene, the show-place, and often the pent up prison that is torn and rent by the surging forces that rage within its walls. The real agents are the objects which excite the soul to the energy of self-preservation, and which enforce and reinforce its excited conditions according to definite mechanical laws. The so-called faculties of the soul are thus explained: Certain states, produced as above described, by the blending of a sufficient number of homogeneous and the complication of a sufficient number of heterogenous residua, and excited by actual exciting objects, are states of perception. When the residua only are the excitants, or when the force of the residua is great enough to overcome and displace the exciting energy of exciting [i. e. material] objects, then representation

only takes place. When many residua so completely blend together as to exclude all the power of differences to excite them, we have generalization. But there is no so-called faculty to perceive, to imagine, and to generalize. Only a capacity in the mind in its reactions to be more or less strongly affected, and in the reactions themselves to strengthen or weaken one another, to admit those with which they assimilate, and to exclude those with which they cannot harmonize. In other words, while to the soul is denied any faculties of subjective energy, to the ideas of the soul or their residua, are ascribed energies and faculties in large abundance. In some of its features this theory is not unlike the theory of Hartley and Hume, who explained all mental phenomena by the single law of the association of ideas, thus investing ideas themselves with an agency that is appropriate only to the spiritual agent itself, and subjecting mental phenomena to purely mechanical agencies and laws. Indeed, the definitions of Herbart in the last analysis, would not be unlike those given by Hume, who made a perception and an idea to differ only in that the one is a stronger and the other is a weaker impression; or, as Dr. Reid remarks: "Suppose a man strikes his head smartly against the wall, this is an impression; now he has a faculty by which he can repeat this impression with less force, so as not to hurt him; this, by Mr. Hume's account must be memory. He has a faculty by which he can just touch the wall with his head so that the impression entirely loses its vivacity. This surely must be imagination." Essay III. ch. 7.

One pre-eminent, indeed the capital defect of this theory, is that it sinks out of view the appropriate and spontaneous energy of the soul itself, and presents no satisfying conception and definition of its act of knowledge. It does not assert for it this as its high and peculiar function, by which it affirms its own being, its own states or acts, and the being of the universe of matter and spirit with which it has to do. Instead of being such an agent with such a function, it degrades it to be the passive reactor or recipient of stronger or weaker impressions, and from the strength or weakness of these ideas derives the character and all the energy of its phenomena. These phenomena are not knowledges or cognitions of facts that are thereby assured to be, but products of two factors, the objective stimulant, and the subjective re-agent both entering into the result, by laws like those which control the pressure of the atmosphere on the barometer, and the rise or falling of the waves of the sea. In other words, the system defines for us the conditions of mental acts, but never reach-

es the acts themselves. For example, Mr. Morell tells us that to the act of distinct perception, it is necessary that there be oft-repeated residua from similar excitants, which at last blend into one generalized perception; but he does not tell us what it is for *the mind* to perceive. He does, indeed, imply, and sometimes say that the mind must distinguish differences and recognize similarities; but differences and similarities, in the language of his system, are simply a complex blending or antagonistic residua. It is the residua which are the agents, not the intellect, as they consent to unite into a strong vivid whole, or refuse thus to conspire to a sufficient product. It avails little to say that the residua are nothing without the mind itself; that they, with their weakness and strength, are the joint result of the exciting stimuli, and the self-asserting and reacting spirit. What we require to be explained is not the energy of the mind in producing or preparing its own materials or objects, but it is the knowing that something exists when these objects are elaborated and prepared as the conditions of its knowledge.

We observe that Mr. Morell, by a happy inconsistency with the spirit of the system from which he borrows so much, often uses the ordinary language of common life and of sound philosophy. He speaks of the mind as being conscious, of its referring its sensations to the self and the individual, of distinguishing, of recognizing, of classifying, etc., etc. But so far as he does this, he forgets himself, and is untrue to the definitions and principles on which he builds.

In order adequately to appreciate Herbart's system in contrast with the commonly received psychology, one ought to understand his doctrine of the *ego* and of self-consciousness. This doctrine he treats very largely, and upon no single topic does he urge his own views so strongly and in such sharp and scornful antagonism with the common doctrines, as upon this. He rejects the view that in consciousness there is a reference of the subjective psychical state to the ego or self as its subject, or that in perception there is the distinction of the object from the subject, contending most stoutly that the self and the ego from which these subjective states and objective realities are distinguished, is of later growth and gradual acquisition, which is slowly attained and built up as the product of manifold processes of blending and separation, to which are superadded some necessary metaphysical relations. First, the mind slowly learns to distinguish the states of its own body from the universe of world-objects, and latest of all does it conceive itself as an I or self, which is distinguishable

ble from both, as a highly refined result of its own most cultivated processes. He rejects necessarily the doctrine of consciousness, either as a faculty or an act by which the mind is at once subject and object, the observer and the observed, and employs all the resources of his logical ingenuity to expose the verbal and real absurdities which such a doctrine involves. Self-consciousness and reflective consciousness are both, according to his views, of the very latest growth in the order of time, but it is impossible that they should emerge at all until a long preparation of mental experiences has gone before.

We observe that Mr. Morell avoids both these topics, we cannot suppose designedly, and yet they are too prominently discussed by Herbart himself, and too fundamental to his psychological system, to be easily overlooked. We must conclude that he was too exclusively occupied with the applications of this system in perception and reproduction to care to treat of these other topics, fundamental though they are to any doctrine of the soul; or that he failed to observe to what conclusions the principles of Herbart would lead. Hence he unconsciously, though inconsistently, adopts the ordinary language oftener than he thinks, and thus saves himself from the extremes to which greater rigor or a sharper observation in the application of his own system would inevitably have carried him.

We do not care to follow Mr. Morell's doctrine of perception any farther. To do so would oblige us to expound the doctrine of Herbart in respect to both time and space, for which we have not room. It cannot be found in all its fullness or in all its purity in the use made of it by Morell, who has endeavored to unite Trendelenburg and Herbart in a way which neither of these philosophers would wholly sanction. The apprehension of externality also fails to be fully explained.

If we now proceed to Part III, *The Nature and Development of Ideas*, we shall find the principles of Herbart, which we have expounded, to be consistently and thoroughly applied. In the chapters on the Relationship between Perception and Ideas, we have the opinion enounced and enforced that the only difference between the two is in the vividness and number of the constituent elements. Our perceptions are continually passing into ideas, and our ideas are continually returning into and blending with our perceptions, in the way in which we have already explained. In the chapter on *The Action and Reaction of Ideas*, the author brings out the



great law of the Herbartian psychology which we have stated already, viz : as the mind can, on account of its unity, entertain but one idea at the same moment, when two or more ideas present themselves, they either blend into one composite idea, so that being thus made one they can enjoy a hospitable reception ; or if they are so repulsive to one another that they cannot blend, the stronger overbears and thrusts out the weaker, which latter has its revenge by taking away so much of the force and energy of the stronger, as to increase the probability that it will be unable to hold the door against the next object that presents itself for admittance. Both being turned out, begin at once to use all the strength which is left them, after fighting with one another, to contend against the third object which has a hard struggle to push the door against the two or two million that have been turned out before, as well as against the train of passengers that are continually coming up *de novo*. If any of these new passengers happens to be of kin to the struggling crowd, he will either swallow him or put him into his pocket, and so the two will go in as one ; or he will take him on his arm, sometimes making a train as long as a row of Irishman's cousins or the tail of a Highland chief, and they will march in with all the dignity of a very complex but strongly reinforced idea. But even then there is so much loss of strength experienced in struggling through and against the barking and pushing crowd of previous *expults*, that they must soon resign the mastery to the next new comer with fresh energies. Or in the more dignified language of Morell, "The contest of ideas for the mastery closely resembles the relationship of forces as expounded in the science of dynamics. Here are two mutual forces, striving for the occupation of the consciousness. If they are similar and act in the same direction, their results are *combined*. If they are opposed, then the one overcomes the other ; but, in doing so, it loses a portion of its own power equivalent to that which it displaces." In Chap. III, on the "Blending of Ideas," the same fundamental assumptions are applied to explain the union of similar ideas in the formation of simple and complex general notions, and the view already explained is more emphatically announced, that in perception as well as in the higher processes generalization and classification are required.

In Chap. IV, "Association of Ideas," two leading assumptions are illustrated and applied. First, that what we call experience is made up of constantly combined ideas ; second, as only dissimilar ideas can be combined—similar ideas

always blending into one, dissimilar uniting in series—it follows that the tendency of one such idea to suggest another must arise from and be measured by the amount of force which the one has expended in extruding the other. Action and reaction are equal, and if one idea has driven out another with a certain energy, then the other is in precisely the state of tension or tendency to come back, which that expelling force represents. These principles are illustrated by the author in the operation of the ordinary laws of association.

We pause here in our analysis of the work, to interpose one or two critical remarks. There is some defect of clearness in the conception of what Morell intends by ideas, which is more or less noticable in all the psychologists of the Herbartian school. Are ideas the objects of the mind's apprehension before they are perceived, or after they are perceived? The original definition of Herbart would require the idea, *vorstellung*, to be the joint product of the acting, i. e. the exciting object and the re-acting mind. One of the most careful and consistent of Herbart's disciples, *Waitz*\*, is very particular in insisting on this construction, and criticises Herbart for want of precision. If this view is adhered to, we do not see but it involves all that is objectionable in the common doctrine of the faculties of the soul. For the soul may have as many ways of reacting, under the same excitement, as would be required to furnish it with the ordinary out-fit of faculties. Moreover, if this view is carefully adhered to, then the force to blend and the force to expel, does not lie in the object as such, but in what we call in our English terminology the mental state, that is, the mind's active energy under the excitement of the arousing object. If this is so, then the question will not only suggest but force itself to our attention, what is involved in the mind's reaction when it perceives, recalls and generalizes? Is the separation described and accounted for by saying that similars blend in complexes, and dissimilars combine in series? But what is the similar and dissimilar? the object or the mind's own reactive state? If the last, then the whole play and interplay of these friendly and hostile forces, depends in the main upon the mind's individual energy to emphasize, which would lead us in just the opposite direction to that in which Herbart and Morell would conduct us, they seeking to account for all faculties, developments and acquisitions, by the blendings and combinations of dynamic forces that belong to the nature of that idea, and not to the individual mind.

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\**Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft.* § 11

Another set of questions will also force themselves upon our attention. Does not the mind when it reacts against or under these exciting conditions, refer these reactions of its own to itself as their subject? Or is it not essential to the very nature of psychical action, that the soul should distinguish its knowing, feeling and willing as its own? If this is so, then the whole theory of the Herbartian psychology is abandoned by a single concession, or rather it is overturned by a fact. No substitution of the vague word reaction or *Selbst-erhaltung* can suffice to set aside the simple experience of what psychical action is in its essential and distinctive elements.

The right conception being fixed of what these psychical states are which are endowed with these forces and their dynamic laws, we have the clue by which to correct and adjust the confused and somewhat inconsistent explanations of the author. The blending of ideas is simply the discerning of similar objects by the knowing mind, and the consequent union of them under the old fashioned general conception. The combination of dissimilars is the mind's act of distinguishing dissimilars as diverse; and the connecting of them, the relations which they hold to the individual observing or knowing them, as under continuity of time, conjunction of space, or some specially aroused feeling, as in contrast. The law of Morell, "the strength of association, therefore, may in every case be stated as equal to the amount of action and reaction of the associated ideas," is translated into this more intelligible formula, the strength of association depends on the greater or less energy of the mind's own activity in its original and subsequent reactions, whether this reaction be in the form of knowledge, feeling or willing. Doubtless it is true that after the mind has had a so-called idea there is a tendency thereby created towards the recalling or bringing back, what we call the same idea, under favoring occasions. The occurrence or presentation to the mind of what is called a kindred idea is favorable, of an idea not kindred is entirely hostile. But on closer inspection we find that what is called an idea is the result of some form of the soul's own activity, and the favoring or disfavoring character of the ideas can pertain only to the soul's own actings. At the first view it seems as though the ideas, as independent entities, had attracting and repelling qualities, as two globules of quicksilver rush and are blended into one, or as a drop of water and of oil meet only to repel one another. But the second and nearer view corrects this first impression, and shows us

that it is the mind's own activity as determined by its capacities which determines the attractions and repulsions.

Herbart follows the first view in common with Hartley and Hume of the the English school, not indeed holding or applying the doctrine of association in all respects as they did. He has at hand certain ultimate metaphysical relations, by which he seeks to supplement the defects of his psychological scheme. In this respect his system is far better than theirs. On the other hand, he carries the mistaken assumption of the attractions and repulsions of ideas to an extreme which is more inconsistent with consciousness, exposed to more serious objections than theirs. He makes the faculties themselves, and even the conscious Ego itself, to be the resultant of successive accretions and excretions of assimilable or non-assimilable ideas. This general principle of Herbart Morell has adopted, being fascinated as it would seem by the simplicity of the principle, by the completeness with which it provides for a progressive development or up-building from the simplest elements to the most complex results, and by the close analogy which it establishes between the processes and laws of psychology and physiology. And yet he professes to adopt it in part. Whenever his new system fails to account for or square with the facts of consciousness, he resorts to that which is generally received. Sometimes while seeming to adhere to the new, he uses the language of the old, and thus softens the harsher features and adjusts the violent contrasts of the system of which he is so enamored.

But, with all his wariness, he does not always avoid carrying the principles of Herbart to their logical results. In the chapter on Association he falls, as we have noticed in passing, into the error of Hume in making the conjunctions of associated ideas to be the sole and sufficient foundation of experience; or in other words, he abandons entirely the position that in all experience there is required an element *a priori*. To be consistent, he must of necessity resolve the relation of causality into customary association. Even in the chapter on the *a priori* element in our mental processes, we find him seeking in vain to blend under a common conception three kinds of priority—that which is determined by physiological conditions, by psychological constitution and logical axioms, leaving only a confused impression of the real question which is under discussion, and leaving wholly unconsidered the relations, *i.e.* the speculative or metaphysical, which are usually recognised as containing what is proper-

ly called the element *a priori*. In this chapter he falls below his master, who rests his entire system upon certain permanent relations in distinction from those which are accidental, which relations must be accepted by every mind as the conditions *a priori* of all its scientific thinking.

The remainder of this volume of Mr. Morell we will leave without comment. It is divided into four parts, making seven in the entire work. These four are entitled : On the Logical Processes of the Human Mind ; The Human Reason ; Development of the Will ; On the Feelings. In the discussion of these most important subjects the author shows at times great superiority. It is, however, when he is at the farthest remove from the Herbartian psychology that he utters the truest and most profound sayings. Even when he endeavors to develop his principles from the philosophy of Herbart, he falls into an occasional inconsistency of thought and language which is more creditable to his love of the truth than to the consistency and vigor of his thinking. The volume contains in all its parts many sagacious observations and fine discriminations. These will give it a place of importance, perhaps of permanence, in the literature of English Psychology. Even those portions of it that are borrowed from Herbart are not without value to the careful student, in that they call attention strongly to phenomena and laws which have too often been overlooked by the student of psychology. The explanation of these phenomena, which is furnished by Herbart and his disciples, we think to be inadequate and erroneous, for the reasons which have been given in the critical remarks which we now bring to a conclusion.

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ART. VI.—PAUL'S ALLEGORICAL USE OF THE MOSAIC NARRATIVE.

By HOWARD CROSBY, D. D., New York City.

THAT a mystical significance underlies the words of Scripture, is a prevalent conviction of the pious mind, and yet in the practical use of this conviction we are checked by the fanciful performances of Philo and Origen, who, in the chase after allegory, neglect the historical sense and even deny its truth. So conservative have these extremists made some,

that a school of literalists finds an easy support, who invite us to find nothing more in a mosaic narrative than in a page of Thucydides or Polybius. It is history, simple history, and that is the end of it. The apostle Paul is certainly a safe guide. Three times he develops a mystical meaning from the Old Testament history, and in no case apologizes to his readers for the interpretation as if it were unusual, nor does he use the style of mere tropical reference.

After an examination of these three passages, we may have some light shed upon the *via media* between bald literalism and conjectural license.

I. The first of the three passages is found in 1 Cor. x. 1-4. "*All our fathers were under the cloud, and all passed through the sea, and were all baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea; and did all eat the same spiritual meat, and did all drink the same spiritual drink, for they drank of that spiritual rock that followed them, and that rock was Christ.*" The truth on which the apostle is insisting in the context is this, that the possession of external privileges is no proof of salvation. He asserts that not all who run in a race receive the prize, that it is possible for one to be even a teacher of others, and yet prove a castaway, and then he quotes the instance of the Jewish church, in which were many who were not pleasing to God, concluding this portion of his argument with the deduced exhortation, "wherefore let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall." The passage under consideration respects the fact that Israel formed an external church, and that every Israelite was a member of this early church. It is the preliminary statement to that of the defection of many. In it Paul refers to three distinct events in the history of Israel, all occurring between their flight from Egypt and the giving of the law, and authoritatively pronounces these plain matters of fact to be fraught with a symbolical and typical meaning.

The first event is the PASSAGE OF THE RED SEA. The fact is stated thus: "All our fathers were under the cloud and all passed through the sea," and the mystical meaning of the fact is given immediately afterward, "*and were all baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea.*" Now, in order to rightly appreciate this interpretation, we must have a right appreciation of the fact interpreted. The record is given in Exod. xiv. 19-22. "And the angel of God who went before the camp of Israel, removed and went behind them—even the standing pillar of the cloud removed from before their face and stood behind them, and it came between the camp



of the Egyptians and the camp of Israel (now it was the dark cloud, but it gave light by night), so that the one came not near the other all the night. And Moses stretched out his hand over the sea, and the Lord caused the sea to go by a strong east wind all that night, and made the sea dry land, and the waters were divided. And the children of Israel went into the midst of the sea upon the dry ground, and the waters were a wall unto them on their right hand and on their left." Such is the narrative, our ordinary translation of which is defective in several points, e. g., the word "wayyissà," is carelessly translated by "removed" and "went," when in each case it should be rendered "removed," as the two passages are parallel, the Angel of the Lord and the standing pillar being the same; and a grosser error is the insertion of "to them" and "to these," in ver. 20th, so that it reads, "and it was a cloud and darkness *to them*, but it gave light by night *to these*," thus giving rise to the popular notion that the pillar of cloud had different aspects to the two armies, for which there is no support in Scripture. We have put "standing pillar" in place of "pillar," so that the word "stood" which follows may bear some such relation to the noun as "ya'amod" bears to 'ammud. The children of Israel, it seems, crossed the Red Sea at night at a point where it was probably about four miles wide. The great work of their escape consisted of two parts, the separation of Israel from the Egyptians, and the marching across the sea. The former was accomplished by the removal of the cloudy pillar (which was luminous by night), for the van to the rear of Israel, which then by its supernatural brightness struck the Egyptians with awe, and made them hesitate and halt in the pursuit. While this separation was established, the east wind began its work of blowing out a furrow through the sea from the Arabian to the Egyptian shore, and before the morning dawned the host of Israel passed between the two walls of water safely to the other side, the fiery cloudy pillar acting as their rear-guard, moving after them, and permitting Pharaoh and his army to follow only at a long distance. When the pursuing army had all descended into the supernatural road of Israel's escape, the action of the fiery pillar discomfited them, and, as they sought flight back to the western shore, Moses, by command of God, stretched forth his hand, and the east wind, failing at the western end of the furrow, permitted the waters of the sea to unite there, and cut off effectually the Egyptian retreat. At length Israel is safe on the Arabian shore, the pillar of cloud has also reached the eastern verge of the sea,

and the east wind now entirely spent, the whole host of Mizraim is now engulfed in the water.

From this narrative we see that the "fathers" were *under the cloud* as under its protecting and separating power. There is nothing in the story to permit us to suppose that any rain fell from the cloud upon Israel. The passage often quoted from Ps. 77, 17, has reference to "clouds" and not to the "cloud" supernatural, so that even if it refer to this scene at the Red Sea, it cannot explain the *baptism* of the cloud in our present passage. There may have been rain and hail (Ps. 18, 13), but if so, the rain and hail came from the natural *clouds* and not from the supernatural *cloud*, and, moreover, fell not on Israel but upon the Egyptians, so that if the baptism alludes to this, it was the Egyptian army that was baptized; and the baptism, moreover, was a judgment! Further, the "fathers" *passed through the sea*, by treading upon the sea's dry bed, while "the waters were a wall unto them, on their right hand and on their left." There was no wading through water, so that the expressions "through the sea" and "in the sea" (used by Paul), mean just what "into the midst of the sea" (used by Moses), means. They convey a just idea of the *dry* passage in spite of their literal meaning. It is exactly the language which all men would naturally use for a dry passage across a sea, upon its sandy bed, between two walls of water. The notion that a spray was blown from these walls of water upon the marching host of Israel, is gratuitous and unlikely. There is no hint of such a *sprinkling* in the narrative, any more than there is of a *pouring* from the clouds upon Israel, or an *immersion* of the "fathers" in the sea. The Egyptians only are spoken of as receiving any of these baptismal applications. As the wind was strong and directly in their faces, the children of Israel would have been sadly troubled and their march impeded by any spray dashed upon them. Moreover, the same wind which drove the waters back in a body northward and southward, would drive the spray in the same direction and away from Israel.

We are, therefore, led to believe that the older commentators are in error in regarding the *water* of the cloud and the sea as typical of the water of baptism, and must paraphrase Paul's sentence, which furnishes the mystical meaning of the narrative, thus: "and were all introduced into the relation of a church visible and formal (i. e., the Mosaic church), by the significant tokens of separating protection given by the miraculous cloud and of escape through the miraculously divided waters, which tokens formed, as it were, the baptism of the nation.

The second event (in this allegorical reference of 1 Cor. x. 1-4, is) the SUPPLY OF THE MANNA. Here the event and its mystical meaning are combined in the one sentence, "*and did all eat the same spiritual meat.*" The spiritual meat (*βρῶμα πνευματικόν*) was certainly the manna which began to be miraculously supplied the children of Israel a month after the exodus, and just as they had reached the outer borders of the Sinaitic mountain-region of the peninsula. But why was it called "spiritual?" Not because its substance was spiritual, for it came as material food to supply material wants. Nor could it have received this epithet as coming from the spiritual heavens. It was indeed *dagan shamayim* (the corn of heaven), but it rained upon Israel from the material heavens. The argument that it is styled "angel's food," is of no avail here, for the Hebrew of Ps. lxxviii. 25, has no reference to angels. The Septuagint and Vulgate have entrapped our English translation into this error. The "*lehem abbirim*" is the food or bread of the mighty, and the Psalmist there says "they ate princes' food," the word "man" being by no means distinctive or emphatic. We can only account for the word "spiritual" as applied to the manna, as signifying its typical character, that it was a spiritual symbol, though a purely material phenomenon. This sense of *πνευματικόν* is certainly not common, and yet we find it in Rev. xi. 8, "And their dead bodies shall lie in the street of the great city, which spiritually *πνευματικῶς* is called Sodom and Egypt." In this way the manna typified the Messiah, as the bread of life, on which the church feeds.

The third event is the SUPPLY OF WATER. Here we have a fuller description than in the foregoing case, and one which is, doubtless, to have a retroactive force and include the former. The words are, "and did all drink the same spiritual drink, for they drank of that spiritual Rock that followed them; and that Rock was Christ." The retroactive force to which we allude would supply after the preceding sentence, "and did all eat the same spiritual meat," this additional description, "for they ate of that spiritual meat which followed them,—and that meat was Christ." The rock was smitten for thirsty Israel in Horeb some days after the manna had been first supplied. The deep ravines of the Sinai regions, (Horeb) in which was this rock, have the highest floor of all the valleys in the peninsula, and water flowing copiously from this high ground would run down the valleys in all directions. The Rabbinical tradition is, therefore, in all probability, the true one, which asserts that the water of the smit-

ten rock formed Israel's supply by following them northward. When, however, they arrived at Kadesh, they had begun to ascend again, having left the downward inclinations of the more southern wadys, and there a new rock was smitten for them, (Num. xx. 11.) The apostle by "rock" then means the "water of the rock," when he says, "that spiritual rock which followed ἀκολουθούσης them."

Now, as the passage of the Red Sea was a baptism of the Jewish church, yet not in the use of the baptismal element, water, so here the use of the manna and the smitten rock was a eucharistic service, yet not in the use of the eucharistic elements, bread and wine. The manna was not bread, nor was the water wine. Yet this baptism and eucharistic supply were the grand tokens of God's grace, in accepting which Israel was put into a receptive condition for God's complete law, which was immediately thereafter given at Sinai, just as a converted man to-day receives baptism and the eucharistic emblems, as the expression of his obedience (through God's grace) to the law of Christ, and views the same as seals on God's part of his own acceptance with God—marks of separation and sustenance at the hands of God.

II. The second of Paul's three allegorical interpretations of the Mosaic narrative is found in 2 Cor. iii. 13-16. "*Moses put a vail over his face, that the children of Israel could not steadfastly look to the end of that which is abolished; but their minds were blinded; for until this day remaineth the same vail untaken away in the reading of the Old Testament; which vail is done away in Christ. But even unto this day, when Moses is read, the vail is upon their heart. Nevertheless when it shall turn to the Lord, the vail shall be taken away.*" The narrative which the apostle here uses is found in Exod. xxxiv. 29-35. As Moses descended from Mt. Sinai, with the sacred tables of stone, the skin of his face shone so brightly with a supernatural glory that the people were afraid to come near him. The lawgiver, therefore, put a vail over his face\* while communing with the people, but removed it when he went into the tabernacle before the representative presence of God. This phenomenon probably continued for a short time only—indeed we are led to think by the phraseology of the narra-

\* It is supposed by Alford that Moses, while delivering the law to the people, did not wear the vail, but wore it only during his usual intercourse with them. Hence he reads the first verse of this passage, "Moses put a vail over his face in order that the children of Israel might not look on the termination of the transitory glory." This view seems to militate with the apostle's interpretation, or to reach it with much harshness.

tive that it continued only till Moses had twice turned from the people to Jehovah. Paul, in the passage before us, shows the symbolic character of this historic fact. Moses represents the Scriptures, and the vail represents the obstacle in the way of the Jewish understanding before those Scriptures, to wit, their pride. Paul is declaring the gospel ministry to be a purely spiritual ministry, and as in ver. 6, he happened to say that it was "not of the letter," he is led to throw in a parenthesis including 7-16 verses, comparing the Mosaic ministry of the letter with the Christian ministry of the spirit. In this parenthetical comparison the interpretation under consideration occurs.

The first sentence in the passage contains a mingling of the narrative and its interpretation, the apostle having before, in the seventh verse, stated the narrative simply. There he had it, "so that the children of Israel could not stedfastly behold the face of Moses;" but here, "that the children of Israel could (*proprie*, "did") not stedfastly look to the end of that which is abolished." *The face of Moses* in the narrative answers to "that which is abolished" (*τοῦ καταργουμένου*). From the seventh and eleventh verses, where our English translators have rendered this same word, "which was to be done away" and "which is done away," we readily see that the Mosaic law is referred to, as compared with the gospel. It should read in English, "that which *is in process* of decay;" for the Mosaic ritual, being temporary in its design, was actually waning or decaying from the start. The participle is present. If "which is done away" were intended, we should find the perfect participle *κατηργημένου*. The phrase may be thus read: "that the children of Israel did not stedfastly look to the meaning (*τέλος*) of the temporary and typical ritual." The next portion of the passage may be thus paraphrased: "But the real reason of this fact thus symbolically represented was the dullness of their minds ["blinded" is a wrong translation, and misleads one in tracing the connection,] and we need not be skeptical about that, for the same vail is still over the Mosaic books and the prophets when they speak to the Jews, because the knowledge of Christ as the great Anti-type can alone remove the vail." Then follows the repetition of the assertion concerning the continuance of the vail, for the purpose of showing that the vail was not an arbitrary institution of God, but a necessity originating in their own will: "But unto this day, when Moses is read, the vail is *upon their heart*." The next verse has called forth much difference of

opinion. The chief trouble regards the subject of the verb "turn." What shall turn to the Lord? Israel? or Moses? or the heart? If it refers to Israel, as seems at first most natural, why is not the verb in the plural, as the nation is spoken of in the plural above? The explanation usually given is, that *τις* is to be supplied in a collective sense. This might be satisfactory, or the reference to *καρδία* might be adopted ("when their heart shall turn, etc."), if a comparison with the original narrative did not induce us to take "Moses" as the true nominative to the verb. We put the narrative and Paul's words together:

33 And till Moses had done speaking with them, he put a vail on his face.

34 But when Moses went in before the Lord to speak with him, he took the vail off.

15 But even unto this day, when Moses is read, the vail is upon their heart.

16 Nevertheless when he turns to the Lord, the vail is taken away.

In the New Testament passage we have supplied "he" for "it" before the verb, and translated *ἄνυ ἐπιστρέφη* and *περὶ αἰρῆται* by indefinite presents as they should be translated. The comparison shows at once the apostle's meaning. When the Old Testament appears before the Jews, they cannot understand it; but when it appears before the Lord (*i. e.* the Lord's people, who are in Christ—chap. i. 21—and one with the Lord), there is no mystery in it at all.

III. The third of Paul's three allegorical interpretations of the Mosaic narrative is found in Gal. iv. 22-31.

Without entering into a minute examination of these verses, we may note,

1. That the apostle makes Agar to represent the Law, and Sarah the Gospel.

2. That he makes the barrenness and late bearing of Sarah to represent the late appearance of the Gospel.

3. That he quotes from Isaiah (liv. 1) as equally referring to the same.

4. That he makes Ishmael's persecution of Isaac to represent the treatment of Christ's church by the Jews.

5. That he makes the banishment of Hagar and Ishmael to represent the final victory of the church of Christ over Judaism.

Now these are not mere ingenious parallelisms, for the language here, as in the other instances, is not poetic, nor is there the slightest hint in the apostle's words that he is using a figure: "this Agar is Mount Sinai in Arabia, and answereth to (συστοιχεῖ) Jerusalem which now is." The word *συστοιχεῖ*



does not mean, "has some dim resemblance to," but "is co-ordinate with," "is in the same *στοῖχος* or row with," showing no accidental relation, but an established and designed connection. Moreover Paul expressly says (ver. 24), *αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἀλληγορούμενα*, which things are spoken allegorically, (quæ sunt per allegoriam dicta—*Vulg.*); that is, these facts concerning Hagar and Ishmael are narrated because big with a typical import—the literal history has, besides its exoteric truth, a spiritual and mystical meaning.

This passage, then, with the other two, are proof to us that Paul saw (and therefore that there is) a great deal more in the Mosaic narrative than mere local history. There are other allusions of the apostle which swell the proof, as his reference to Melchizedek (Heb. vii.), and his use of the institution of marriage as an indication of the relation between Christ and the church (Eph. v.). If we follow Paul's guidance, we shall find the Old Testament history a luminous prefiguring of the great truths of the Redeemer's kingdom, and must believe that the God of providence, who is the God of redemption, ordered all the events in the lives of the patriarchs and the career of Israel to be the illustrations of his future economy of grace. If, then, we read the Mosaic narrative, searching for Christ and his church, we shall find them on every page, not by a fanciful interpretation, but by a sober rendering. That the Mosaic *ritual* had such a mystical meaning no one doubts, and there can be no solid objection against a like significance to the Mosaic *narrative*. All Scripture forms a *whole* in a higher sense than as merely tracing a continuous current of grace; it is a whole as fitting part to part. Its unity is not that of a river, but of a house. It is no harshness to illustrate the work of the Redeemer by the story of Ruth; to unite Moses and John in one view, and to see Christ in Joseph, and John the Baptist in Elijah. On the contrary, this mingling of the Old and the New is the most thorough and profitable way of studying the Holy Word. We do not use conjecture or employ a figure by so doing. The hidden sense of the narrative is its truest sense, its *most real* meaning. Deny this, and we cut ourselves off from one of the richest sources of spiritual instruction and refreshment.

## ART. VII.—THEORIES OF THE INSPIRATION OF THE SCRIPTURES.

*The Plenary Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures.* By ELEAZAR LORD. *Inspiration not Guidance or Intuition: Second Series on Plenary Inspiration.* By the same. *The Prophetic Office of Christ, as related to the Verbal Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures.* By the same. New York: A. D. F. Randolph, 1858, 1859.

THE BIBLE is called the Word of God. It is held by all Protestant Christians to be the only infallible rule of faith and practice. This quality of infallibility attaches to it because it has God for its author. Thus it is distinguished from all other books. "The authority of the Holy Scripture," says the Westminster Confession of Faith, "for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, dependeth not upon the testimony of any man or church, but wholly upon God (who is the truth itself), the author thereof; and therefore it is to be received, because it is the word of God." It is "given by inspiration of God, to be the rule of faith and life." Inspiration is that divine act or energy, whereby these Scriptures are made the very Word of God. All Scripture is *theopneustic*—God-breathed, inspired.

While all this in general terms is taught and conceded, there is still the greatest diversity, even among the more orthodox, as to the nature of this divine inspiration. Modern Biblical criticism has led to a modification of the older views. Diversities of style, historical and scientific difficulties, and apparent discrepancies, have been alleged as demanding a revision of the theory. Some content themselves with saying that we cannot have any definite theory. Others distinguish the divine and human elements in the Word. Some rest in different degrees of inspiration. Others insist upon the difference between revelation and inspiration. And, others, again, make inspiration to be a common quality of all works of genius, breaking down the wall of partition between the Bible and other books. Upon hardly any topic of equal moment is there greater diversity of opinions and definitions. Protestant Christendom is, on the one hand, diffusing the Bible in a thousand tongues, more widely than ever before, while, at the same time, it is divided upon the question of the nature of that Inspiration, whereby alone the Bible is guaranteed as the infallible standard of immutable truth.

The theories may be distributed into various classes, best grouped, perhaps, by taking the relation of Revelation to Inspiration as the defining element. Revelation is usually understood to signify God's direct communication of truth in various ways to mankind, while inspiration is restricted to the divine act in relation to the record of that truth in the Scriptures. The theories, then, will be determined by the various modes in which Revelation is defined, and also by the varied definitions given of the agency of God in Inspiration.

1. The first class of possible theories—to begin with the lowest—lies outside of the pale of positive Christianity. Pantheism and naturalism—the two opposite poles of anti-Christian thought, not recognizing a personal God, of course deny any specific Revelation. Inspiration is only the elevation of the soul in its natural functions and processes. A genius in any sphere of thought or activity, and an inspired man are equivalents. No direct argument can be held with them about the inspiration of the Scriptures, because they deny all the premises of the argument. Yet their indefinite phraseology is often borrowed by many who do not agree with them in their denial of a personal God.

2. Another class believe in a personal deity, but deny that he has made any specific revelation. They may admit a natural revelation in the intuitive truths of reason and conscience; but beyond this they do not recognize any communication of the divine will. Here, too, inspiration can only be considered as an exaltation of the natural faculties, a heightening of the consciousness in the contemplation of rational and moral intuitions. The deists and extreme rationalists come under this head. In their sense, heathen philosophers may be inspired; as when Cicero tells us: *Nemo vir magnus sine aliquo afflatu unquam fuit.*\* The elder Fichte† says: "It is neither morally nor theoretically possible for a revelation to give us instructions, which our reason might not and ought not arrive at, without the revelation." Macnaught spoke in the same vein (though his views have since been modified) when he asserted, that "inspiration is the action of the divine spirit, by which all that is good in man, beast or matter, is originated or sustained." F. W. Newman claims that "an authoritative external revelation is essentially impossible to man." Theodore Parker defended the position that "inspiration is the consequence of the faithful use of our faculties;" "we may call it miraculous, but nothing can be more

\* *De Natura Deorum*, ii. 66.

† *Kritik aller Offenbarung*, p. 173.

natural." With these, and such as these, the question of the inspiration of the Scriptures is irrelevant; the previous question of the fact of a revelation is the one in debate.

3. Advancing a step, we come to those who accept a specific, historical revelation, as given to prophets and apostles and centering in Christ, but who restrict inspiration to the effect produced by this revelation upon the mind and heart of those who received it, under the illuminating power of the Holy Spirit. The inspiration here is simply the subjective effect of the objective revelation. The record of this revelation is the record of this subjective consciousness. There is no distinguishable inspiration of the Scriptures as scriptures. This is the view of Schleiermacher and De Wette, of Bunsen, of Scherer, and Morell, in part. Thus Schleiermacher resolves the inspired authority of the New Testament into the "normal dignity" of the apostles, as the first recipients of the fullness of the Spirit. Morell makes revelation to be the presentation of the object; and inspiration, the power of reciprocity in the subject—an influence by which the apostles were able to grasp the revelation. He says \* revelation is "the act of God, presenting to us the realities of the spiritual world." Inspiration is "that especial influence wrought upon the faculties of the subject, by virtue of which he is able to grasp these realities in their perfect fullness and integrity." Bunsen's † theory is, that the primary subjects of inspiration are the great heroes of scriptural thought preparatory to Christ, and Christ himself; and "the second subjects of the inspiring workings of the Spirit, are the authors of the writings which constitute Scripture; their inspiration must be just in proportion with what they undertake to represent, and with the measure of the Spirit which they manifest in treating it."

Without entering into a criticism of these theories, it is apparent that in none of them is the fact of inspiration extricated or distinguished from that of revelation; inspiration is simply the subjective effect of revelation. There is no specific divine agency in respect to the production of the Scriptures. The doctrine of inspiration is virtually merged in revelation.

4. We pass, then, to another class of theories, in which the two begin to be more carefully discriminated, in which inspiration is viewed more objectively and independently, and as having specific reference to the record. Here comes in the

\* *Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 149, 167.

† *Philosophy of History*, etc., ii. 311. *Theses*, xi.-xiv.

formula, "The Scriptures *contain* the Word of God," in distinction from the formula, "The Bible *is* the Word of God." The writers are inspired, divinely guided in what they write, yet not in such a way that all the Bible is inspired so as to be free from error. Inspiration extends to what is essential, especially moral and religious truth; but the Bible is not inspired as to chronology, history and science. Its details are not guaranteed. Thus are met the objections urged on the ground of discrepancies and inaccuracies. At the same time the theory does not undertake to draw the line distinctly between the uninspired and the inspired portion of the sacred volume. This general view is held by most of the modern German commentators and theologians, even the more evangelical—though the latter usually say that the alleged errors are unimportant.\* Tholuck reviewed the subject in his essay on the Doctrine of Inspiration,† and came to the conclusion that "the Bible, as we have it, cannot, in any case, be held to be verbally inspired, and hence the contents of Scripture, in all its details, cannot be regarded as externally guaranteed." The same position is defended by Rothe,‡ Schenkel, Meyer, and many others in Germany; by Coleridge, Arnold, Alford, Stanley and Jowett, in England; and by the Unitarians in this country. Twisten, in his Dogmatics, views the Bible as inspired somewhat in proportion as its sayings refer directly to Christ and his kingdom. Even Dr. John Pye Smith, in one of his earlier essays,§ seemed to imply that inspiration belonged only to "the religious and moral element" of the Old Testament; but he afterwards expressed his belief "that even with respect to common and natural things the declarations of the Bible are infallible, when interpreted by the use of proper means, and the final sense is thus elicited."

5. Next in order come those who accept the Bible as an infallible authority, free from error. Inspiration gives us a book, properly called the Word of God, inspired in all its parts. The inspiration is plenary, in the sense of extending even to the words. But here a distinction is made. Those

\* Faustus Socinus De Auctoritate S. Scrip. "Summa est, eos (Evangelistas) nihil prorsus inter se dissentire in us historiae partibus, quae *alicujus sint momenti*. Et quod in quibusdam rebus minimis inter se differant, hoc non solum illis minuire, sed augere etiam debere auctoritatem et fidem."

† Deutsche Zeitschrift f. christl. Wissenschaft, 1850. Translated in the Journal of Sacred Literature 1854, and in Dr. Noyes's collection of Theological Essays.

‡ Zur Dogmatik, 1863.

§ Congregational Magazine, July 1837, and Sept. 1838. See British Quarterly Review, Jan. 1857, pp. 246-8.

whom we embrace under this (fifth) class, hesitate to define Inspiration as meaning a dictation of the words. It is rather viewed as a divine influence upon the writers, extending indeed to the selection of words, yet not necessarily in all cases dictating the words themselves. The inspiration has respect to the inspired person, the writer, and is not concerned solely about the words, or the things written. It is viewed as in part subjective, rather than purely objective. This theory is adopted in order to account for the manifest diversities of style in the writers, and to save their individuality. Thus it is contrasted with the so-called "mechanical theory" of direct dictation, in which the writers are regarded as merely "the amanuenses of the spirit." Inspiration has for its proximate object the men, and for its remote object the record. The writing is inspired through and by the inspiration of the writers. This theory, as Mr. Lord describes it, is, that "an infallible guidance of the writers, instead of a conveyance to their minds of the infallible thought and words, which they were to record, was the object and end of inspiration." But this general theory has likewise its diversities of statement, of which at least two may be distinguished: (1.) That of Degrees of Inspiration, according to the subject-matter: (2.) A denial of Degrees of Inspiration, and the assertion of a divine guidance reaching to the words, the mode of this influence being left undetermined.

(1.) The Theory of Degrees of Inspiration. This was for a long time the ruling theory among the leading English and Scotch theologians, and it was adopted by many in our own country. It was doubtless derived from the Jewish Doctors,\* on the basis of the traditional three-fold division of the Old Testament. Yet as held in modern times it has had quite a different sense, and it is at the best but an hypothesis, without any clear scriptural warrant. Dr. Whitby † contends for such "assistance of the sacred writers of the New Testament, as will assure us of the truth of what they wrote, whether by inspiration of suggestion, or direction only," in contrast with a dictation of the words. William Parry ‡ grants that the primary sense of Inspiration is "the immediate communication of knowledge from God,"—the same as revelation. But he uses it, "except in the case of Paul," to signify, "suggestion,"

\* See Lee on Inspiration, p. 402.

† General Preface on the Divine Authority of the Scriptures of the New Testament, 4th ed. 1718.

‡ Inquiry into the Nature and Extent of Inspiration, Lond. 1797, reprinted in Boston, 1811.



"superintendency," an influence on the minds of the writers—so that "every religious sentiment they taught is true." Dr. Doddridge \* understands by it "any supernatural influence of God upon the mind of a rational creature," whereby a higher knowledge is attained or imparted. He distinguished three degrees, "superintendency," "elevation," and "suggestion." Dr. John Dick† gave this theory a more explicit statement. He defines Inspiration as "an influence of the Holy Ghost on the understandings, imaginations, memories, and other mental powers of the sacred writers, by which they were qualified to communicate to the world the knowledge of the will of God." He regards it as "plenary," and he speaks of an "infallible guidance and direction." Yet inspiration has not the "same sense" in application to all parts of the Scripture. He recognizes four degrees, as does Dr. Daniel Wilson,‡ which are thus defined: in *suggestion*, the Holy Spirit suggests or even dictates the truth; in *direction*, the writers are left to describe the matter revealed, in their own way, the mind being only guided; *elevation* adds vigor; *superintendency* is the watchful care exercised by the Spirit, so that nothing derogatory to the revelation be inserted. Dr. Wilson says "in each case such assistance, and only such assistance was afforded, as the exigencies of the case required. Where nature ended, and Inspiration began, it is not for man to say." Dr. Henderson, in his Lectures on Inspiration, makes five "degrees," viz., excitement, invigoration (elevation), superintendency, guidance, and direct revelation. Dr. F. A. Philippi of Rostock,§ distinguishes three degrees of inspiration, corresponding to the three degrees of revelation, the legal, the prophetic, and the apostolic; he also advocates, what he calls, a word-inspiration, in distinction from an inspiration of the words.||

(2.) The Theory of an Infallible Guidance or Influence ex-

\* Dissertation on the Inspiration of the New Test. 1749.

† Essay on Inspiration, 1810, reprinted in Boston 1811.

‡ Lectures on the Evidences, Lecture xlii.

§ Kirchliche Glaubenslehre. Bd. i. 1854, p. 184.

|| Several of the later German writers, while denying dictation, concede the inherent connection between thoughts and words, and say that the word must virtually be included in the inspiring act. Thus Beck, in his Introduction to the System of Christian Doctrine: "This coalescence of the word with the thing, of the manifestation with the contents, in the one product of the revealing Spirit, lies in the nature of the case." "The opinion that only the thoughts are from the Holy Spirit, while the words are left to the free choice of man, runs out into the extravagant notion—the fundamental dualistic lie of many theories of inspiration—as if two sorts of Spirit were at work, the one producing the contents internally, the other the expression of the same externally." J. P. Lange, in his Philosophical Dogmatics, after saying that the old theory attributed to the Spirit the impulse to writing, the *suggestio rerum* and the *suggestio verborum* in a too external way—adds, that the impulse, the object and

tending even to the Words—yet not necessarily in all cases a dictation of the Words. Knapp defines inspiration as “an extraordinary divine agency upon teachers, while giving instruction, whether oral or written, by which they were taught what and how they should write or speak.” Dr. Woods (Lectures i. 171), says “that the sacred writers had such a direction of the Holy Spirit, that they were secured against all liability to error, and enabled to write just what God pleased; so that what they wrote is, in truth, the word of God, and can never be subject to any charge of mistake, either as to matter or form.” He dislikes the theory of “degrees,” and does not advocate a dictation of language, but contends that “the work of the divine Spirit in the sacred penmen related to the language they used, and their manner of expressing their ideas.” Prof. Lee\* makes a broad distinction between revelation and inspiration, and advocates “the dynamical” instead of “the mechanical” theory of inspiration. The problem to be solved, he says, supplies two conditions: (1.) The coëxistence of divine and human elements in the Bible; and (2.) The fact that certain portions of the Bible are not revelation. “The first condition is satisfied by the *dynamical* theory; the second by the distinction between revelation and inspiration.” Inspiration is “that actuating energy of the Holy Spirit which guided the prophets and apostles in officially proclaiming the will of God by word of mouth, and in *committing to writing* the several portions of the Bible.” “Even the form and language in which its truths are expressed bear the impress of its divine origin.” The same doctrine in substance is advocated in the *Princeton Review* in an article upon Lee’s work.† “In saying that the Bible is the word of God, we mean that he is its author, that he says whatever the Bible says.” “The Bible is the product of one mind. It is one book.” “The thoughts and language, the substance and the form of Scripture, are given by the inspiration of God.” “The denial of verbal inspiration is in our view the denial of all inspiration. No man can have a wordless thought any more than there can be a formless flower.” The

the word, must all be united in a living inspiration; and that many later supernaturalists constructed the theory in an external way, by “first restricting the divine impulse to single cases, bringing it into a false opposition to the human occasions; further, by limiting the inspiration of facts to mere guidance, or the preservation of the writers from error; and, in fine, by saying that words were only imparted in the sense of keeping the writers free from error and unseemliness.”

\* The Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, reprinted, New York, 1857.

† As cited in Lord’s Inspiration not Guidance, etc., p. 80 seq.

writers "were under the *guidance* of the Holy Spirit in the *selection* of the words." "The object of inspiration is to render *men infallible* in communicating truth to others." "They were kept from error, and *guided to the use of words*, which expressed the mind of the Spirit, but within these limits they were free to use such language and to narrate such circumstances as suited their own taste or purposes."

6. There remains one other theory of Inspiration, which is sometimes termed "the mechanical"—though its real import is hardly denoted by this epithet, any more than "dynamical" expresses the peculiarity of the previous view. Its essence is found in a literal acceptance of such phrases as, "the Bible is the Word of God;" God is "the author of the Bible;" "all Scripture is theopneustic," or God-breathed. It differs from the last theory in being purely objective—making Inspiration, in its vital sense, to refer to the divine act alone—the act of imparting the Scriptures themselves, in language, to the writers. The Word is infallible, but not the man who writes the word; and it is infallible, because it is the very Word of God. There is no commingling of divine and human elements in the inspiration; for inspiration is simply a divine act and energy. The distinction of revelation and inspiration is held to be irrelevant as far as the Scriptures are concerned; they are in all parts both a revelation and an inspiration—the inspiration communicates the revelation. In the previous theory the divine inspiring agency is represented as acting through and in men, "guiding," "influencing" them in the choice of words; in this theory the divine agency consists in giving to prophets and apostles the words themselves. The Bible is made one organized and organic whole, because it has the Holy Spirit for its author. As Lord Bacon says, "The *inditer* of these books knew four things, which no man attains to know, which are, the mysteries of the kingdom of glory, the perfection of the laws of nature, the secrets of the heart of man, and the future succession of all ages.

This theory undoubtedly expresses the simple and spontaneous faith of the church, both Jewish and Christian, as to the sacred books, before speculation and Biblical criticism led to further distinctions and refinements. It expresses what must be conceded as to large portions of the Bible, where God himself is introduced as speaking, where prophecies are directly imparted, and where specific revelations are made. Philo expressed the Jewish belief when he said, that "prophets are *interpreters*, God making use of their organs to

manifest his will ;” and he exaggerated it when he described the prophets as unconscious, mastered by rapture. With this agrees the testimony of Josephus. The Fathers of the church speak of the Scriptures as *cœlestes literæ*, and *instrumentum divinum* ; they interchange such phrases as “the Scripture saith,” and “the Holy Ghost saith.” Barnabas uses the words, “The Lord saith in the prophets.” Clement, of Rome, calls the Scriptures “the oracles of God,” “the sayings of God,” and says that “the Scriptures are the true utterance of the Holy Spirit.” Justin Martyr states more explicitly, that “we must not suppose that the language proceeds from the men who are inspired, but from the divine Word which moves them ;” and prophets “needed no art of words, but only to offer themselves in purity to the operation of the divine Spirit, in order that the divine power of itself might reveal the knowledge of divine and heavenly things, acting on just men as a plectrum on a harp or lyre.” Athenagoras represents prophets as entranced in ecstasy, and “uttering that which was wrought in them, the Spirit using them as its instrument, as a flute-player might blow a flute.” Theophilus, of Antioch, avoiding such extravagances, speaks of them as the organs of God ; “the words of the prophets are the words of God.” Irenæus declares that “the Scriptures are perfect, being uttered by the word of God and his Spirit ;” “all scripture as given to us by God will be found to be harmonious.” He implies the verbal theory when he says : “Matthew might have said, This is the generation of Jesus ; but the Holy Spirit, foreseeing that the truth would be corrupted, says, by Matthew, This was the generation of Christ.” Origen’s allegorizing interpretation presupposes the same view ; and he says, that “not one jot or tittle of the divine instruction is vain ;” that there is nought “superfluous ;” that there is “nothing in the Law, the Gospels, or Apostles, which did not descend from the plenitude of the divine majesty.” In another passage (cited in Lee, p. 80), he says : “Scripture as a whole is God’s one perfect and complete instrument, giving forth to those who wish to learn its one saving music from many notes combined.” Hippolytus employs the current figure of men as “organs, having the Word within them to strike the notes ;” and Tertullian terms the Scriptures (*literæ*) the *voces Dei*. These extracts might be indefinitely extended,\* as illustrating the prevailing tenets taught in the primitive church. The same views were adopted in the

\* For a full collection see Lee on Inspiration, and, especially, Westcott’s Introduction to the Gospels, appendix B.

main by the Reformers, and passed into the theology and Confessions of the sixteenth century. It was even thought necessary to defend the position that the New Testament Greek was free from all barbarisms; and the Swiss Formula Consensus, 1675, declared the Hebrew vowel points inspired.\* By the Lutheran and Reformed divines the sacred writers were usually termed, "the notaries of God," "the amanuenses of God," "the hands of Christ or of the Spirit." Dr. Owen describes Inspiration as "the implanting into the minds of the prophets what God would have them utter." Even the "judicious Hooker" does not hesitate to say, "that so often as God employed the prophets in their official work, they neither spoke nor wrote any word of their own, but uttered syllable by syllable as the Spirit put it into their minds." The same view is, in substance, held by Bishop Horne in his Preface to his work on the Psalms. Among recent writers it is espoused by Haldane in his work on the Authenticity and Inspiration of the Scriptures; and by Gausson in his *Theopneustia*, who says, "the style of Moses, Ezekiel, and Luke, is the style too of God." Baylee on Verbal Inspiration declares that "the Bible is God's word in the same sense as if he had made use of no human agent." Dr. Tregelles says: "I believe the sixty-six books of the Old and New Testaments to be verbally the Word of God, as absolutely as were the Ten Commandments written by the finger of God upon the two tables of stone." Dr. Alexander Carson, in his work on the Inspiration of Scriptures, severely attacked the theories of Bishop Wilson, Dr. Pye Smith, and Dr. Dick, in the interest of a strict verbal dictation.

This rapid and general sketch of the various theories, and of the present state of opinion, may be sufficient for the purpose we have now chiefly in hand, that is, a statement and comparison of this strict view of inspiration, as advocated in the three works of Eleazar Lord, Esq., the titles of which are given at the head of this article. In these volumes, and in various contributions to religious periodicals, he has attempted to present the verbal theory, freed from the rigid forms and misleading illustrations by which it has often been prejudiced and encumbered, and in sharp contrast with the definitions and statements of late writers, especially those who come nearest to his views. He also exhibits the theory in a more philosophical form than that found in the works of Gausson

\* "In specie autem hebraicus Veteris Testamenti Codex tum quoad personas, tum quoad vocalia sive puncta ipsa, sive punctorum saltem potestatem, et tum quoad res, tum quoad verba, *θεῖνός* est."

and Carson. His three volumes constitute, in fact, the ablest defence of verbal inspiration which has been produced in this strife of opinions and definitions. This will be conceded even by those who do not agree with him in his theory, and who may dissent from some of his arguments. As an able discussion, by a layman of high standing, distinguished too for various contributions to theological literature,\* his works are entitled to a careful examination. No one who reads them will question the ability of the writer, nor accuse him of being indefinite in his own views, or of misrepresenting those from whom he dissents. His own theory is clear, and sharply discriminated, especially from those which take refuge in indefinite phraseology. Our object, in the remainder of this article, is to present his statements and arguments as fully as our limits will allow, and to give them as far as possible in his own phraseology. It will be enough to do this, without either formal advocacy or dissent. And the presentation of the whole case in a condensed form will enable all our readers to decide for themselves as to the real meaning and value of a theory, which may be so easily perverted by one-sided or partial statements, and which is so frequently dismissed as if it were scarcely worth the hearing. The fact that the theories of Inspiration are so varied and discordant also lends additional importance to such a discussion. Up to the time of the Westminster Assembly there was substantial agreement; but from the period of Dr. Whitby to the present time there has been no settled theory which has met with general acceptance. And this diversity is not wholly owing to the difficulties suggested by modern criticism; for great differences are found even among those who profess to take the Bible as an infallible authority, inspired in a plenary sense. The differences among such are owing to an unsettled state of opinion about the nature of Inspiration itself. Many of Mr. Lord's statements and arguments are addressed chiefly to those who regard the Scriptures as the word of God, and as infallible. From their own concessions he would lead them to accept his view as the only consistent and tenable position.

Mr. Lord's first volume, on the Plenary Inspiration of the Scriptures, insists, in substance, on the following facts and principles: All Scripture is *theopneustic*, God-inbreathed—

\* Mr. Lord published, in 1860, a valuable work on *The Psalter Re-adjusted, in its Relation to the Temple Services and the Ancient Jewish Faith*, pp. 370; and, in 1861, an *Introduction to an Analysis of the Book of Isaiah*, pp. 289. He has also written able pamphlets on the Currency Question.



inbreathed, inspired of God. "The words of the original text of Scripture are the words in which the Divine thoughts were inspired into the minds of the sacred writers, infallibly represent those thoughts, and are as infallible as the thoughts are." "Inspiration is a divine act, exerted, not on the faculties of the sacred penmen, but in conveying to their minds the thoughts which they were to express in writing." "The primary error which pervades the treatises of those who believe in any divine inspiration is that of regarding *inspiration as an influence on the mental faculties of the sacred writers*, instead of regarding it as an inbreathing, imparting, conveying to the minds of the writers, exactly in thought and language, what they were to write." The *men* were not made infallible, but "what they wrote was infallible, solely because it was just what was given to them by inspiration." Mr. Lord further claims that this sense of Inspiration is the only one authorized by the declarations of the divine Word; that all other significations have no support in the Scriptures. And he argues the same position from the nature of language itself in its relation to thought. "Language is the exclusive medium of thought;" "thoughts can be conveyed from one mind to another only by language;" "we intellectually conceive and receive thoughts, are conscious of them, remember them, express them, only in words, and signs equivalent to vocal articulation." "Language is not a product of human ingenuity, but a primeval gift of God, essential to man's exercise of the power of thought." "Words are the matrix, vehicle, instrument of thought, and as articulated and written, are representative not of *things*, but only of thoughts." Hence it is urged, "that the inspiration of the divine thoughts into the minds of the sacred writers necessarily comprised the inspiration of the words by which they were rendered intelligently conscious of the thoughts conveyed, and which they wrote as they received them; that, on this ground, that which they wrote is, in fact, and is expressly denominated, the Word of God; and that what they wrote was inspired in the language of common life, and in the style and idiom of the respective writers;" that, in fact, "a divine revelation, to fulfil its purpose, *must* be made in the ordinary language, styles, and idioms of its recipients."—The second volume recapitulates and enlarges upon some of these points; further defines what is meant by inspiration, and what is the "mediate instrumentality of language;" criticizes in detail articles in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* and in the *Princeton Review*; examines the "intuitional" theory of inspiration; and re-

views at length Prof. Lee's Discourses on Inspiration.—The third volume argues the doctrine of verbal inspiration on two grounds : *first*, the nature and limitation of the office of Christ as Prophet, and his exercise of that office through the instrumentality of the sacred writers, by the inspiring agency of the Holy Spirit ; and, *second*, from the fact of human consciousness, that men think and receive, and are conscious of thoughts only in words,—so that thoughts conveyed to their minds by inspiration, must necessarily be conveyed in words, in order to their receiving and being conscious of them.

The substance of the argument is this : Man needs an infallible revelation of the divine will ; he can have this only by inspiration ; there can be no real inspiration except in language ; the testimony of Scripture and the nature of language equally establish this point ; such inspiration is not only consistent with, but demands, diversities of style, idioms, and the like ; and this is the simplest, the only intelligible, and the only scriptural view of Inspiration.

In proceeding to give a more full analysis and development of Mr. Lord's views, we arrange the material in the form that seems to us best adapted to a concise and clear exposition, beginning with,

I. *The Nature of Inspiration.* The question, as he puts it, is this : "What is the nature of that Inspiration, by which the Divine thoughts are so conveyed to man, and so expressed in human language, that the words of the sacred text are the words of God ?" The solution of it requires such an exposition of the nature and effects of inspiration, as shall perfectly reconcile the fact, that the words as inscribed by the sacred penman are the words of God, with the fact, that the writing consists of the ordinary language in the peculiar style and idioms of the respective writers." "Divine inspiration" is defined "as the act of God by which he conveyed to the minds of the sacred writers the thoughts which they were to express in the Holy Scriptures. And inasmuch as He alone could determine what thoughts should be expressed, and as man could not in the rational and ordinary exercise of his faculties receive inspired or other thoughts, otherwise than as they are conceived in words, it follows that He conveyed to them by Inspiration what they wrote—the thoughts in the words by which they are expressed."

"By the terms *nature* and *mode* of Inspiration a reference is not intended to the manner of the Divine act, or the mode in which the Divine agency was exerted in the act of inspiring thoughts into the minds of the sacred writers." What

inspiration is, as a fact, may be known without the presumption of fathoming the method of the Divine agency in the act or fact." "The mode of the Divine agency is not known, but the fact of its being exerted is known by the effect produced, namely, the conveyance of thoughts to the intelligent consciousness of the sacred writers." Thus is met the objection that this verbal theory is inconsistent with the essential inscrutableness of the divine working. There is mystery about the mode in which God acts; there is not necessarily a mystery about the nature of Inspiration as a fact. The mystery attaches not to the fact itself, but to the mode in which the fact is produced by the divine action through and in the human soul. But "the fact of inspiration is as little chargeable with mystery as the fact that the thoughts of men are expressed to each other by vocal utterance."

Such inspiration is not a miraculous act; it "produces supernatural, but not contra-natural effects." "It does not appear that the Divine act of inspiration suspended or counteracted any law, function, or faculty of the human mind;" "it appears to have been exerted in concurrence with the the natural exercise of the faculties of men;" "the writers doubtless had an intelligent consciousness of the inspired thoughts which they were to express in writing." "They were not subjected to a state of ecstasy on the one hand, nor to a state of unconsciousness on the other." "It did not affect their moral character directly;" it "did not add to their intelligence or consciousness concerning matters of ordinary experience or scientific truth." "It did not render them infallible in respect to anything, except in receiving and delivering what was inspired." "It did not affect their individual peculiarities as thinkers, reasoners, and writers, or in respect to the language, style and idiom to which, by education and habit, they were accustomed." "As the divine thoughts were conveyed into their minds in words, they were of necessity conveyed in words and idioms with which they were familiar, of which they understood the usage and signification, and which they were qualified by education to speak and write." These and similar statements show how the doctrine is guarded against certain consequences and imputations often alleged against it.

On the other hand, affirmatively, it is stated (1), that "the divine act of inspiration conveyed the thoughts which the Scriptures express to the minds, the intelligent consciousness, of the sacred writers." (2), "It conveyed these

thoughts in words—in the words, which they were at the same time moved to speak and write. The Spirit spake by them, His word was on their tongue." "To suppose thoughts to be inspired into the writer's mind without words, would be to suppose that in receiving them he did not retain the ordinary use of his faculties." The inspiration must be in words, "because it is impossible for man to determine or understand what a particular thought is, unless he knows and understands the words which are employed to express it." (3), "The divine act of inspiration rendered the sacred writers infallible in respect to what they received and wrote in their official character. What they received they wrote. What they received was the infallible word of God. What they wrote, therefore, was His infallible word."

By Inspiration, then, in this theory, is meant nothing more nor less than the divine act inbreathing, conveying thoughts from the divine mind into the mind of man. *The nature of inspiration* is simply this: that it imparts thoughts and words to the mind of the recipient. "In the Divine act of Inspiration, consequently, the agency of the recipient can in no wise have any participation whatever, any more than in a divine act of creation, or in the act of one person in speaking to another."

Whatever difficulty may be found in the application of the theory, there can be but little difficulty, we apprehend, in understanding what Mr. Lord means to state and defend. Nor can there be any doubt about its sharp contrast with the theory which supposes that in the inspiration itself divine and human elements coalesce, or which implies that inspiration is a divine act guiding, influencing, determining the faculties of men in the choice of words, in distinction from a divine act imparting thoughts and words.

So far is it from being true, that we cannot talk about the "nature of inspiration,"—that, on the contrary, the whole question is about that very point. The whole matter in question is, whether the sacred writers were properly inspired. The different theories are, and must be, theories as to the nature or mode of the inspiration. "Was it supernatural? Was it exerted on the faculties, stimulating and guiding them? Or was it a divine act by which the thoughts expressed were conveyed into the minds of the sacred writers?" Admitting that the Scriptures are inspired, "the first question to be considered is, whether the divine agency in inspiration was exerted *on the faculties* of the sacred writers, or was exerted in conveying to their minds what

they were to express in writing? This at once involves the *nature* of inspiration. These two modes of agency have nothing in common." "In the Scriptures themselves, nothing is more clearly distinguished than are the enlightening, guiding, sanctifying influences of the Holy Spirit, from His agency in imparting new thoughts, infallible truths, revelations by vocal articulation, or by inspiring them into the minds of those appointed to receive and commit them to writing." "The divine acts in the two instances, like the effects produced by them, are wholly distinct and different. Yet nothing is more common in treatises on Inspirations than to confound these two distinct agencies." "Hence in treating of that subject, it is necessary to treat of the *nature of inspiration*—inferring its peculiar nature from its peculiar effects."

II. *Inspiration as set forth in the Scriptures.* The proper question, then, being about the Nature of Inspiration, we must come to the Scriptures for our answer. Inspiration being a divine act or energy, the testimony of the Bible must be final and decisive as to its nature. Mr. Lord accordingly devotes to this part of his argument a large space in his several volumes, particularly chapters vi. and vii. of the first volume, and chapters iv., v., and vi. of the third volume; besides occasional statements and arguments in his review of other opinions. A large part of the third volume, on the Prophetic Office of Christ, bears upon the same point, as does the third chapter of the second volume—under some new aspects, showing a thorough study of the topic in its most intimate and vital relations. And he discusses the question, not only in the light of single texts, and individual assertions, but from the general and peculiar character of the Scriptures, as, in their very form and intent, containing and conveying a revelation from God to man by means of language as the instrument. God in the Bible is speaking to man by signs, by words, in commands, promises, warnings and visitations; he tells the prophets what they are to utter; he imparts truth in words; he prescribes minutely as to rites and ceremonies; he reveals what could not otherwise be known; he gives knowledge of his will, knowledge of the past, knowledge of the future; in all this he speaks to man through and by the instrumentality of language. And this is verbal inspiration. If, then, the nature of inspiration is to be determined by its effects, and if its effect is to communicate the will of God in language addressed to man, then its nature, it is argued, must be verbal. "To the extent perhaps of two-thirds of

the entire contents of the sacred volume, the original text consists of words which had been audibly spoken by the Revealer to the writers." "The portions of Scripture above referred to" (the prophetic and those in the form of a direct revelation) "are admitted, by all who believe in any inspiration, to have been inspired; and if, in respect to them, the inspiring act conveyed the thoughts in the words by which they are expressed in the original text, then, to that extent we discern the nature and effect of inspiration, and have grounds on which to ascribe the same effect to the inspiration of the rest of Scripture." "Often it is expressly said, that the very words which were employed by the revealing Spirit were the words which are written; and there is no reasonable ground to conclude that such was not the case uniformly."

To come to more particular illustrations. The facts recorded in the first chapter of Genesis "refer to what was done or said by the Creator, and could have been known only by inspiration." "Particular verbal directions were repeatedly given to Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Joshua, David, and many others." "The entire ritual of the Levitical service was detailed to Moses in words, and by him written out for the guidance of the priests, the Levites, and the congregation. All the details concerning the form, dimensions, materials, workmanship and furniture of the Tabernacle were in like manner verbally expressed to Moses, and written down by him." What the prophets spake was by divine command: "Thus saith the Lord" was their formula. "The prophet that hath any word, let him speak my word faithfully." (Jer. xxiii.) Moses told the people "all the words of the Lord, and wrote all the words of the Lord." (Ex. xxiv.) "The word came to Jeremiah from the Lord, saying; Thus speaketh the Lord God of Israel, saying, Write thee all the words that I have spoken unto thee in a book." Jehovah said to Isaiah, "I have put my words in thy mouth" (li.); to Jeremiah (i.) the same: to Ezekiel, "Thou shalt speak my words unto them." David says, "The Spirit of the Lord spake in me, and his word was on my tongue." Ezekiel: "The Spirit entered into me when He spake to me, and set me upon my feet." Our Lord says: "Have ye not heard that which was spoken to you by God, saying, I am the God of Abraham," etc.; and, again, "The Holy Ghost spake by the mouth of David;" "Well spake the Holy Ghost by Esaias the prophet." The very formulas, *It is written*, *As the Holy Ghost saith*, *That it may be fulfilled*, and the like, by which the Old Testament is quoted in the New, imply that in the Old Tes-



tament we have the words of God. And the identification of the phrases *Scripture*, and the *Word of God*, the fact that the term *Scripture* throughout the New Testament is used without exception, fifty-one times, in this sense, seems to indicate, that between the written word and inspiration the apostles made no distinction. The whole method in which our Lord cites from and uses the Old Testament Scriptures implies that in them we have the oracles of divine wisdom, the word of God. "These," says Christ, "are the words of which I spake unto you, that all things must be fulfilled which were written in the Law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms concerning me. Then opened he their understandings, that they might understand the Scriptures." "One jot or tittle shall in no wise pass from the law till all be fulfilled." Peter and Paul both call the Scriptures "the oracles of God." And the apostles claim for their own writings an equal, and, in some respects, a higher divine authority and sanction.

The argument is strengthened and advanced by our Lord's commands and promises to his disciples. In the great commission he says: "Go ye and teach all nations, to observe whatsoever I have commanded you" (Matth. xxviii.). "When He, the Spirit of truth, shall come, He will guide you into all truth; for He shall not speak of himself, *but whatsoever He shall hear that shall He speak*." "It is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you" (Matth. x. 19). "Take ye no thought how or what thing ye shall answer, or what ye shall say: For the Holy Ghost shall teach you in the same hour what ye ought to say" (Luke xii. 11, 12; comp. Mark xiii. 11, and Luke xxi. 14, 15). "But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things, *and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you*" (John xiv. 26). "Howbeit when He, the Spirit of truth is come, He will guide you into all truth: for He shall not speak of himself; but whatsoever he shall hear, that shall he speak; and he will show you things to come" (John xvi. 13). Thus did our Lord four times during his earthly ministry give specific promises and pledges that to his apostles should be imparted the very words they were to utter.

Nor yet is this all. For we have from some of the apostles definite statements as to the nature of the divine energy under which the Scriptures were written. As far as Paul is concerned, it is generally conceded that his claims are specific, to a revelation which must have reached even to the words.

He begins all his Epistles with the assertion of a divine commission and authority as to what he writes. He says to the Corinthians (1 Cor. ii. 11, 12, 13), "that we have received the Spirit which is of God, that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God. Which things we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth." He has "a revelation of the mystery not made known in other ages" (Eph. iii. 5, Gal. i. 12). The word he declared to the Thessalonians (1 Thess. ii. 13), was "in truth the Word of God." Peter reckons Paul's words as "Scripture" (1 Pet. iii. 15, 16), and claims like authority for himself (1 Pet. i. 13, 2 Pet. iii. 2). And he says (1 Pet. i. 11), that the spirit of Christ was in the prophets, and that "holy men of God *spoke* as they were moved by the Holy Ghost" (2 Pet. i. 21). And Paul (2 Tim. iii. 16), is still more definite in the noted passage which defines the very nature of Inspiration, saying, "That all Scripture is *theopneustic*—God-inbreathed"—thus paraphrased by Mr. Lord: "All scripture, all the words written in the holy books—given, imparted, conveyed by inspiration—the act of God the Spirit, breathing them into the minds of the writers."\*

As far as the Biblical testimony is concerned, the only theory on inspiration is, to say the least, one that includes the language in the inspiring act and agency. The Bible does not make any distinction between an influence guiding in the selection of the words, and an act giving the words; it does not favor the view of an influence exerted upon the faculties, in distinction from a divine act imparting the language. Its point of view is objective and not subjective. Much the larger part of the Bible, too, claims to contain the very words of God himself. And hence it is held, that the only legitimate induction from the express statements, and necessary implications of the Scripture, is that of a Verbal Inspiration, in the sense that the Spirit of God "conveys the words themselves to the intelligent consciousness of those whom He appointed to write them." "The Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament are *the word of God*, the only rule of faith and obedience."

This Scriptural testimony is confirmed by another line of thought, new in its specific application to this subject, which Mr. Lord develops at length, with much ingenuity and abil-

\* This interpretation of the passage holds good, whatever view of the syntax be taken. On this see Dr. Pye Smith's *Testimony to the Messiah*, i. 27; and the comments in Carson on *Inspiration*, pp. 154-166.

ity in his third volume, on *The Prophetic Office of Christ in Relation to the Verbal Inspiration of the Scriptures*.<sup>\*</sup> We can only give a meagre summary of the argument. Jesus Christ is the Great Revealer, and as such the Great Prophet. He revealed the will of God under the Old Testament economy, as well as under the new dispensation. He appeared as the *Malach Jehovah*—the Messenger Jehovah—the official mediatorial Person—administering the visible theocracy, and speaking to all the prophets. He mediates between God and man in all the divine works of creation, providence, and grace. "His office as an intermediate personal agent is analogous to the immediate office of words in the communication of thoughts. Accordingly the terms *Dabar* (Heb.), *Memra* (Chald.), *Logos* (Greek), and *Word*, signifying word, speech, thought, discourse, are applied as personal designations of the divine Mediator, Revealer, Teacher."<sup>†</sup> All that God communicates to man, he communicates through the Word and by words. Prior to the incarnation, "the presence and agency of that Divine Mediator, the Administrator and Revealer, was signified by his vocal utterance of words." The common formula about the prophets, is, that the "Word of Jehovah came" to them. Only through the instrumentality of language could the thoughts, purposes, and instructions of Jehovah be communicated. And not only was this so, but "the prophetic office of Christ, the Revealer of God—the Logos in the beginning and the incarnate Word—expressly restricted him to the utterance of the words prescribed by the Father, whose Legate or Messenger he was." He was foretold as the Great Prophet (Deut. xviii.), and he interprets his own commission: "My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me." "He whom God hath sent speaketh the words of God." "I do nothing of myself, but as my Father hath taught me, I speak these things." He exercised this prophetic office also "mediately, through the instrumentality of men, whom He designated and commissioned to speak His words in His name, as He spake the words of the Father."

<sup>\*</sup> See also the volume on Plenary Inspiration, pp. 115-130; and Inspiration not Guidance, chap. 3.

<sup>†</sup> "There is uniformly a difference between the meaning and use of the Hebrew term *Dabar*, translated *Word*, that which is vocally expressed—and *Amar*, translated *say, said*. The latter merely signifies the action of the speaker in uttering the words, and is accordingly followed by the words uttered." Thus "the Word (*Dabar*) of the Lord came to Abraham, saying (*amar*), Fear not," etc. "*Dabar* seems to have a personal sense." The same holds true of *Logos* and *lego* in Greek. "The personal appropriation of the chief of these terms demonstrates the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures." Inspiration not Guidance, pp. 46-47.

This was effected through the instrumentality of the Holy Spirit. And, "in the nature of the case, He could not commission them as his delegates to do more than was prescribed or authorized in his own commission. If He was sent not to do his own will, nor to speak of himself, but to speak only the words given Him, put in His mouth, by the Father, then the prophets, teachers, apostles, messengers, whom he commissioned and sent, could do nothing of their own will, could utter no words other than those which He, by the inspiration of His Spirit, put into their mouths." And prophets and apostles so understood their commission. The office of the Spirit, too, is, in the divine economy, specific and limited. "It cannot transcend the will of the Father, which the Son was commissioned to reveal and execute, nor be otherwise than subordinate to the official prerogative of the Son." "And if the sacred penmen actually wrote any other than the words put into their mouths immediately by the Son, or mediately from the Father and the Son, by the Spirit speaking in and by them, such words were not the words of God, but merely of man." The Spirit himself was "not to speak of himself," but "whatsoever He shall hear that shall He speak;" "he shall receive of *mine*," says the Saviour, "and shall show it unto you." "The appropriate and conclusive inference from these considerations and references is, that the language—the words, signs, symbols—by which Jehovah, the Logos, conveyed the Divine thoughts to man, which also He employed as the vehicle of his power and grace to patriarchs, prophets and apostles, and which He commissioned holy men to write and publish as his words, infallibly expressing his unchangeable thoughts, His testimonies, messages, commands, counsels, covenants, promises, predictions, warnings, instructions, were not selected or modified by man's wisdom or agency. By the instrumentality which He assigned to His word, as He spake it to His servants, and inspired it into the minds of his chosen penmen, He magnified it as his vehicle of manifestation, above all His name—all the other methods by which He manifested His perfections to His creatures."

To this may be added the following considerations: "The words of Scripture must necessarily be the words of God, if they involve His authority in any degree." "In all that relates to His own acts and purposes . . . to the work of redemption, to the church, and to the future state . . . his words must be as infallible as He himself is." Again, "the words of Scripture are the sword of the Spirit in changing men from darkness to light, subduing their wills, en-

lightening and sanctifying them;" and this too implies "that they endure forever and are infallible."

If Christ be the Great Revealer, if through Him alone we know fully the mind of God in respect to salvation, then, too, it is all-important that we should have his very words. They are the life of the church. Doubt on this point is doubt as to the possibility of assurance on the most momentous themes. How, now, can we be thus assured—especially in view of the marked diversities of the evangelists? Mr. Lord argues this matter at length (pp. 47-63), to show that it can only be explained by his theory "of the Prophetic Office of Christ, and His exercise of that office through the agency of the Holy Spirit, sent by Him to inspire His words into the minds of the sacred writers, as He himself was sent by the Father to speak His words." Thus "the system from the beginning is one comprehensive, perfect, effectual system for the infallible communication of the will of God to man."

III. *The Argument from the Nature of Language in its Relation to Thought.* "The inspiration which is affirmed of the Scriptures,—that of words with the thoughts represented by them—is in harmony with our intellectual constitution, and with those laws conformably to which we think, are conscious of thoughts, and remember and express them. We are constituted to think in words, to receive thoughts by hearing and by reading words, to express them by articulating words, and in like manner to receive thoughts by the inspiration of words" (i. 114.) "Thinking is voluntary conscious mental action. Thought is the effect and product of such action; realized to our consciousness by being conceived in words as its necessary condition, mode, form, vesture, vehicle; the instrument of the mind in conceiving it, of the memory in retaining it, and of the voice and the pen in conveying it to other minds" (ii. 52.) Words are the "element, matrix and pabulum of thought; insomuch that a thought as such is realized to our consciousness only in its concrete verbal form." On this general ground it is argued, that if there be an intelligible communication of the Divine will to man, it must be made in human language, in words, or signs, which are the equivalent of words. Man thinks only in words; therefore he can receive thoughts only in words. The inspiration consists in giving the words, and not in influencing men in the selection of the words. For in the latter case, the words are not God's but man's. Inspiration, in short, is objective, and not subjective; the writers are not the object of inspiration, but words are that object. There is an agency of man in receiving the

words—and so far forth there is a subjective act accompanying the inspiration ; but this does not constitute the inspiration. The inspiration itself consists in giving to prophets and apostles the words, by which the Divine will is revealed to the human race.

In another passage Mr. Lord puts the case thus : “ The Divine thoughts conveyed to the sacred penmen were conveyed in the very words which they wrote as Holy Scripture. 1. Because thoughts can be conveyed from one mind to another only in words, or their equivalent, signs. 2. Because man is so constituted, that he cannot receive and be conscious of the thoughts of another, except in the words which properly express them. 3. Because the writer, being conscious of the words as he received them, could not write other than those words without resisting his consciousness and violating his integrity. 4. Because words so conveyed, received and written, are the very words of Him who conveyed them ; whereas, other words substituted in their place would not be His.”

These general positions are elucidated at length in all three of Mr. Lord's volumes—particularly in the first. Chapter IV. is on Vocal and Written Language ; chapter V. on the Origin of Language ; chapter VIII. Words necessarily and perfectly express the Thoughts conceived in them ; chapter IX. Nature and Office of Types ; chapter X. Thoughts Remembered only in Words ; chapter XI. The Figurative Use of Words ; chapter XII. False Theory of Language, that Words represent Things instead of Thoughts. Both the other volumes also enter into this subject in various aspects and relations, and in comparison with other theories. We can only touch on a few of the points.

1. “ Language is not a product of human ingenuity, but a primeval gift of God, essential to man's exercise of the power of thought, and necessary at the very dawn of his existence.” This is argued, not only from the narrative in Genesis about man's primeval condition, but also from the nature of the case, and the absurdities involved in any other supposition. Naturalism takes for granted that man was at first in an infantile, or merely animal condition ; that he long continued in a state of barbarism ; and that at length, necessity led to the invention and use of language. But there are no facts to support this hypothesis ; the weight of historical evidence is against it. And, in fact, “ such thinking as the invention of language implies, presupposes the actual knowledge and use of words.” The knowledge of words “ was no



less necessary to man as a thinking and social being, than light was to his seeing, and sound to his hearing." A primeval revelation, of which there is such distinct evidence, also implies that language was comparatively full formed from the beginning.

2. "Words are the matrix, vehicle, instrument of thought, and as articulated and written, are representatives not of *things*, but only of *thoughts*. Words are as perfect a medium of thought as light is of visual, or air of auricular perception; and to those who understand and use them alike, they perfectly convey the thoughts conceived in them from one mind to another." This general position, that "words represent thoughts and not things," is advocated in one of the most interesting and philosophical chapters of the first volume (ch. xii). The contrary view is said to proceed from the sensualistic philosophy, deriving all thought from sensation, or from certain fictitious ideas (images), the product of sensation. In opposition to this, it is shown, that, for the larger part of the words of any language such a derivation is impossible. The mind has its instinctive beliefs, its necessary laws of thought—and by these, in the main, language is determined. Words are not "primarily sounds," like those of animals; but "articulate sounds, of which animals are incapable; sounds of which the articulation is the effect conjointly of the intellect, the will and the vocal organs, exerted purposely to express the thoughts, which it is their office respectively to embody and convey. They involve intelligence, discrimination and design; and have a particular signification to the consciousness of the utterer, before he articulates them." They are "organic utterances indissolubly connected with thought from the earliest exercise of the mind in thinking, and the earliest exercise of the vocal organs in articulation," and not "sounds invented by men, to which, by after agreement, they annex a meaning to signify particular things." The soul is a distinct entity, with its own capacities and relations. Its vital and necessary relations are to moral and religious ends—to God as creator, judge and redeemer. These relations can be conceived only by means of language. All that we can know of God, and all that can be revealed to us about Him must take this form of words—words representing thoughts and not merely external things. So, too, the primary beliefs of the mind can only be known or expressed in language. And revelation itself "is addressed not to a particular faculty of our minds, but to our whole nature as rational and accountable agents. When its truths are presented to the

mind in words"—and only thus can they be expressed—"our intellectual and moral nature responds to their reality and truth." And if not thus expressed they cannot awaken our moral and religious susceptibilities.

3. Of Vocal and Written Language (ch. iv.) Thought may be expressed in words and its equivalent signs in a variety of ways: (1.) By articulate vocal signs. (2.) By significant acts and gestures. (3.) By picture-writing. (4.) By hieroglyphics. (5.) By arbitrary marks—as in the Chinese language—not alphabetic, yet representing vocal sounds. (6.) By every species of alphabetic writing. "Spoken words are *audible thoughts*. Pictures, hieroglyphics, and alphabetic marks are *visible thoughts*." Thoughts in the mind, too, "which are not in any manner expressed, are, at least so far as we are conscious of them, silently articulated or clothed in words." "There is an analogy between the office of words as the instrument of thought, and that of light as the instrument of vision, and of air as the instrument of hearing. By means of light we become conscious of seeing through the medium of the eye. By means of air we become conscious of hearing through the ear. So by means of words we become conscious of thinking, and by means of the vocal organs and of writing, we express our thoughts audibly and visibly to ourselves and others." Though the mind is doubtless active in the forming of thoughts before they take shape as words, yet when the thoughts are distinct, discriminated, defined, and in a condition to be expressed to others, to be a vehicle of communication, they must needs take the form of words. So, too, memory is distinct only in conjunction with words. And as no mind can communicate with another mind, so as to be intelligible, excepting through the medium of a spoken or written language, so, too, no intelligible revelation can be made excepting in this way.

4. Words necessarily and perfectly express the Thoughts conceived in them. "As we conceive and are conscious of thoughts only in words, so our words necessarily and perfectly signify and express the thoughts which we conceive in them; since all that we are conscious of in thinking, we are conscious of in the words in which we think."

"In thinking, the mind selects and collocates the words in which we are conscious of our thoughts, and which we speak or write when we express our thought to others; since we are no otherwise conscious of thoughts than of the words in that succession in which we write or verbally express them; and since the thought conveyed in a perfect sentence is precisely

that thought only as it is defined and qualified by the particular words employed and collocated as they are when the sentence is written; so that to conceive a thought in words is, of necessity, to conceive it in words collocated as when written, so as perfectly to express it."

"Accordingly, the *usus loquendi*; the exact signification, or sense in which words are used in the connections, grammatical forms and collocations assigned to them in sentences, is fixed by the action of the mind in thinking, so that the rule of usage is predetermined by the intellectual congitative act."

These general principles are fully unfolded by Mr. Lord in their various applications and relations, and in sharp contrast with other theories. Even those who differ from him must acknowledge that they are the result of mature reflection, and that they are held with definiteness and advocated with force. In reference to those, who claim that they think without words, or that words are necessarily fluctuating and uncertain, he says, that "they labor hard to convey their own thoughts to their fellow mortals by this inadequate and fallacious medium. And though they necessarily fail to furnish any evidence that they have any thoughts which they have not words to express, they exhibit a degree of skill in using words in such a way as to signify nothing, and thereby subject themselves to the obloquy of not being understood."

5. This theory of language, as applied to the inspiration of the Scriptures, offers, it is claimed, a strong rational argument, in support of their own testimony (above adduced), that this inspiration is verbal. "A revelation from God is a communication of his thoughts in such a manner that they may be intelligently apprehended and understood by men. A revelation when audibly spoken, or when committed to writing, must be expressed in words, and in words which intelligibly and definitely express and convey the thoughts which they are employed to represent and reveal. For otherwise they either would reveal nothing, or no one could determine what they revealed." "Inspiration, as its effects show, comprised a correct conception of the meaning, the form and the sound of the words in which the inspired thoughts were conveyed, so that the sacred writers were rendered conscious of the thoughts, and were qualified to conceive them in the same words, and to express them intelligibly and perfectly by speaking and writing. Their words, therefore, necessarily represented and expressed the thoughts of which they were made conscious by inspiration." So that "the words of the original text of Scripture, being the words in which the Di-

vine thoughts were inspired into the minds of the sacred writers, infallibly represent those thoughts, and are as infallible as the thoughts are."

We add, under this head only a reference to what the author says on the Figurative Use of Words (ch. XI.), and on the Nature and Office of Types (ch. IX.). The necessity of figurative language is shown by a clear analysis of its nature. As to Types, which have frequently been extravagantly pressed by the advocates of a verbal inspiration, it is made evident, that the theory of language here advocated is utterly opposed to all fanciful conceits of figurative and typical interpretations. These have been adopted just because their advocates had not the true theory of language; because they did not take the words of Scripture to signify simply and exactly the thoughts which they express in the connections in which they are employed. "For men, therefore, to treat as typical anything which had not that office by Divine appointment, would be an error like that of substituting words of their own choosing, in place of the original words of inspiration."

IV. *Objections and Difficulties.* Some of these have already been incidentally noticed; others, too, will be referred to under the fifth head. Mr. Lord nowhere treats them in a distinct chapter, but refers to them repeatedly at various points in his different volumes.

1. It may be said, that we do not necessarily think in words; that thought and words are not identical. But, any so-called thought that precedes words (internally conceived), is to say the least immature thought; it is undeveloped; it is not yet in the logical form necessary for its communication. There is doubtless a mental process before the thoughts are definitely shaped in the mind; but when the thought is consummated it must take the form of language. And the question, here, it should be borne in mind, is not one simply about the process of forming thoughts in our own minds, but rather about the *communication* of the thoughts of God to the human mind. And Mr. Lord's challenge to opposers is to show, how such a *communication* can be made without the instrumentality of words. And these thoughts, too, as they are the most important, having respect to God's will and purposes, and man's salvation, must needs be communicated in the most unimpeachable and infallible form. And how can this be without language, or signs equivalent to a vocal utterance?

2. It is said, that such an inspiration of words implies that we know the mode of the Spirit's operations, and that this

is inconceivable. One answer to this is found in the fact, that almost all who believe in inspiration admit that much of the Bible (all the direct communications and revelations) was imparted in words ; and of course, that in respect to so much of the Bible, inspiration is necessarily verbal. "The moment they admit that by inspiration thoughts were conveyed to the minds of the prophets, their objections are as conclusive against their own theory as against the one they oppose." This is common ground. And, again, it may be replied—that this theory does not pretend to decide the mode of the Spirit's agency ; but simply to define the effect of that agency. And, once more, Mr. Lord asks, "How can any man say that *revelation* is the effect of one *mode* of the Divine operation, and that inspiration was a different mode (viz : an operation on the faculties) unless he certainly and infallibly knows something of the nature and mode of such Divine operations ?"

3. Another objection is met by the statement, that "Inspiration does not imply that the words recorded as having been spoken by wicked and evil spirits were divinely inspired into the minds of those speakers ; but only that in order to the words of those speakers being infallibly recorded, they were conveyed to the minds of the sacred writers by inspiration."

4. The verbal theory is said to throw discredit on versions as compared with the original Scriptures. It is difficult to see how this applies to the verbal theory, any more than to any view which makes Inspiration extend to the whole of Scripture. Mr. Lord further says, in conformity with his theory of language, "That inspired thoughts as expressed in the words of the original text of Scripture, being clearly conceived in those words by a translator, and as clearly conceived in the words of another language, may be as clearly expressed in such other words as they are in the original ; and the inspired thoughts may be conveyed to the reader of the translations as perfectly as they were conveyed by inspiration to the sacred writers, and as they were conveyed to the readers of the original text ; since in both instances the words equally express and are the correlates, vehicles, and representatives of the thoughts conceived in them ; and since it is impossible that particular thoughts should be perfectly conceived, except in words which perfectly represent and express them."

5. The difficulties derived from the variations in the present state of the text, are "as hard to be surmounted on any other view of the subject as on that of verbal inspiration ;"

"they are far less real and important than is commonly imagined, . . . and do not affect any important fact or doctrine; or if they do in any instance, such fact or doctrine is elsewhere and repeatedly expressed in the earliest, most perfect and most reliable copies."

6. There are not only variations in the text, but also variations in the statement of the same facts or events or sayings, as recorded by different writers. No more difficulty, it is alleged, is found in harmonizing such accounts on the theory of verbal inspiration, than on any theory which holds to the infallibility of the Scriptures—than on the theory that the writers were so guided and superintended as to be kept from error. If there is substantial agreement, then there may be diversified statements of the same fact. The Holy Spirit speaks to and through each writer, according to his character, training, past knowledge and individuality, and may therefore give different aspects of the same truth. Mr. Lord does not enter into the explanation of these difficulties in detail; but says that nothing of practical value is gained by lowering the theory of inspiration. He is arguing with those who hold equally with himself, that all parts of Scripture are inspired.\*

7. Another objection, taken from comparatively trivial and personal statements and allusions—as Paul's greetings to individuals, his directions to Timothy about his cloak and parchments, and the like—is met in this way: "Such passages express the very thoughts which, under like circumstances, the same writers would have expressed in ordinary uncanonical letters. They actually had, as men, the feelings, wishes, sentiments, intentions, which they expressed. But what of that? Does that forbid that these thoughts should be intelligently realized to their intelligent consciousness by inspiration, when in their official capacity they were to write them as part of Holy Scripture? Was there not the same necessity that these particular thoughts in distinction from all the other thoughts of which they were personally conscious, should be divinely selected and specially inspired into their minds to fulfill the purposes of God as moral Governor, as there was that particular historical fact in distinction from all others, concerning the lives and acts of Abraham, Jacob, Jo-

\*Carson on Inspiration, p. 132, says in reference to the inscription on the cross, differently given by each evangelist: "If the four accounts are all substantially true, and would not discredit any four uninspired men, they may, without any disparagement to God, be all the language of the Holy Spirit." But did not the Holy Spirit know exactly just how the words read?



seph, David, and other Scripture characters should be so selected and inspired? etc.\*

But why need the writers be inspired in respect to matters which they knew before? "The matter so inserted shows to what extent, and in what manner, the Divine Lawgiver and Author of the original revelations, saw it to be necessary—for the instruction of mankind and the purposes of his government—to connect the revelation he gave and enjoined with the agency and experience of contemporary individuals, families and nations, and with human nature in like particulars and like circumstances in all subsequent times." (Prophetic Office, pp. 119–121.)

8. The language of the Bible is said to be the language of common life; and this is not only granted by Mr. Lord, but emphasized and shown to be necessary to a verbal inspiration. The writers were inspired to use these idioms—"because they understood, and were qualified by their education to write that language in the style to which they were respectively accustomed; because their readers also were qualified to understand what they so wrote; and because when translated into the like phraseology of different nations, what they wrote would be level to the capacity of common people, whose thoughts and style of expression are for the most part alike." "Because the writers and readers understood the words and style, which were in common use to express all personal and social facts, relations and beliefs—all that they previously knew—it was absolutely necessary to their understandings, that the supernatural revelation should be communicated in the same familiar words and styles."†

9. But it is said, that each writer has his own style and idioms, his own individuality; and that this is entirely inconsistent with the theory of verbal inspiration. Now, this individuality of style is just as marked in those parts of Scripture, which all who believe in inspiration hold to have been directly revealed and verbally communicated—*e. g.* in the prophets, the revelations given to Paul and the like—as it is in other parts, which are said (on account of this individuality), *not* to be verbally inspired. So that the objection is in fact refuted by the concessions of some who urge it. But, further, Mr. Lord lays down the dictum—"That it was necessary that the books should be inspired in the language, style and diction of the recipients, that he and his readers might, in their own accustomed and familiar words and idioms under-

\* Inspiration not Guidance, p. 97–8. See also Plenary Inspiration, 260–1.

† Plenary Insp. 262–3. Proph. Office of Christ, 119–121.

stand correctly what had been conveyed by inspiration ; and because no other than the inspired words could perfectly and infallibly express and convey the inspired thought."\* And, again, "the reason why the styles of the different writers differ from each other, arises not from the fact that what they wrote was inspired, nor from the nature of the subjects to which the inspired thoughts relate, but wholly from the circumstance that the thoughts conveyed must necessarily be inspired in words familiar to the writers, because they could receive, understand and be conscious of the inspired thoughts only in words which were previously known and familiar to them. Accordingly it happens both in the prophets and the evangelists, that in some instances the same thoughts are expressed by different writers in different words, and in other instances in the same words."† To which is added the consideration‡ "that the entire scheme of mediation, intercourse and fellowship between God and man requires this. It was necessary that the Divine Messenger himself should be capacitated in human nature to sympathize in all that concerned his people individually and personally. Hence He employs men of like passions, sympathies and trials to preach his word. In like manner He employed the sacred penmen to write in His words whatever of their personal experience, feelings, affections, circumstances, history, He thought necessary for instruction, warning, example or encouragement to others," etc.

So "the Word of God, as recorded in the Bible, stands out as the verbal expression of His thoughts and will . . . and the intermediate instrument of intellectual and spiritual intercourse and influence between Him and them . . . in a manner analogous in respect to its externality, its mediate instrumentality, and its enduring existence, to the Divine Logos, the personal Word incarnate, the visible Mediator." And thus is the whole theory rounded off, and brought into its vital relations with the Incarnation. This aspect of the subject is worthy of further thought and study.

V. *Contrast and Comparison of Theories.* It was, perhaps, natural that Mr. Lord in his discussions should have most direct regard to the theories which come nearest to his own, and should be most anxious to point out their deficiencies ; as his object was to unite all who accept the Scriptures as an infallible guide upon one basis, against all those who would weaken or undermine the inspired authority of the Bible.

\* Inspiration not Guidance, p. 161. See p. 42-3, 94-6.

† Plenary Inspiration, pp. 99-102. See also p. 263.

‡ Prophetic Office, p. 64-6.

His second volume is largely occupied with the criticism of recent works on the subject, particularly those of Morell and Professor Lee, and with an examination of articles in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* and *Princeton Review*. For our present object it will be sufficient to give a summary on a few of the main points.

1. The Theory of Degrees of Inspiration. This has generally been abandoned by the best recent writers of all shades of opinion. It is felt to be arbitrary and mechanical, unsupported by Scripture, and relieving no difficulties that are not better met by a more vital and organic view of inspiration. Of the four or five degrees of inspiration enumerated, that of *suggestion* is the only one which falls under the head of a proper inspiration. The implied and assumed difference between doctrines and facts cannot be carried out in a rational and satisfactory manner. So much of Scripture is undeniably represented as coming directly from God, that the remaining parts ought not to give the norm and definition of inspiration.

2. The Intuitional Theory. This is fully and ably discussed by Mr. Lord in the sixth chapter of his second volume, in opposition to the rationalists. He shows "that the power of intuition is not *receptive*, but merely *perceptive*; that it is exercised immediately and involuntarily, and is not susceptible of enlargement or improvement by instruction, and therefore cannot be the subject or organ of inspired thoughts, whether with or without words, or of any inward spiritual inspiration, inspiration of genius or awakening of religious consciousness; and that the mental power of perceiving truths intuitively is, on the one hand, distinguished from instinct, by its attributes of intelligence, and on the other, from intellectual cogitation, by the fact that intuitive perceptions are immediate, natural, involuntary and necessary, and are neither acquired nor improved by instruction, whereas intellectual cogitation is mediate, through the intervention of words, is consequent on instruction, and is voluntary."

The fact is, that even *revelation* has naught directly to do with the "elevation of the intuitional consciousness." Revelation is given to solve the problem of man's spiritual and eternal destiny; it presupposes that man is a moral and rational being—that he has intuition of moral and rational truths. These truths are simple, ultimate, invariable. No action upon them, no enlargement of them, could possibly answer the question which revelation is given to solve.

3. The Distinction of Revelation and Inspiration. This

has been, among recent writers, chiefly elaborated by Prof. Lee. The distinction is taken and used by different writers with different sense and intent. (1.) Some say that the Bible contains a revelation ; that so far forth it is inspired ; but that there is very much in the Bible which is not directly revealed, and which is also not inspired. Here revelation and inspiration cover the same ground ; but neither covers the ground of the whole Scripture. (2.) Others distinguish between the two ; say that the Bible contains revelations (direct communications from God), which of course are also inspired ; but that all the rest of the Bible, though not strictly a revelation, is still inspired. The Bible contains much which the writers knew by tradition and experience and have recorded ; but yet in recording this they were inspired, so as to be kept free from error. Though the whole Bible is not strictly a revelation, yet it is all inspired. Here inspiration covers a broader ground than revelation. This is substantially the position of Prof. Lee. Yet it is here manifest that this distinction, as thus held, is not strictly interwoven with the theory of inspiration, and does not help it much, one way or another. For if the inspiring act determines all the words and statements of the Bible (equally those which are not, as those which are revelations), then, much is not gained for qualifying the theory of inspiration by insisting on the distinction between revelation and inspiration. Inspiration guarantees the human elements as much as it does the divine elements of the Bible, as being exact and infallible. (3.) The third view says, that whatever distinction may formally be made between the two, yet in point of fact they both go together ; that the Bible is a communication in language from God to man ; as being such a communication it is a revelation ; and the fact of its being such a communication is also the fact of inspiration—for this is what inspiration means. This is the view of Mr. Lord. He says : " In both Testaments, wherever the words which are translated *reveal*, *revealed*, *revelation*, are applied to anything contained in the Scriptures, distinct verbal communications are referred to." In reply to Prof. Lee, he says : that " the distinction which he makes between Revelation and Inspiration is obviously altogether irrelevant to a discussion of the nature and mode of Inspiration ; since, according to his views, every portion of the Scripture was inspired, and he holds to one kind only, and rejects all pretences of different kinds and degrees, of Inspiration."\* He also objects strenuously on Scriptural grounds

\* Inspiration not Guidance, pp. 319, 320. See also Prophetic Office of Christ, pp. 106, 107.

to Prof. Lee's ascription of all "revelations to the Logos, and all inspiration to the Holy Spirit,\* and especially to his assumption that the Logos withdrew, as to his immediate personal presence and agency, at or before the death of Moses from all direct action as theocratic ruler and revealer.

4. The Distinction between the 'Mechanical' and 'Dynamical' Theories is also discussed in connection with the same work.† Mr. Lord claims that the 'mechanical' or 'verbal' theory holds, equally with the other, that the Holy Spirit employs man's faculties in accordance with their natural laws; and says that the 'dynamical' theory is not "a theory of inspiration as a divine act, but a theory of effects on man's faculties in uttering, writing, publishing, making known revelations to others." The fact is that the two words 'mechanical' and 'dynamical' do not accurately express either theory, or reach to the real question at issue, which is,

5. The Relation and Proportion of the Divine and Human Elements in the Sacred Scriptures. Some seem to think, that they have attained a clearer view of inspiration, and freed it from difficulties, when they say that the Bible contains both Divine and Human elements. But very different ideas may be intended by this phrase, and very diverse conclusions derived from it. (1.) It may simply mean, that the Bible tells us about man as well as about God—about human frailties, imperfections and sins, as well as about God's works and words. This is true; nobody disputes it; and nobody can make much out of it for a theory of inspiration. (2.) It may, however, be meant and implied that the Bible, considered as a record of facts and truths, has human elements in the sense that it is imperfect, fallible, inconsistent and contradictory, as are the books that proceed from men; that it does not merely tell us about human imperfections, but does this in a fallible and imperfect manner. It may mean, in short, that the human element is uninspired, and the divine element is inspired; so that the distinction between the divine and the human in the Bible is the same as the distinction between what is inspired and what is uninspired. But this is not what is meant by Prof. Lee, or by any who hold to the plenary inspiration and infallibility of the sacred books. (3.) It may mean, again, that the Bible, though made up of divine and human elements, is still inspired in relation to both the elements. How, then, does the distinction aid us in respect to the doctrine of inspiration? For the doctrine of inspira-

\* Insp. not Guidance 253 seq.

† Inspiration not Guidance, pp. 235, 252.

tion is specifically about the divine origin and authority of the whole Bible. And if it is all inspired, then so far forth, it is all from God, all divine. And we do not seem to have got any further along with the distinction, than we might have got without it. The question of the nature of the inspiration still remains, as indeterminate as ever. It is a question as to how far, in the inspiring act of God, the faculties and powers of the human mind were used—whether they were restricted to receiving a communication in words, or were effectually determined by the divine agency in the selection of words—which is the theory we have to consider under the next head.

It may be alleged, that the human element is found in the fact that the words employed are human words. To this Mr. Lord replies:\* "If in any sense of the language, the words of which the Bible consists, or the act of writing them, or both together, constitute a distinct human element of the Scriptures, then the same words when audibly spoken by Jehovah to the patriarchs, to Moses, the Israelites, the prophets, the people of Judea, and the apostles, and when spoken by the Father to the Son, and by the Son to the Father, must have the same human element in them; and must therefore have been other than infallible." Who can tell where the human ends and the divine begins, especially if the Scripture in all its parts is inspired—the Word of God?

6. The last contrasted theory is that which makes Inspiration to be a divine influence upon the minds of the writers, guiding, determining them in the choice of the words, in distinction from a divine act imparting the words. "The question," says Mr. Lord, "comes finally to this: Did the inspiration which is affirmed of the Holy Scriptures impart, convey, transfer to the minds of the sacred penmen the thoughts which they were to express in writing; or, did that inspiration, instead of conveying any thoughts whatever, only excite, enlighten, assist and guide the writers in the exercise of their faculties? There is no middle ground between these two views; and under one or the other of them, every theory of inspiration is necessarily to be classed." The former rests the doctrine of the infallibility of the Scriptures on the ground "that they consist of the recorded words of God;" the latter, on the ground "that the writers were rendered infallible in selecting and recording the words." But in what sense were the writers, or could they have been, rendered

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\* Insp. not Guidance, p. 183.



infallible, excepting in so far as they received an infallible communication from God? Only what they communicated was infallible, not they themselves; and it was and could be infallible, not as the product of their authorship, but simply as a revelation from an infallible being.

The whole here turns upon the question whether Inspiration is to be defined in relation to the writers, or to what they wrote. In other words, is the inspiration to be defined by its subjective aspects in relation to man, or its objective, in relation to God? Were the men inspired to write the Word, or was the Word they wrote inspired? Alford says, "the men were inspired, the books were the result of that inspiration." Mr. Lord says: "The primary error which pervades the treatises of those who believe in any Divine Inspiration, is that of regarding the Inspiration *as an influence on the mental faculties of the sacred writers*. The fact of such a *guidance*, is, we apprehend, nowhere taught in the Scripture as a constituent of inspiration; the mode of it is, we think, inconceivable." The passage John xvi. 13, "The spirit shall *guide* you into all truth," does not refer to their being guided in the selection of words, but to a knowledge of what Christ had spoken. He urges the consideration that just so far as the writers were left to choose the words, just so far the fallible, human element may have intruded. If, however, the writers were infallibly *guided* to the very words (of which there is no evidence), then there is no difference in the result—the effect is the same as that which he contends for; while his theory has the advantage of decisive Scriptural support in all those parts of the Bible which claim to be directly God-given. He asks: "Is it possible to conceive of an influence on the faculties of the human mind, which, without suspending the free exercise of those faculties, should determine it to adopt certain particular words whereby to express its thoughts? Must not such an influence amount to express dictation?"\* And again, "No degree or kind of influence ever was, or possibly could be, exerted on man's mind, enabling him to discover or know the thoughts, acts, or purposes of God till he revealed them by his Spirit. If Inspiration was an influence on the faculties of man, then the Spirit did not by his inspiring influence reveal the deep things of God."

In his last volume † Mr. Lord sums up his objections to the theory of guidance, in substance, thus: "If it is admitted that

\* Prophetic Office of Christ, pp. 100-104, 122-124.

† Insp. not Guidance, p. 165. Ibid., p. 163.

revelations, predictions, and the like, were directly imparted in words, then the alleged guidance can be asserted only of those parts of the Bible which contain historical matters, facts of experience and observation, previously within the knowledge of the writers. To this he objects: 1. That the assertion of such an infallible guidance about such matters is unscriptural, in the sense of not being taught in scripture, and of being contrary to what is there taught. 2. It is superfluous and unnecessary. There is nothing in the nature of the case to demand it. "The effect required is fully provided for by the Scripture doctrine of Inspiration, which teaches that what the sacred penmen wrote was conveyed to their minds by the inbreathing act of the Holy Spirit." 3. It is inconceivable and impossible. "For it implies that the sacred writers were, in the intelligent exercise of their faculties, guided to select words whereby to express thoughts of which they were unconscious, which is inconceivable and impossible." "Apart from words we have no consciousness of thoughts. It is therefore absurd to suppose the mind to select—whether with or without guidance—words whereby to express thoughts of which it was already conscious in words. To suppose it to select *other* words, is to suppose it to have *other* thoughts differing from the former as much as the newly-selected words differ from former words." 4. So that this supposed guidance and influence, if it means anything, and if it gives us infallible truth, must in the end amount to the same as the theory of verbal dictation; it must be "theopneustic, the inbreathing, inspiring act of God, conveying the requisite intelligence the particular truths, the particular thoughts, the particular words which they were to write as His Word, the Holy Scriptures, the infallible rule of faith and life."

We have thus attempted to present, as fully as our limits allow, the theory of inspiration advocated by Mr. Lord in his various treatises. Our object has been expository and not controversial. The difficulty of the subject, and the variety of opinions, render the whole question one of special moment at this time. No man in the country, not even among the clergy, has bestowed more attention upon it than the author of these volumes. Even those who do not agree with him will acknowledge the new light he has cast upon many important topics, and the new aspects in which he has presented the whole matter of verbal inspiration. No writer has more sharply defined the various theories, or traced them more definitely to their logical results; and no one has as yet

given as philosophical an exposition and defence of the strictest theory, freed, too, from various misapprehensions and perversions, with which it has hitherto been associated and embarrassed. His works have not received the recognition and discussion to which they are fairly entitled by their ability and comprehensiveness.

The whole subject merits and must receive increased attention. Protestantism, in opposition both to Romanism and Rationalism, stands on the infallibility of the Scriptures as the rule of faith and life. Upon the doctrine of Inspiration, too, depends "the doctrine, the ordinance and the instrumentality of the ministry of the Gospel. The ministers of the Gospel are called and commissioned to preach, not philosophy, not their own wisdom, not any known system . . . but the word of God as written by the inspiration of the Spirit, as the infallible standard of truth, and rule of faith and practice. The standard, the rule, the truth itself is extant, and unalterably fixed in the inspired writings." They cannot preach with full authority excepting as they are able to proclaim the word of God. By their very office they are committed and restricted to this. And their power over their people is well nigh gone, when the fact that the Bible is in truth the Word of God is obscured or denied.

For the last fifty years or more the effort has rather been to accommodate the theory of Inspiration to what is called the human side, the individuality of the writers, the diversities of narratives, the critical difficulties disclosed by the processes of Biblical criticism. The divine authority and unity, the inspiring life of the Bible, have been comparatively neglected. There is at present little danger of the prevalence of any too strict view of inspiration: the tendency is rather to an increased laxity of thought and statement. The whole subject, in view of its vital importance, needs to be discussed anew and afresh. Mr. Lord says, "the most striking feature of the very numerous, learned, philosophical and theological treatises of modern times, on the subject of Inspiration, is that of their various and inconsistent definitions, theories and speculations." A profounder study of the subject may lead to the conclusion that the older theory has elements of simplicity, unity, and adaptation to man's permanent religious wants, which are not found in most of the modern treatises. We need an infallible authority in what pertains to salvation. The ultimate reason why we receive and rest in the Scriptures must be, that they are the Word of God.

## ART. VIII.—CRITICISMS ON BOOKS.

## THEOLOGY.

*The Heidelberg Catechism, in German, Latin and English.* With an Historical Introduction. Prepared and published by the Direction of the German Reformed Church in the United States of America. Tercentenary Edition. New York: Scribner. 1863. 4to, pp. 277. In the July number of this Review, 1863, Dr. Schaff gave so full and able an account of this Catechism, that we need not enter into a particular examination of its characteristics and merits. The able Historical Introduction, prefixed to this volume, goes over the ground with a fullness and exactness, that leaves little to be desired. This edition is brought out in the best style of typography; and the whole is got up in a way which might profitably be imitated by other denominations in issuing their standards. The Catechism is given in the original German of 1563, in Latin, in modern German, and in a new English version. The conclusion of the noted answer to the 80th question, on the mass, is put in brackets. In the Creed, "hell" is rendered "hades."

*Christliche Glaubenslehre nach protestantischen Grundsätzen dargestellt von DR. ALEXANDER SCHWEIZER.* Band I. Leipzig, 1863. Dr. Schweizer, Professor at Zürich, is well known by his elaborate works on the Reformed Dogmatics. He represents extreme necessitarian views, combining in his system some of the principles of Calvinism, with the views of Schleiermacher, and a strong pantheistic tendency. The method which he follows, in this attempt to construct a systematic theology, is a combination of the Trinitarian, scholastic and federal methods. The main division is into three parts: 1. The Basis of the Christian Faith. 2. The Elementary Religious Belief (natural theology) in the Christian System. 3. The Specific Christian Faith, in the three Economies of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. The work is clear and able, but vitiated throughout by its pantheistic leanings. The truths of Christian theology he makes, with Schleiermacher, to be an expression of the utterances of Christian consciousness. A second volume will complete the work.

*Die Entstehung und Fortbildung des Luthertums, 1548—1576.* Von DR. H. HEPPE. Cassel, 1863. Dr. Heppe in this volume on the origin and progress of Lutheranism, continues the work in which he has long been engaged with so much zeal—to show that original Lutheranism and Melancthon's system were identical, and not really opposed to Calvinism. He contends that the Lutheranism of the Formula of Concord was a departure from the primitive genius of the evangelical church. He here gives extracts from some twenty local Lutheran confessions, ranging between 1548 and 1576, to support his views. An appendix replies to objections to his previous works, urged by Callinich and others. He hardly seems to make enough account of the fact, that two systems, which were developed into such different forms, must have contained the germs of the differences even in their earlier stages of growth.

*A Popular Hand-Book of the New Testament.* By GEORGE C. McWHOR-

TER. New York: Harpers. 1864. pp. 295. Mr. McWhorter has produced a useful, and popular manual upon the authenticity, canon 35, inspiration and history of the books of the New Testament, including an account of the text and of the chief versions. Each book is taken up by itself, and its contents and scope carefully noted. Many of Alford's views and suggestions are incorporated, as are, incidentally, those of other writers. The style is clear and the arrangement good. It will be found a valuable help to laymen and teachers of Sunday Schools, as well as to students in theology.

*The Redeemer and the Redeemed. An Investigation of the Atonement and of Eternal Judgment.* By CHARLES BEECHER. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1864. pp. 359. Mr. Beecher's theory is, that Lucifer was God's prime minister; that he was to be impeached and overthrown for disloyalty; that another being was created, with a host of attending spirits, who was to supersede him; that Lucifer seduced all of them excepting their leader; that these fallen beings are the human race, who were thenceforth banished to this earth; that the Second Person of the Trinity united himself with their loyal leader; that He came into the world to save it; that Satan, not knowing he was united with the godhead, put him to death; that he rose from the dead, and had a long argument on the matter in the court of heaven; and that Satan was then deposed from his high office, and the race brought under the working of the system of redemption. As compared with other theories of the atonement, the author says, that he accepts from the oldest theory the idea, that the prominent object was to destroy Satan. From the Old School theory he takes the view that the atonement involved a full execution of justice—the justice, however, being spent upon Satan and not upon Christ. From the New School view he accepts “the sublime and most important idea, that the atonement was of the nature of an argument addressed to the reason of the intelligent universe.” But as to the substance of this argument, he says, it was not to prove that God would punish the innocent instead of the guilty, but to prove that Satan “merited impeachment and removal.” The pre-existence of the race is assumed as established by Dr. Edward Beecher in his *Conflict of Ages*. The author's notion that Lucifer was a kind of “elder brother” of Christ is attempted to be proved by divers instances, in which the younger is substituted for the elder.

The book contains ingenious investigations and combinations; is written, in parts, with eloquence and ability; and shows that the writer has had severe struggles in grappling with these high problems. But we do not think it will carry conviction to many minds; or that it really relieves any great difficulty. The whole conception is too imaginative and artificial. In giving up the idea of substitution, the main point in the orthodox theory is abandoned. And the statement that the New School regard the atonement as of the “nature of an argument” is inaccurate and one-sided. Doubtless, it can be stated in an argument; but its nature is something far more profound and necessary. A syllogism cannot redeem mankind.

To make out his theory of a fall in a pre-existed state, Mr. Beecher is of course obliged to controvert the doctrines that Adam was created holy in the garden of Eden, and that he fell there. He contends that Adam was not “holier than any of his posterity naturally are as they rise into life.” He seems to us here to deny plain Biblical facts. The whole narrative in Genesis of the temptation, the fall and the sentence,

pre-supposes a state of innocence. By their disobedience our first parents came under the sentence of death; and this of course implies that they were not under that sentence before. "By one man sin entered into the world, and *death by sin*," says the apostle Paul. He also calls it "the offence of one"; and says "by one man's disobedience many were made sinners"; and that "the judgment was by one to condemnation." Mr. Beecher says that all this only means that Adam was taken as "an average sample of a blind and naked race, and found disobedient." Cain, or Noah, or Ham, then, might just as well have been taken as Adam, and the argument of the apostle would have had the same force. He disposes very easily of the statement that Adam was created in the image and likeness of God, saying, that this cannot mean the moral image, since it is ascribed to men after the fall—the likeness is one "of constitutional faculties and dominion." That this likeness remains, no one doubts: but that "the image of God" means no more than this, is what Mr. Beecher does not show and cannot show. The substantial idea of the divine image is given, for example, in Eph. iv, 24: "the new man which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness;" and in Col. iii, 10, "the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him." Christ is also called "the image of God;" does that mean merely "constitutional faculties?" The moral resemblance to God is, and must be, included in the full idea of the divine image. The author also tries hard to make out that the Scriptures represent Adam and Eve as in a state of "spiritual blindness" before the fall, because it says, that their "eyes were opened," and they knew that they were "naked." He says, they ought to have felt ashamed before, but did not. But the common view of a state of unconscious innocence explains the whole narrative perfectly. The author's argument from the contrast of the "natural" and "spiritual" body in 1 Cor. xv, 42-49, is also set aside by the interpretation of the passage as given, for example, in Olshansen's Commentary. The ordinary view of the primitive state is the simple and natural result of the Scripture testimony; Mr. Beecher's is the result of a pre-conceived theory.

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#### HISTORY.

*Die Weissagungen des alten Testaments in den Schriften des Flavins Josephus.* Von DR. ERNST GERLACH. Berlin. 1863. This work is a prize essay, approved by the Berlin Faculty of Theology. It examines at length the opinions of Josephus on inspiration, prophecy, the Messiah, and kindred topics. Josephus, the author holds, was inclined to the views of the Essenes, though he acted politically with the Pharisees. He fully admitted the reality of inspiration and prophecy, and looked for the coming of the Messiah. The second part of the treatise is devoted to an examination of the alleged testimony of Josephus to Jesus, and here the author, after a full weighing of the testimony, comes to the conclusion that these passages are interpolated. At the same time he allows the genuineness of what Josephus says about John the Baptist. The literature of the subject is fully collected, and the different opinions subjected to a critical discussion.

*History of the Romans under the Empire.* By CHARLES MERIVALE, B.



D. From the Fourth London Edition. Vol. II. New York: Appleton & Co. 1864. pp. 428. With a Map of the Northeast of Spain. This volume carries on the history from B. C. 52 to 44, ending with the assassination of Cæsar. It begins with his seventh campaign in Gaul against Vercingerotix, and gives a complete account of Cæsar's conflicts with Pompeius and the Senatorial party, until he attained the supreme authority. The work increases in value and interest, and in thorough mastery of the materials, with the progress of the narrative. The characters of Pompeius and of Cæsar are described with impartiality and force. Cæsar, in particular, is estimated aright, in his defects, as well as in his marvelous talents and influence. As Drumann says: "He was great in everything he undertook; as a captain, a statesman, a lawgiver, a jurist, an orator, a poet, a historian, a grammarian, a mathematician, and an architect." The concluding chapter on the causes of the rise and the degeneracy of the republic is admirable. The relation of religion to the state is rightfully described. Rome used religion for the sake of the state; the state was the great idea. "The Roman priests and diviners never succeeded in separating themselves as a distinct class from the rest of the people." The moral decline, the inefficacy of morals and philosophy to save the state, are fully exhibited. "Cicero's writings," says the author, "may be searched in vain for a single expression of reliance on the progressive improvement of mankind." All was thus prepared for the advent of the Great Deliverer.—The volume is brought out in excellent style.

#### BIOGRAPHY.

*Autobiography, Correspondence, etc., of LYMAN BEECHER, D. D.* Edited by CHARLES BEECHER. In 2 vols. Vol. I. New York: Harpers. 1864. pp. 563. This familiar record of the life of one of the ablest and most eloquent ministers of the last generation, will be eagerly sought for; and no one can begin the volume without going through it at a rapid rate. It is simple, outspoken, genial and entertaining. The seeming lack of art in its preparation heightens the effect. It is a living biography of a live man. And not of the man only; his wives, his children, his parishioners, his friends, his opponents, all come upon the stage; and we feel well acquainted with them. It is seldom that we get so right into the very hearts and minds of a household. The parish at East Hampton, and that at Litchfield, the ways and means of ministers and their wives, all the details, are brought into full view. Nobody can help loving and admiring Dr. Beecher, after reading the book. Few men are endowed with such a union of blunt common sense, keen logic, racy wit, unflagging good humor, skill in controversy and condensed and inspiring eloquence. Few men in this country have done more in their day and generation to further the great moral, philanthropic and religious movements of the times. His wives, Roxana and Harriet, were also remarkable women; to say nothing of the rest of the family. The volume is brought out in excellent style, and well illustrated.

• *Life and Correspondence of THEODORE PARKER, Minister of the Twenty-eighth Congregational Society, Boston.* By JOHN WEISS. 2 vols., 8vo. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1864. Theodore Parker, the record of whose life is fully given in these two handsome volumes, was in many respects a man of marked individuality. From comparatively humble

circumstances he grew up, with unflagging perseverance and resolution, backed by abilities of no common order, to occupy a position of great influence, and to make himself felt even in the political conflicts of the day. His range of scholarship was wide; he aimed at universality. He mastered the elements of many languages, and was familiar with the history of literature. Apparently made for a scholar, he plunged into the thickest of the fight in the anti-slavery discussions of the last twenty years; and though he received many blows they were faithfully returned. His style was clear and forcible, adapted to popular impression, and always showing the marks of a resolute will as well as the cultivation of a superior intellect. Nature formed him for an aggressive leader. His forte was in opposition. This may have been partly owing to the circumstances of his life; for he had high moral instincts and aims. He was a thorough radical in theology and politics; and this of course provoked constant opposition. His nearest friends were strongly attached to him, and there was in his private life much of delicacy and sentiment, cordial affection, and untiring benevolence. But in his public career he was a bold and uncompromising opponent of the popular historic religion of the church, and an earnest advocate of the great moral and political movements of the day, extreme and outspoken in his opinions, and violent in his invectives not only against opinions but against men. He fought hand to hand against persons and not against mere abstractions.

He was educated as a Unitarian; but he could not remain content with even the Unitarian views of the Bible, and Christ, and revelation. He abandoned all belief in the Scriptures as the word of God, and in Christ as anything more than a man. He believed, he said, in three things, God, justice and immortality. And he quarreled with all his Unitarian neighbors for not taking the same ground. He was simply a deist. He denied all miracles, and all revelation excepting that found in human reason. He made it, he says, the great effort of his life to overturn the popular theology—and by that he meant not merely orthodoxy, but the Unitarianism of the old school, as represented by Drs. Norton and Ware. He was constantly complaining of being hated and opposed—forgetting that his own hatred of the orthodoxy, and opposition to almost everybody else was the ground of their opposition to him. He could not keep his attacks on Christ and the Bible out of his political pamphlets, and we are glad to see that Mr. Chase in his correspondence, comments on this with a just rebuke. His opinions were early formed; and all his studies were pursued with a view to confirm them. He was bitterly disappointed that he met with no more success in his efforts to overthrow the established faith. His radicalism led many Unitarians into reaction, and sensibly modified their views as to the need of some standard of belief. No man in the country for the last quarter of a century has done so much to cast discredit upon Christianity and the person of Christ. His biography does not do full justice to him in this respect. It passes lightly over many things which made him most notorious. In fact, we miss in this biography an estimate of his works and position upon theological questions.

Mr. Parker was a man of wide and varied attainments. He accumulated a large and valuable library. But he was certainly not distinguished for thorough scholarship, and critical accuracy either as to language or thought. He spread himself over too wide a field to be eminent in any one department. We are repeatedly told of the number of langua-

ges he read; but there is nothing in his works which indicates any superior philological attainments. He did not set himself down to a thorough investigation of the great theological subjects which he disposes of in such a magisterial way. He was always writing and studying for the popular ear. His mind was quick and bold, but not accurate or philosophical. When he comes to talk about the ultimate grounds of his belief, he gives us nothing but the vague and abstract intuitions of conscience and common sense.

His biography is full of interest, though it exalts him to a position which he cannot hold in the history of the theology of our country. His eminence was in the sphere of moral reform; but he was not content with that. He wanted to overturn Christianity as well as slavery; and his name will decline as Christianity grows. Mr. Weiss has done his part of the work with evident partiality. The materials on the whole are well arranged, though the biographer's style is somewhat strained and artificial. The American edition leaves out some comments on Mr. Parker's co-laborers in the anti-slavery work, which showed that he could be as biting to his friends as to his foes. But these omissions have been more widely published in our newspapers than any part of the biography. So we do not see that much was gained by leaving them out.

#### PRACTICAL RELIGION.

*Five Years of Prayer, with the Answers.* By SAMUEL IRENEUS PRIME. New York: Harpers, 1864, pp. 375. The "Power of Prayer," by the same author, published some five years since, was received with great interest in this country and abroad, and contributed to extend and increase the interest felt in the "Fulton Street Prayer-meeting." "The Five Years of Prayer" contains the facts which have been brought to light in connection with the prayers of Christians during this period. The narrative embraces not only the daily prayer-meetings in the city of New York, but also the work of the Spirit in the army and the navy; and across the sea during the great revivals in Ireland, Scotland, England and Wales, France and Germany. While some might object to portions of the volume as straining a point, it cannot fail to interest the Christian reader and increase the faith of the church in the power of prayer.

#### GENERAL LITERATURE.

*Hannah Thurston; A Story of American Life.* By BAYARD TAYLOR. New York: Putnam, 1863. The author of this story, so widely known already by his books of travels, has here entered a new field. The same interest in external nature, which helped to make him a traveler, here shows itself in graphic descriptions of scenery, and a quick eye for all the outward aspects of life. If in the higher objects and aims of the book the success is only partial, the reason is not hard to find. It is easier to describe the outward features of distant lands than to unfold truly the life of men at home.

The scene of the novel is laid in the interior of the State of New York, and so recently as to give a natural place to the discussion of women's rights, table-turnings and spiritualistic manifestations generally. The object of the book is to show how the question between the sexes finds its true solution without a reform on the basis of woman's rights.

The progress of the story, which is steady and straight, gives opportunity for incidental sneers at foreign missions, at revivals of religion, and at the temperance reformation. The hero and heroine are early introduced and strongly advertized—a bachelor in his prime—Maximilian Woodbury—just home from varied travels, of wide experience, well freed from prejudices, rich enough to purchase and settle in a plain farming town where he will be the first man; in person commanding, with rich barytone voice, brown waving hair; ready, self-possessed and high-toned in conversation—a thorough man of the world, and fond of a good sear: the maiden, Hannah Thurston, of Quaker parentage and training, of fine intellect and person, well read in the most modern books, and devoted to the advocacy of woman's rights as her life work.

These strong attractions are lightened by equally strong reliefs. A tailor—Seth Wattles—figures in the story; ill formed, of lumpish features, sodden fibre, and bloodless complexion—and he sings very horribly, as is fit; but Max. Woodbury soon after sings; his voice—a rich barytone—tuned to the true masculine fibre, rings through the house in a noble lay. This is all fair, and redounds to the glory of the hero; but the next is not perhaps quite fair. The chosen maiden too shines by contrast. Four spinsters meet her in the same sewing circle, and while Hannah Thurston works beautiful leaves and flowers, which all admire, these four work on garments—each for her own adopted little heathen girl away in Jutnapoor; and in this work, we are informed, “their withered bosoms feel a thrill of the lost maternal instinct which they dared not indulge in any other way.” Now on this we are moved to remind the author, that however foolish foreign missions may be in their origin, that age and loss of beauty are of the Lord, and therefore should not be made matter for a sneer. Or if the phrase is too theological, we will change it to the modern dialect, and say that age and beauty are such broad facts in human experience that a kind gentleman will be careful not to mention them in a way to give needless pain to any of the family.

These elderly maidens, what could they do towards marrying? Perhaps no gentleman had ever asked them; but only some Seth Wattles, a tailor, with lumpish features, bloodless veins, and a very bad singer. And perhaps, added to this, Seth had, some day years ago, forgetting what he owed to himself, sneered at old maids in their hearing. We can think of Seth repenting of this often afterwards, but too late; for the damsels, with no thought of ever being old maids themselves, yet with true womanly instinct, said each to herself, “I wish Seth no harm, but, after what he said to-day, he is no gentleman, and never will be if he lives a thousand years.”

We follow these elderly maidens and find them faring hard all through. They are kept together, without any display of individuality; and thus, with their slender fourfold force, they continue to invite gentle sneers, till one of them marries a missionary with a name studiously chosen to invite contempt to the laborers in the missionary field.

In due form and order, an equally explicit delivery is made on the temperance reformation, and on revivals of religion. Thus three of the four social movements that have in this age done most to counteract sensuality and selfishness in the people of this country are treated as fair matter for sarcasm. The author has traveled much, but is not well instructed of things at home—and this, not in higher matters merely,

but in language and social usages as well. We are told respecting a sewing circle, that "it would be called, to use the social technology of Boston, a great success." What does the author understand by the phrase *social technology*? As the phrase of itself has no meaning, we must do as teachers are wont to do in the case of hard texts, we must look at the context; and this seems to show that the author meant this: That the use of the word *success* in the way quoted is a local use, and the place where it is so used is Boston. In other words, it is a provincialism; (did the author mean to say *terminology*? and use another word about as long and of the same ending;) the word is a provincialism, and Boston is the province. The author is as much mistaken in the thing as in his language. The use of the word as quoted is not localized anywhere. A Londoner, as far from loving Americanisms as Dickens is, uses the word in just this way, writing to the English and for the English, and uses it as an explanatory term, showing that such use is what everybody understands.

Leaving these side topics, in which the author exhibits himself rather than his subject, we come to the main object of the book—to show that the question of rights as between the sexes finds its true solution in love and marriage. The theme is a fair one, and is steadily pursued; but the author has missed his aim by the admixture of foreign elements. These are found in the overpowering and aggressive personality of the hero, whom the author in his fondness has charged with qualities too strong to give the maiden a fair chance; then in the sickness and death of her widowed mother, weakening her by sorrow, by loss of home, and burdening her with a dying mother's advice. So the marriage takes place, under a stress from different sides, sooner than the woman is prepared for it. All comes right at last, but the artistic solution is missed. We have not a faultless chrysalis, but a very serviceable salt instead, dissolved a little and mixed with other things, but genuine, and almost as good as any. In other words, the solution fails in just the point where all our interest in the experiment centered. The thing to be done was to show that love and marriage would take up into a higher plane and satisfy for Hannah Thurston all claims of woman's rights; the thing actually done is to show that love, plus the lover's special advantages, plus a home, plus a dying mother's advice, prevailed on Hannah Thurston to marry Max. Woodbury; and after a year of married life, not sooner, is her heart fully at rest.

We turn from the uncomfortable stress of this book and its various offences, to find relief in the memories of a true work of art. In the story of Adam Bede a like great question is put, and fairly solved on its own ground and by its own laws. We cherish the picture as a joy forever, and dismiss the story of Hannah Thurston.

*The Moral Power of the Sea: An Inquiry into the Relations of Commerce to the Evangelization of the World.* By WILLIAM ALKMAN. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania Seamen's Friend Society, pp. 151. This little volume is timely and adapted to do good. It discusses the subject of which it treats in a popular manner and with ability. It gives a brief outline of the history of Commerce, and traces both its good and its evil influences on the work of Christian Missions, and notes the great lessons which God is teaching the world by means of it. It gives likewise an interesting sketch of the recent efforts in behalf of the sons of the ocean. The reading of the book will quicken the interest already felt in their

temporal and spiritual welfare, and urge the prayer, that "the abundance of the sea may be converted" speedily to God.

*The Book of Praise*, from the best English Hymn-writers, selected and arranged by ROUNDELL PALMER. Cambridge: Sever & Francis, 1864. 16mo vellum, cloth, vignette Title, pp. 480. Price, \$1 50. This is an exquisite gem of a book, from the famous Cambridge press, and published by a house distinguished for the taste and finish of their issues. In this selection of hymns great care has been observed to give the original text, and to trace the authorship of each. We observe in the collection a large number of the hymns which form the gems of sacred poetry, and with which we are all familiar. The arrangement of the collection is new. Part I. Hymns arranged according to the subjects of the Creed; II. According to the subjects of the Lord's Prayer; III. For Natural and Sacred Seasons. The Notes and full Index of Authors add to the value of the work.

*Daleth: or, The Homestead of the Nations. Egypt Illustrated.* By EDWARD L. CLARK. Boston: Ticknor & Fields, 1864, 8vo. pp. 289. In point of artistic beauty and finish this book can hardly be excelled. The paper, letter-press, and binding are exquisite; while the illustrations are abundant, and some of them really beautiful and gorgeous, representing the manners, customs and antiquities of Egypt. It is a popular, however, and not a scientific work on this fruitful theme. It adds nothing to the knowledge we already possessed of that enigmatic people. The author has merely availed himself of the investigations of our modern Egyptologists, and blending history and discovery with the notes of modern travel has produced a highly fascinating book. He gives many a beautiful sketch of ancient Egyptian civilization and life, interspersed with the musings and descriptions of a highly poetic and enthusiastic mind. He shows familiarity with the literature of the subject, and a literary taste and culture of a high order. And he conveys to the reader not a little of his own enthusiasm for the recondite subject. There is, however, a vagueness of thought and expression at times, and a looseness, if not falsity of statement, that mars the work, and betrays a poetical rather than a logical mind. But notwithstanding these blemishes the volume possesses great interest and cannot fail to be highly popular.

*Caxtoniana: A Series of Essays on Life, Literature, and Manners.* By SIR E. BULWER LYTTON. New York: Harpers. 1864. pp. 442. These essays belong to the "old-fashioned field of *belles-lettres*;" and are delightful specimens of that mixed mode of literature. The subjects were chiefly suggested in connection with the author's novels under the name of Pisistratus Caxton. All reflecting persons will find in them ample materials to quicken and direct thought and imagination. They are a healthful relief from the sensation-literature of the day. Such essays as these on Certain Principles of Art in Works of Imagination, on the Difference between the Urban and the Rural Temperament, on Style and Diction, on Essay Writing, and on Rhythm in Prose—not to name others, impart a sound tone of thought and feeling to the mind of the reader. They are the ripe products of a thoughtful temperament.

The Sixth Number of *Harper's Pictorial History of the Great Rebellion* is fully illustrated with maps and wood-cuts. The opening scenes of the war are described with fidelity and spirit. The notes give documentary evidence. It is issued in folio size at the low rate of 25c. a number.



*Annis Warleigh's Fortunes.* A Novel. By HOLME LEE. No. 239 of Harper's Library of Select Novels. A tale showing a good deal of talent and descriptive ability; at times somewhat prolix, but keeping the attention fixed by an involved and mysterious plot. Annis (or Sunshine) is a charming character.

*Very Hard Cash.* A Novel. By CHARLES READE. With Illustrations. New York: Harpers. 1864. pp. 258. A novel of unusual fertility and power, full of incident and wit; somewhat improbable, but always entertaining. Insane hospitals, and life among pirates, contribute to the interest of the work, which is full of startling scenes.

*The Wife's Evidence.* A Novel. By W. G. WILLS. Harpers No. 240. This novel possesses a very tragic interest. It is a domestic tale of misery and crime, dark and harrowing in many of its features, but relieved by filial and conjugal fidelity and devotion of a truly noble character. The dark and the light, the good and the evil passions mingle and play in the tale, imparting life and instruction to it. Mr. and Mrs. Coleman are characters as beautiful as they are rare.

*Work and Play; or Literary Varieties.* By HORACE BUSHNELL. New York: Scribner. 1864. pp. 464. This collection of Dr. Bushnell's miscellaneous writings will be cordially welcomed.

*The School-Girl's Garland.* A Selection of Poetry. By MRS. C. M. KIRKLAND. Second Series. New York: Scribner. 1864. A beautiful book in appearance; and the name of the author is a guarantee that the task undertaken has been accomplished with taste and judgment.

#### ART. IX.—THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

##### FRANCE.

Emile Saisset died at Paris on Sunday, Dec. 25. He was born at Montpellier, Sept. 16, 1814. He was a Prof. at the Sorbonne, a member of the Institute, and one of the leaders of the spiritual school of philosophy. Most of his writings bear upon pantheism, of which he was an ardent opponent. His *History of Scepticism (Aenesideme)* appeared in 1849. In the *Manual of Philosophy* (1841, several times republished), he wrote on Ethics and the Existence of God. He translated Spinoza, and works of Dr. Samuel Clarke. His *Philosophy of Religion in the Nineteenth Century*, 1845, his *Essay on Religious Philosophy*, and his *Precursors and Disciples of Descartes*, are all devoted to the examination of religious and philosophical questions. The *Essay* obtained the Monthyon Prize, and was translated in Edinburgh, 1863, in 2 vols., under the title of *Modern Pantheism*. His essay on Roger Bacon, extracted from his *Precursors of Descartes*, was translated last year in our REVIEW. French philosophy loses in him an enlightened representative. His style of treating philosophical questions was clear and animated.

*Revue Chrétienne.* Jan. 15, 1864. F. Godet on the most ancient Traditions about the Four Gospels—a careful collection of the testimony. Rosseeuw St. Hilaire, The Duke of Egmont in Flanders; the Trial of the Counts Egmont and Horn, 1567–1568—an able paper. Th. Roller, The

Italy of the Italians—a review and commendation of R. Rey's History of the Political Regeneration of Italy, 1815–1864. The February part contains an extract from a forthcoming work, by Edward de Pressensé, on the Church and the French Revolution, now in the press. It reviews all the proceedings of the revolution in relation to religion up to the time of the Concordat of Napoleon with the Pope. In another article Rosseeuw St. Hilaire gives an account of Pressensé's Lectures on the Life of Christ in reply to Renan, which were received with most marked favor. The other articles are by Roller on Italy, and by Puaux on the Death of Louis XIV.

A Commentary on the Gospel of John, by F. Godet, has just been published; and an Explication of John, by an anonymous author. Both are well spoken of.

Rev. Albert Barnes's Commentary on the Epistles to the Corinthians has been translated into French by Napoleon Roussel. The first volume of Mr. Ticknor's History of Spanish Literature has been translated by J. G. Magnabal, with the notes and additions of Spanish commentators.

*Theological Works.* The complete works of Chrysostom are to be translated into French, under the direction of priests of the Immaculate Conception of St.-Dizier. The first volume is published for six francs. It will form 10 or 11 volumes. Abbé Gaume has published a new version of the New Testament, with notes. M. Michel Nicolas, Critical Studies on the New Testament. Gieseler's History of Doctrines has been translated by J. F. Bruch and A. Flobert. Abbé Barral, Studies on Athanasius. Abbé Gratry has written an eloquent reply to Renan.

M. H. Wallon will soon publish a life of Richard II. of England, which is anticipated with eagerness. His account of the Insurrection of the Peasantry in England, and of the Fall of Richard II., both published last year, are models of historical narrative.

A lawyer, Joseph Bizouard, is publishing a work, *Des Rapports de l'Homme avec le Démon*, which is highly commended by Roman Catholic authorities: three volumes are out, it will be completed in six.

The great Indian epopée, the Mahavharata, is announced, in the first French translation by M. H. Fauche. It will be in 12 vols.; the first is published for 5 francs.

An indication of the interest still felt in Scotch Philosophy in France may be found in the fact that a *Criticism of the philosophy of Thos. Brown*, by F. Réthoré, a volume of 285 pages, has recently been published in Paris.

The prize of eloquence of the French Academy, on the subject of the Life and Genius of Cardinal de Retz, has been assigned to two memoirs by Topin and Michon, among 26 competitors.

M. P. Faugère, the editor of Pascal's *Pensees*, is about to publish an abridgment, recently found, of *Our Saviour's Life*, by Pascal. It is chiefly related to the words of the Gospels. M. Eichthal's work on the Gospels has put in the Roman Index. About is preparing a Life of Voltaire, and Houssaye, of Rousseau. The 13th vol. of the Correspondence of Napoleon I. is out.

#### GERMANY.

*Theologische Studien und Kritiken.* Erstes Heft, 1864. Professor C. Schmidt of Strasburg contributes a long and valuable account of the fa-

mous sermons of Berthold of Ratisbon, who lived in the 13th century. They were first published 38 years since, at the instigation of Neander, by Kling, and again by Pfeiffer in 2 vols., 1862. Grimm warmly commended them. He had, say his contemporaries, at times 40,000 hearers—some say 100,000 to 200,000. His sermons are distinguished for simplicity and earnestness. Pischon, chaplain to the Prussian embassy in Constantinople, gives an interesting sketch of the present constitution of the Greek-Orthodox church. Köster conjectures, in an interesting article, that the purer religious ideas of Homer may be traced to the Hebrews through the Phœnicians. Valentiner contributes a specimen of a new version of the *Enneades* of Plotinus. The "Reviews" are of Hilgenfeld on the Canon by Weiss; of Sudhoff on the Heidelberg Catechism by Hundeshagen; and of Reifenrath on the theology of the *Theologia Germanica* by Winkel. The second Heft of the *Studien*, 1864, has a long and able discussion by Beyschlag on the Conversion of Paul, in reply to Baur and Holsten; a continuation of Pischon on the Greek Church; Caspari on Zion and Acra of the Syrians; Wettler on Pastoral Theology as deduced from Paul's epistles; and reviews of Böhmer on Genesis, and Schneckenburger on the Chronology of the New Testament.

*Zeitschrift f. die Lutherische Theologie*.—1. 1864. Professor G. Thomasius on the Position of the Clergy in Relation to the present opposition to the Doctrines and Order of the Church. Richter on the Inspiration of the Scriptures as Verbal. G. L. Plitt, on the question of the Testimony of Hegesippus to James the Just. Iwan Müller on Apollonius of Tyana. O. Zöckler on Peter of Alcantara, in relation to the monastic and clerical counter-Reformation in Spain in the sixteenth century. An unpublished satire of the sixteenth century is also given, Nicholas von Amsdorf's conversation of a Raven with a Dove. More than half the number is filled up with valuable criticisms of new theological works.

*Jahrbucher für deutsche Theologie*. 1863. Nos. 2, 3, 4. Prof. Ritschl of Bonn contributes two articles on the New Testament statements about the Death of Christ, in relation to salvation, discussing especially the representation of it as a sacrifice, but denying its strictly vicarious nature. H. Schmidt on Origen and Augustine as Apologists. Prof. Schaff on Ecumenical Councils—a clear and learned essay. Hamberger, The Rationality of the Idea of a Celestial Body. Diestel, the Idea of the Theocratic King. Plitt on Zinzendorf's views as to the different methods of teaching in the various writers of the Bible, in harmony with unity of spirit. Osiander on the Protestant Doctrine of Justification, against Döllinger. Jacoby, The Idea of Religion. Baxmann, an able criticism of Baur's reconstruction of Christianity. Full reviews of the most recent valuable works are also given.

The Roman Catholic Theological Quarterly (*Theolog. Quartalschrift*) No. 1. 1864. Prof. Dr. Aberle, Contributions to the Introduction to the New Testament: the first topic is an attempt to show that in some fragments of early Christian literature there is evidence that Papias knew the Gospel of John—an ingenious and learned discussion; he also examines anew the testimony of Irenæus to the Gospels, in order to propose an interpretation of the noted passage (*Adv. Haer.* 3, 1, 1.) which would make it mean that Irenæus did not say that the Gospels were current after the death of the apostles, but after their departure from Jerusalem. The other articles are Kellner on the Philopatris, falsely ascribed to Lucian; and Alberdingk-Thym on the Dutch dramatist, Bondel.

The first article in the *Zeitschrift f. d. historische Theologie*, 1864, is a long account by Dr. A. Walte of the steps by which the city of Bremen went over from the Lutheran to the Reformed Confession, in connection with the Hardenberg Controversy in the seventeenth century. Professor Otto of Vienna, in the second article, gives the evidence that a Dialogue ascribed to the Patriarch Gennadius of Constantinople in which was taught the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father *and the Son*, is a spurious work—though even Kimmel in his collection of the symbols of the oriental churches receives it as genuine. The present article is in corroboration of criticisms by Prof. O. in the same periodical, 1850. The last article by Linder is an exhibition of the rules of church discipline, as adopted in the Swiss churches, especially that of Basle. The second number of this *Zeitschrift* contains a sketch of Eckhart's theosophy, and an analysis of a newly found tract ascribed to him; an outline of Patrick Hamilton's life by Collman on the basis of Lorimer; Wesley's journal of a tour in Germany in 1728, and his interview with Zinzendorf in 1741; a list of Rosicrucian works by Hochhulth; and Ebrard on the date of the Waldensian poem entitled *Nobla Leiczon*.

*Zeitschrift für die wiss. Theologie*. Tübingen. Heft 4, 1863. A. Hilgenfeld on the Gospel of the Hebrews—an attempt to vindicate its antiquity and originality. Incidentally, the writer rebukes Renan for his imperfect theories about the origin of Matthew and Mark. D. F. Strauss, Schleiermacher and the Resurrection of Jesus; giving extracts from S's unpublished lectures, to show how he tried to account for the resurrection by natural means. This article shows that Strauss still holds to his idealistic and mythical interpretation of the Gospels. Egli, The Land of Sinai, in Isaiah xlix. 12; not China, but a district of the Kurds in Persia. R. A. Lipsius, The Ophitic Systems—a learned contribution to the history of Gnosticism; it is to be continued.

The latest volume of the continuation of Bunsen's Bible-work, contains the Acts, Romans and Corinthians, by Prof. Holtzmann; and Galatians by Prof. Kamphausen.

Of E. Förster's *Memorabilia from the Life of Jean Paul Richter*, the 4th volume has been published; the 3d is not yet out. The work is issued to celebrate the centenary of Richter's birth. In this country, too, a new impulse has been given to the fame of Richter by the admirable translations of Dr. Brooks.

Fr. H. R. Frank's *Theology of the Formula of Concord* has reached its third volume. It is an elaborate exposition. This volume discusses the Lord's Supper, the Person of Christ, and Christ's Descent to Hades.

C. Haas is editing a selection from the works of Anselm: the first volume contains the *Monologium*, *Prosligion*, etc.

A new edition, the eleventh, of the German Conversations-Lexikon, is to be published by Brockhaus in 15 vols. Each part costs 20 cents; ten make a volume.

Jul. Fürst's *Bibliotheca Judaica* is completed by the publication of the third part. It is a record of all the books of the Jewish literature, and includes a history of Jewish Bibliography.

August Hahn, General-Superintendent at Breslau, died May 13, 1863. He was born in 1792, the son of a schoolmaster; studied in Leipsic, 1810-14; taught in the Preachers' seminary at Wittenberg, 1817; became Professor and preacher at Königsberg, 1819; Professor at Leipsic 1826; at Breslau, 1833; General-Superintendent, 1844. He was a man

of acknowledged learning ; of great ability as a teacher ; firm in his evangelical views, and devoted to the Union between the Reformed and Lutheran churches. In his early life he devoted himself to oriental literature, and published, in 1819, a treatise on the Gnostic Bardesanes, the first hymnologist of the Syrian church, and also, with Sieffert, a Syriac Chrestomathy, 1825, containing extracts from Ephraëm Syrus, whom he diligently studied. In 1823 he wrote on the Gospel of Marcion, showing it to be a Gnostic compilation. When he became Professor at Leipsic, 1827, in his Inaugural, he declared against the prevalent rationalism, and excited a violent controversy, in which Krug took the lists against him. His letter against Bretschneider, 1832, on the Posture of Christianity in our Times, gained him the favor of the King, and his appointment at Breslau, where he contended against David Schulz, the head of rationalism in that quarter. The first edition of his text book of Theology appeared in 1828 ; it is an evangelical and able work, though modifying the doctrines of original sin and of the sacraments, as stated in the Lutheran symbols : the second edition, 1858, is more elaborate and careful. In 1847 he wrote on the Confession of the Evangelical Church and the Obligation of the Ordination Vows, against the lay interpretation. In 1853 he published on the Confession in Relation to the Roman and Greek Churches. Two volumes of Sermons by him appeared in 1829 and 1854. In 1842 he edited very carefully a Library of the Symbols and Rules of Faith of the Apostolic Church—a very useful work. His edition of the Hebrew Bible, 1831, and of the Greek Testament, 1840 (the latter republished in this country by Dr. Robinson), are well known. He lectured on almost all the branches of Theology—dogmatics, ethics, church history, history of doctrines, symbolism, exegesis of all the New Testament, excepting the Apocalypse, and practical theology.

#### ITALY.

An account of the recent discoveries in Pompeii, fully illustrated, is to be published under the patronage of the King of Italy.

The amount devoted to education by the Sardinian budget of 1863 was 16,128,078 francs—a larger proportion to the population than in either France or Prussia. The Universities receive about five millions. The present number of the universities is 21. The examinations are not very strict, only about 5 per cent. being rejected, while in Paris 20 per cent. ; in Belgium 30 per cent., and in Oxford about 25 per cent. are "plucked." The minister of Public Instruction is Signor Matteucci. Before 1859 the only organization for public instruction was in Sardinia. The Turin university has 8 to 900 students ; the university of Naples was reported in 1861 at 10,000, but the minister could only find between 2 and 3,000. The number of Lyceums is 89—pupils, 6,000. Only 1,000,000 of children are in the elementary schools, out of three millions ; and only one-eighth of these in the Two Sicilies. In the universities are 31 chairs of theology.—*Brit. Qu. Rev.*

The Italians are making preparations for celebrating the sixth centenary of Dante's birth, which will occur in May, 1865. A great festival is to be held at Florence. A *Journal of the Centenary of Dante* is to be published at Florence twice a month devoted to the matter.

## SWITZERLAND.

M. A. Pictet, of Geneva, has received the Volney prize of the French Academy for his treatise *Les Aryas Primitifs*.

The Committee of the Evangelical Alliance at Geneva offer a prize of 500 francs for a popular Life of Calvin, to commemorate the tercentenary of his decease: he died May 27, 1564.

M. Frederic Troyon has enriched the museum of Lausanne with 1,200 different specimens of utensils and other works, the fruit of fresh explorations in the lake of Neufchatel. These lacustrine abodes of a primitive European race still excite attention. Most of the objects are of rude manufacture—chiefly weapons and instruments of flint and stone.

According to a return just issued by the postal authorities in Switzerland, there exist in that country 345 journals, of which 185 are exclusively political, 22 literary and scientific, 20 religious (15 Protestant 5 Roman Catholic,) and one rationalist; the remainder are miscellaneous. Of these 345 publications, 231 are printed in the German language, 103 in French, 8 in Italian, and 3 in *patois*. The Canton of Berne alone has 45 journals.

## SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

The third volume of Jose Amador de los Rios' Critical History of Spanish Literature has been published at Madrid. 4to. 704 pp.

The state of theological learning in Portugal is at a very low ebb. A correspondent of the *Neue Evang. Kirchenzeitung* says he looked over the theological part of the Catalogue of the Public Library of Lisbon, (some 300,000 vols.) and found only one work on doctrinal theology of the present century, and that was written in 1817, on Antichrist. The *Gazeta de Portugal* is an able journal, edited by a man of talent—Teixeira de Vasconcelles. The *Fe Catholica* is ultramontane, edited by Ribeiro Gomes de Abreu Laurentie, who is writing for it a criticism on Renan's Life of Jesus. The late Jose d'Almada labored earnestly to awaken religious feeling, as editor of several periodicals. In one of his articles he said that "the sermons of the best pulpit orators in Lisbon were written for them by a poet"—Ferreira.

Among the latest Danish works are: Bergmann's *Sleswick Legends*, Rhinestad's *Gustavus III. and his Times*, Prof. Petersen, *Historical Sagas of the Icelanders*, 2 vols., 2d ed.; Oersted, *My Life and Times*; Schmidt's *History of Sleswick*; Holst, *Copenhagen 100 Years Ago*; Carl Petersen, *The Last Franklin Expedition*.

## SCANDINAVIA.

The Royal Library of Copenhagen contains over 400,000 volumes; it is especially rich in oriental, including Sanskrit, manuscripts, and in Icelandic MSS.

Professors C. P. Caspari and Gisle Johnson have finished the first translation of the symbolical books of the Lutheran Church (the *Concordia*) into the Norwegian language. The same Professors, with Prof. Nissen, edit the *Theologisk Tidsskrift*, now in its sixth year, devoted to



the interests of the Lutheran Church. Prof. Johnson has begun (July, 1863) to publish a church journal, the *Luthersk Kirketidende*, devoted to religion and theology. Prof. Caspari is writing a commentary on the Book of Daniel. He has also published, in the proceedings of the Academy of Science, a treatise on the work, *De Viris Illustribus*, of Hieronymus Gennadius. He stands foremost among the divines of Norway.

The work of L. Muller on the Numismatics of Ancient Africa, 3 vols., 4to., Copenhagen, 1860-62, is the most elaborate one on that subject yet published. It includes all the coins of the kingdoms in the north of Africa. It contains also very valuable researches upon the mythology and history of the region.

#### ENGLAND.

*Journal of Sacred Literature.* Jan. 1864. The Book of Daniel—showing, against Ewald, that Hippolytus regarded it as containing real prophecies: A Few Days among the Slavonic Protestants; Oriental Sacred Traditions by E. Burgess, taken from the *Bibliotheca Sacra*; The Old Test. Text and its Emendation—showing the need of a critical revision; Renan's Life of Jesus—continued; Æthiopic Liturgies, translated by Rev. J. M. Rodwell; The Tree of Life, from the German of Piper; Modern Explanations of the Life of Christ; a continuation of Dr. Hincks's able articles on the Egyptian Dynasties of Manetho. In the correspondence is a valuable discussion on the Census of Quirinus.

*British Quarterly Review.* Jan. 1864. Ecclesiastical Questions in 1864; Longfellow's New Poem, highly praised; Froude's Queen Elizabeth; British Scientific Associations, Old and New; Travels in the Himalayas; University Reform and Education—valuable; Revolutions in English History; Modern France; Prospects of Political Parties; France and Madagascar.

*The British and Foreign Evangelical Review.* Jan. 1864. Precursors of the Scottish Philosophy, by D. M'Cosh—on Shaftesbury, Carmichael and Andrew Baxter; Church History illustrated in Christian Song; the Law of Circularity, or Retrogression an Essential Element of Progress—an ingenious essay; Recent Literature of the Gospels; Church Life in Denmark—a valuable summary; Renan's Life of Jesus; Biblical Botany—"yet in its infancy"; Rev. James Sherman; Micah's Prophecy of Christ; The Beautiful Things of Earth, etc. This is a very interesting number of a valuable Review. The article on Renan is by Rev. A. Roberts, whose recent Discussions on the Gospels have awakened so much attention. He adopts the view that our Lord and his apostles used the Greek language, and makes good use of this in some of his criticisms on Renan.

*London Quarterly Review.* Jan. Penal Discipline; the Manchester Church Congress; Recent Works on Heaven; John Howe; Mexico; Scientific Nomenclatures; New Zealand; Renan's Life of Jesus.

*The Christian Remembrancer.* Jan., 1864. Eugénie de Guérin; The Song of Songs; American Church and American Union; State Papers and Calendars; Foreign Chaplaincies; the Church in Cornwall; English History during the Last Hundred Years; Hawthorne on England and the English; The Person of Christ—a review of Renan.

According to the last census, there are in England 1,673 authors, of

whom 145 are women; 8,184 booksellers; 35,483 "engaged in divinity," of whom 19,195 are of the Established Church, and 7,840 "Disseters."

Edward Irving's works are to be published in 5 vols., edited by his nephew, Rev. G. Carlyle.

Among the Theological Works announced, are an edition of the *Codex Beza*, by F. H. Scrivener; Wieseler's *Chronological Synopsis of the Gospels*, translated by Venables; *Authenticity of Daniel*, by J. M. Fuller; a new edition of Hinton's *History of Baptism*, the second volume of Rev. B. Evans's *Early English Baptists*; B. F. Westcott, *The Bible in the Church*, an account of its Reception, etc.; J. P. Lightfoot, on the *Epistle to the Galatians*; a new edition of the *Works of Bishop Butler*, by Mayor; Wm. Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible*, vols. 2 and 3; new editions of Milman's *History of the Jews*, and *Latin Christianity*; W. Cureton, *Ancient Syriac Documents*; Rev. C. H. Wright, *The Book of Ruth*, with a new collation of twenty-six MSS.; Dr. J. H. Todd, *Memoirs of St. Patrick*—an important work; Rev. T. S. Millington, *Testimonies of the Heathen to the Truths of Holy Writ*—in a form of a commentary compiled from Greek and Latin authors of the classical ages of antiquity; Jas. Buchanan, *Analogy as a Guide to Truth*: Edinburgh.

Professor Fraser, of Edinburgh, is preparing a new edition of Bishop Berkeley's works for the delegates of the Oxford Clarendon Press. He has access to important MSS. including the Bishop's Commonplace Book.

E. B. Pusey, Daniel the Prophet: Eight Lectures.

*The Museum*, Edinburgh, Jan. 1864, has an instructive article on the Württemberg Theological Seminaries, by Dr. Wagner. These Seminaries are more like the English than other German institutions. Among their pupils we find the names of Kepler, Bengel, Storr and Platt, Plank and Spittler, Andræ, Baur, Strauss, Dörner, Schwab, Mohl, the orientalist, etc.

The London announcements of forthcoming new books comprise several titles of more than common interest. We notice among them a new series of Mendelssohn's Letters; Rawlinson's History and Geography of Babylon, Media, and Persia; The Queen's English, by Dean Alford; Words and Places, by Isaac Taylor; Leslie's Life of Sir Joshua Reynolds; the Fourth and Fifth volumes of Carlyle's Life of Frederick the Great.

The Archbishop of Dublin, Richard Whately, died Oct. 8. He was born in Cavendish Square, London, in 1787, the fourth son of Rev. Dr. Whately, of Nonsuch Park, Surrey. He was educated at Oriel College, Oxford, where he graduated B. A. in 1808, taking a second class in classics and mathematics; in 1810 he gained the University prize for an English essay; in 1811 he became a Fellow of Oriel; and in 1812 he took his M. A. degree. At Oriel College Whately distinguished himself by his theological bent, attaching himself to the Liberal or Low Church, as distinct from the High Church party. In 1822 he held the Bampton Lectureship at Oxford, and in the same year he was appointed to the rectory of Halesworth, in Suffolk—a living of £450 a year. In the preceding year he married the daughter of William Pope, Esq., of Hillingdon, Middlesex. It was while he was rector of Halesworth that he became known by his theological and theologico-political writings as one of the rising intellects in the English Church.

In 1831, the Whigs being then in office, he was consecrated Arch-

bishop of Dublin and Bishop of Glendalagh; and since 1846 he had also been Bishop of Kildare. As Primate of Ireland, Dr. Whately has led a most active and influential life, taking interest as a liberal churchman in all questions of social and ecclesiastical importance, and more especially in Irish education. He was one of the Commissioners of National Education in Ireland, but resigned his connection with the Commission in 1853. His public duties as Archbishop, however, have not interfered with his continued activity as a theological writer, for until within a few months of his death his pen was constantly busy.

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#### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Dr. Shedd's *History of Christian Doctrine* has been received with marked favor; it is already in its second edition. Mr. Scribner announces an attractive list of new works; among them are—Hon. Geo. P. Marsh on *Man and Nature; or Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action*; second part of Archbishop Trench's *Synonyms of the New Testament*; H. T. Tuckerman, *America and her Commentators*; a second edition of President Woolsey's *Introduction to the Study of International Law*; a reprint of Maine's excellent work on *Ancient Law*; Benjamin M. Dwight's *Modern Philology*, 2 vols; a second series of Max Müller's *Science of Language*; another volume of Dr. Schaff's *History of the Church*, to the time of Gregory I.; Lange's *Commentary on the New Testament*, edited by Dr. Schaff, the volume on Matthew is well advanced.

## ART. X.—COLLEGE RECORD.

By E. F. HATFIELD, D. D., New York City.

## HONORARY DOCTORATES IN 1863.

June 17, Rutgers Coll., N. J.,	D. D., Rev. Cornelius Van Cleef, R. D., New Hackensack, N. J.
" " do do	do Rev. Paul D. Van Cleef, R. D., Jersey City, N. J.
" " do do	do Rev. Edward E. Rankin, P., New York City, N. Y.
" " do do	LL. D., Rev. David H. Riddle, D. D., P., Canonsburgh, Pa.
" 18, Univ. of City of N. Y.,	do Rev. Marshall Henshaw, New Brunswick, N. J.
" " do do	do Hon. Henry C. Cary, Philadelphia, Pa.
" " do do	do Hon. Joseph Allison, do
" " do do	D. D., Rev. David Crawford, P., Edinburgh, Scotland.
" " do do	do Rev. Charles H. Stewart, P., U. S. Navy.
" " do do	do Rev. D. McL. Quackinbush, R. D., New York City, N. Y.
" " do do	do Rev. F. W. Geisenhainer, L., do
" " do do	do Rev. Cor. H. Edgar, R. D., Easton, Pa.
" Hanover Coll., Ind.,	do Rev. Wm. Brand, College Hill, Ind.
" " do do	do Rev. Robert C. Matthews, P., Monmouth, Ill.
" " do do	LL. D., Charles C. Drake, Esq., St. Louis, Mo.
" 24, College of N. Jersey,	do Elijah Slack, M. D., Cincinnati, Ohio.
" " do do	do Philip R. Fendall, Washington, D. C.
" " do do	D. D., Rev. Nath. West, Jr., P., Brooklyn, N. Y.
" " do do	do Rev. David Irving, P., Morristown, N. J.
" " do do	do Rev. Charles J. Brown, " Edinburgh, Scotland.
" Columbia Coll., N. Y.,	do Rev. Morgan Dix, P. E., New York City, N. Y.
" " do do	do Rev. Robert S. Howland, " do
" " do do	do Rev. Jared B. Flagg, " Wabashaw, Minn.
" " do do	do Rev. Gilbert H. Sayres, " Jamaica, L. I.
" " do do	do Rev. Samuel H. Cox, Jr., " Utica, N. Y.
" " do do	do Rev. James A. Williams, " Orange, N. J.
" " do do	do Rev. Matson M. Smith, C., Bridgeport, Ct.
" " do do	do Rev. Thomas R. Lambert, P. E., Charlestown, Mass.
" " do do	do Rev. Henry M. Walbridge, " Toledo, Ohio.
" " do do	LL. D., Hon. William Mitchell, New York City, N. Y.
" " do do	do James W. Gerard, Esq., do
" " do do	do Rev. Sam. Elliott, D. D., Hartford, Ct.
" Kenyon Coll., Ohio,	do Prof. John A. Nichols, New York City, N. Y.
" Shurtleff Coll., Ill.,	D. D., Rev. Aaron H. Burlingham, B., do
" " do do	do Rev. Cornelius H. Taylor, P., Alton, Ill.
" Columbian Coll., D. C.,	do Rev. John Everett, Ct.
" Iowa Wes. Univ., Io.,	do Rev. Enoch G. Wood, M. E., Indianapolis, Ind.
" " do do	do Rev. O. M. Spencer, " Iowa City, Io.
" Ohio Univ., Ohio,	do do " do
" Denison Univ., do	do Rev. — Fairfield, B., Hillsdale.
" 25, Ind. Asbury Univ., Ind.,	do Rev. William W. Patton, C., Chicago, Ill.
" " do do	do Rev. Frederick Upham, M. E., Taunton, Mass.
" " do do	LL. D., Rev. Frederick Merrick, " Delaware, O.
" Cornell Coll., Iowa,	D. D., Rev. Luke Hitchcock, " Cincinnati, O.
" Genesee Coll., N. Y.,	do Rev. E. G. Anderson, do
" " do do	do Rev. H. R. Clark, M. E., Waverley, N. Y.
" Lombard Univ.	do Rev. W. H. Ryder, " Boston, Mass.
July 1, University of Pa.,	D. D., Rev. Henry E. Montgomery, P. E., New York City, N. Y.
" 2, Indiana Univ., Ind.,	do Rev. — Fairfield, B. Hillsdale.

" " Ill. Wesleyan Univ., Ill.,	do	Rev. Jonathan Stamper, M. E.,	Ill.
" " do do	do	Rev. Philo Smith, (Bish.)	
" " Marietta Coll., O.,	do	Rev. John G. Atterbury, P.,	New Albany, Ind.
" " do do	do	Rev. Samuel Wolcott, C.,	Cleveland, O.
" " do do	LL. D.,	Hon. Noah H. Swayne,	Columbus, O.
" " Trinity Coll., Ct.,	do	Hon. W. W. Boardman,	New Haven, Ct.
" " do do	do	Prof. William G. Peck,	New York City, N. Y.
" " do do	D. D.,	Rev. Riverius Camp, P. E.,	Brooklyn, Ct.
" " do do	do	Rev. George H. Clark, "	Hartford, Ct.
" " do do	do	Rev. Henry A. Colt, "	Concord, N. H.
" " do do	do	Rev. Henry De Koven, "	Middletown, Ct.
" " do do	do	Rev. James S. Purdy, "	Hyde Park, N. Y.
" " 8, Univ. of Rochester, N. Y.,	do	Rev. A. Rawenbush, B.,	Rochester, N. Y.
" " do do	do	Rev. Thomas S. Davidson,	St. George's, C. W.
" " do do	do	Rev. John P. Newman, M. E.,	New York City, N. Y.
" " do do	do	Rev. J. W. Olmstead, B.,	Boston, Mass.
" " do do	LL. D.,	Rev. A. P. Peabody, D. D., Unit.,	Cambridge, Mass.
" " do do	do	Edward P. Underhill,	London, Eng.
" " Beloit Coll., Wisconsin,	do	Hon. David Davis,	
" " do do	do	Hon. Richard Yates, (Gov.)	Springfield, Ill.
" " 9, West. Reserve Coll., O.,	do	Hon. William S. Groesbeck,	Cincinnati, O.
" " Amherst Coll., Mass.,	LL. D.,	Hon. Edward Dickinson,	Amherst, Mass.
" " do do	D. D.,	Rev. Jeremiah Taylor, C.,	Middletown, Ct.
" " do do	do	Rev. John Dunns, P.,	Edinburgh, Scot.
" " 15, Harvard University, Mass.,	D. D.,	Rev. Wm. Hague, D. D., B.,	Boston, Mass.
" " do do	do	Rev. Alonzo A. Miner, Univ.,	Worcester, Mass.
" " do do	do	Rev. J. Freeman Clarke, Unit.,	Boston, Mass.
" " do do	LL. D.,	Rev. Joseph G. Cogswell, D. D.,	New York City, N. Y.
" " do do	do	Hon. John P. Kennedy,	Baltimore, Md.
" " do do	do	Hon. Charles Allen,	Worcester, Mass.
" " 16, Wesleyan University, Ct.,	LL. D.,	Enoch L. Fancher,	New York City, N. Y.
" " do do	D. D.,	Rev. Bostwick Hawley, M. E.	Troy, N. Y.
" " do do	do	Rev. John W. Lindley, M. E.,	New York City, N. Y.
" " do do	do	Rev. L. R. Thayer, M. E.,	Boston, Mass.
" " do do	do	Rev. Oren B. Cheney, M. E.,	Me.
" " Hamilton Coll., N. Y.,	D. D.,	Rev. Azariah Eldridge, P.,	Detroit, Mich.
" " do do	do	Edward D. Morris, P.,	Columbus, O.
" " do do	do	David Torrey, P.,	Ithaca, N. Y.
" " do do	do	John J. Brandegee, P. E.,	Utica, N. Y.
" " do do	LL. D.,	Prof. James Hall,	Albany, N. Y.
" " do do	do	Hon. Charles B. Sedgwick,	Syracuse, N. Y.
" " do do	P. D.,	James S. Gardner,	Whitestone, do.
" " do do	do	Charles H. Gardner,	New York City, N. Y.
" " Hobart College, N. Y.,	D. D.,	Rev. Andrew Hull, P. E.,	Elmira, N. Y.
" " do do	do	Rev. J. J. Brandegee, P. E.,	Utica, N. Y.
" " do do	do	Rev. James Rankine, P. E.,	Geneva, N. Y.
" " do do	do	Rev. James De Koven, P. E.,	Racine, Wis.
" " do do	do	Rev. Jas. Dixon Carder, P. E.,	New York City, N. Y.
" " do do	LL. D.,	Prof. Elliott Evans,	Clinton, N. Y.
" " 23, Dartmouth, Col., N. H.,	do	Hon. Noah H. Swayne,	Columbus, O.
" " Union Coll., N. Y.,	do	Hon. Joseph Mullen,	Jeff. Co., N. Y.
" " do do	D. D.,	Rev. Thomas Richey, P. E.,	Fordham, N. Y.
" " do do	do	Rev. William Bannan,	Kingston, N. Y.
" " do do	do	Rev. Joseph E. King, M. E.,	Fort Edward, N. Y.
" " Ohio Wesleyan Univ., O.,	do	Rev. Alex. C. Martin, M. E.,	Meadville, Pa.
" " do do	do	Rev. Jefferson Hascall, "	Boston, Mass.

" "	do	do	do	Rev. S. W. Coggeshall, do.	N. Rehoboth, Mass.
" "	do	do	LL.D.,	Rev. Erasmus O. Haven, do	Ann Arbor, Mich.
" 30,	Yale College, Ct.,	do	do	Rev. Thomas Hill, D.D., Unit.,	Cambridge, Mass.
" "	Univ. of Lewisburgh, Pa.,	D.D.,	Rev. James F. Brown, B.,	Bridgeton, N. J.	
" "	Iowa College, Iowa,	LL. D.,	Hon. George G. Wright,	Keosauqua, Io.	
" "	do	do	do	Hon. John F. Dillon,	Davenport, Io.
" "	Mt. Union College, O.,	D.D.,	Rev. Thomas C. Hartshorn, P.,	Hudson, O.	
" "	do	do	do	Rev. D. L. Dempsey, M. E.,	Beaver, Pa.
" "	do	do	do	Rev. G. W. Clarke, M. E.,	Newcastle, Pa.
" "	Western Univ., Pa.,	LL.D.,	William M. Cornell, M. D.,	Philadelphia, Pa.	
Aug. 5,	Williams College, Mass.,	do	Hon. Josiah G. Abbott,	Boston, Mass.	
" "	do	do	D.D.,	Rev. John C. Holbrook, C.,	Dubuque, Io.
" "	do	do	do	Rev. P. H. Fowler, D. D., P.,	Utica, N. Y.
" "	Bowdoin College, Me.,	do	Rev. William Smyth, C.,	Brunswick, Me.,	
" "	do	do	do	Rev. Daniel McB. Graham, B.,	Portland, Me.
" 12,	Waterville Coll., do	do	Rev. Oakman S. Stearns, B.,	Newton Centre, Mass.	
" "	do	do	do	Rev. Thomas F. Curtis, B.,	Lewisburgh, Pa.
" "	Middlebury College, Vt.,	do	Rev. Martin M. Post, P.,	Logansport, Ind.	
" "	do	do	do	Rev. Erdix Tenney, C.,	Lyons, N. H.
" "	do	do	LL.D.,	Rev. John Jason Owen, D.D., P.,	New York City, N. Y.
" 13,	Pennsylvania Coll, Pa.,	D.D.,	Rev. James L. Shock, L.,	New York City, N. Y.	
" 19,	Madison University, N.Y.,	do	Rev. A. G. Palmer, B.,	Stonington, Ct.	
" "	do	do	do	Rev. W. R. Brooks, B.,	Hamilton, N. Y.
" 20.	La Fayette College, Pa.,	do	Rev. John McMaster, P.,	Princeton, Ind.	
Sept. 2,	Brown University, R. I.,	do	Rev. Andrew Pollard, B.,	Taunton, Mass.	
" "	do	do	do	Rev. James T. Chaplin, B.,	Waterville, Me.

## ERRATA.

Page 249, lines	8 and 10,	for funlt read fault.
" " "	29 and 30,	" Tinien read Tiniere.
" " "	line 34,	" primigenins read primogenius.
" 252,	" 32,	" their read there.
" 255,	" 3,	" Rollerton read Rolleston.
" " "	30,	" improbability read improvability.
" 256,	" 21,	" before if not, insert, to be based.
" 257,	" 22,	" this read that.
" 258,	" 18,	" metaphysical read metaphorical.